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Since the end of World War II, the oil and gas farmout agreement has
become nearly as important and commonplace in the petroleum industry as
the oil and gas lease. In part, this is a reaction to the increased risks and
real costs of deeper drilling. 1 The phenomenon also reflects an increase in
1. Though the average depth of wells drilled in the United States between 1975 and
1981 remained virtually the same (4.531 feet average in 1975 versus 4,501 feet average in
1981), average drilling costs increased 155% from an average of $177,793 to $453,691. See
1986 ENERGY STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK 45, 47, 49, 51, 63, 66–67, 109–10, 116–117. During
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sophistication and a proliferation of small oil companies, both of which
resulted from sharp increases in real prices for oil and gas in the 1970s.2
Though farmout agreements are ubiquitous in the late 1980s,
practitioners and scholars have not standardized farmout agreements to the
degree that they have oil and gas leases. Parties often enter into farmout
agreements on the basis of informal “letter agreements.” Legal writers have
given relatively little attention to provisions and interpretative problems of
farmout agreements. 3 Yet, one does not need a crystal ball to predict that
farmout agreements will demand an increasing percentage of the time of oil
and gas lawyers and of the courts as the years go by. The purpose of this
Article, therefore, is to analyze the structure of typical agreements and
consider some of the problems and alternatives that practitioners must
confront in drafting or reviewing farmout agreements.4
that same time period. United States natural gas reserves decreased 12% from
approximately 228,000,000 MMCF to 201,500,000 MMCF, while United States oil reserves
declined 10% from approximately 32,700,000,000 barrels to 29,500,000,000 barrels. Id.
2. The average price of crude oil at the wellhead in the United States increased from
$3.89 per barrel in 1973 to $31.77 in 1981. See id. at 295. The average price of natural gas
at the wellhead increased from 21.6 cents per MCF to $1.98 during the same period. Id.
Partly in response, United States employment in oil and gas extraction increased from
approximately 273,900 in 1973 to a peak of 708,300 in 1982. Id. at 395.
3. Though none are comprehensive, several excellent papers address issues of farmout
agreements. See 1 L. MOSBURG, STRUCTURING EXPLORATION DEALS ch. 3 (1983); T. FAY,
DRAFTING STANDARD FORM FARMOUT AGREEMENTS (A.B.A. Sec. Nat. Res. L. Monograph
Series No. 1, 1986); Bledsoe, A Detailed Look at Farmout Agreements, ADVANCED OIL, GAS
AND MINERAL LAW COURSE, 1986 TEX. OIL, GAS & MIN. L. SEC. N-l; Brown, Assignments of
Interests in Oil and Gas Leases, Farm-Out Agreements, Bottom Hole Letters, Reservations
of Overrides and Oil Payments, 5 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 25 (1954); Cage,
Anatomy of A Farmout, 21 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 153 (1970); Glass, Farmout
Agreements, WORKSHOP ON BASIC OIL AND GAS INSTRUMENTS, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RES.
L.; Himebaugh, An Overview of OH and Gas Contracts in the Williston Basin, 59 N.D. L.
REV. 7 (1983); Klein & Burke, The Farmout Agreement: Its Form and Substance, 24 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 479 (1978); Lamb, Farmout Agreements—Problems of Negotiation and
Drafting, 8 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 139 (1963); Schaefer, The Ins and Outs of Farmouts:
A Practical Guide for the Landman and the Lawyer, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1
(1986); Scott, How to Prepare an Oil and Gas Farmout Agreement, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 63
(1981).
4. This Article is made possible by a grant from the Oil, Gas & Mineral Law Section
of the Texas State Bar Association, and by the assistance of dozens of lawyers and landmen
who responded to the author’s request for suggestions and who provided more than one
hundred example agreements. Those who responded included: Carol B. Arnold, Houston;
David M. Arnolds, Denver; L.L. Atwell, Jr., Midland; Karen A. Berndt, Houston; Henry C.
Brumley, Wichita; Wilson H. Busby, Tulsa; Lewis C. Cox, Roswell; Wayne Cummings,
Dallas; Shonnie L. Daniel, Tulsa; Andrew B. Derman, Dallas; Frank Douglass, Austin;
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Farmout agreements are important tools of a big business, and only the
creativity of draftsmen and negotiators limits the options that the parties
may consider. While this Article does not cover everything that one might
want to know about farmouts, it does attempt to cover the basic issues that
an agreement must address and to collect representative language. Even in
these respects, however, the Article is not complete. In particular, many
types of clauses are omitted because the author could not find examples
within the time strictures of writing.
I. What Is a Farmout?
An oil and gas farmout agreement is an agreement by one who owns
drilling rights to assign all or a portion of those rights to another in return
for drilling and testing on the property. 5 The individual or entity that owns
the lease, called the “farmor” or “farmoutor,” is said to “farm out” its rights.
The person or entity that receives the right to drill, referred to as the
“farmee” or “farmoutee,” is said to have “farmed in” to the lease or to have
entered into a “farm-in agreement.”
The origin of the term “farmout” is not clear. Professor Hemingway has
said that the term’s use goes as far back as ancient Roman times, when the
state transferred the right to collect certain taxes to private individuals who

Theresa U. Fay, Dallas; Terry Noble Fiske, Denver; Douglas B. Glass, Houston; James C.T.
Hardwick, Tulsa; Terry E. Hogwood, Houston; Albert D. Hoppe, Houston; Charles C.
Keeble, Houston; C. Glyn King, Midland; Robert F. LeBlanc, Tulsa; Robert W. Lee, Tyler;
William J. Legg, Oklahoma City; Pat Long, Amarillo; Thomas W. Lynch, Dallas; Charles F.
Mansfield, Tulsa; Martha L. Marshall, Oklahoma City; Clyde O. Martz, Denver; Peter C.
Maxfield, Laramie; Steven F. Meadows, Dallas; George J. Morgenthaler, Minneapolis;
Joseph W. Morris, Tulsa; R. Clark Musser, Oklahoma City; Kevin McDonald Myles,
Denver; Ljubomir Nacev, Tulsa; W.F. Pennebaker, Midland; James M. Piccone, Denver;
David E. Pierce, Topeka; Howard F. Saunders, III, Amarillo; Hugh V. Schaefer, Denver;
John R. Scott, Dallas; Richard S. Simms, Houston; Ronald T. Sponberg, Midland; Ernest E.
Smith, Austin; Jeanmarie B. Tade, Houston; Anthony F. Winn, Pittsburgh; and Thur W.
Young, Pittsburgh. Sample provisions quoted throughout this Article are taken from
example agreements provided unless the source is otherwise identified.
The author gratefully acknowledges also the support of Margaret Carpenter, his
secretary, and the research assistance of Anne L. Box, Mark A. Haney, Charles L. Hamit,
Brett M. Godfrey, and Eric Carlson, while they were students at the University of Tulsa
College of Law. Of course, the responsibility for the statements made remains with the
author.
5. E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND
GAS LAW 624 (1986).
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received a fee for their services. 6 Other commentators have attributed
“farmout” to the term used in baseball:
[I]n the oil and gas industry it has substantially the same
connotation as it has in the more familiar baseball vernacular.
Like the rookie ballplayer who may be farmed out to a minor
league team for further training, an oil and gas lease may be
farmed out for development. In baseball, the major league team
frequently retains some kind of interest in the player, and the
grantor in a farm-out transaction retains some kind of property
interest in the oil and gas lease.7
Whatever the term’s origin, “farmout” has become firmly entrenched in the
oil and gas industry, though the courts did not use it until 1957.8
Farmout agreements must be distinguished from other commonly
encountered kinds of oil and gas contracts such as operating agreements,
support agreements, and seismic options. An operating agreement is an
agreement between owners of the right to drill in an area that sets out the
rights and duties of each in operations on the property subject to the
contract. 9 The primary distinction between an operating agreement and a
farmout agreement is functional. A farmout agreement is a contract by
which one party earns an interest in an oil and gas lease owned by another,
while an operating agreement is entered into to define the rights and duties
of parties who already own joint interests in a lease or a drilling unit and to
combine those interests for joint operations. Another distinction is that the
farmee “carries” the farmor for all or a portion of the drilling costs in a
farmout, while the parties to an operating agreement generally share the
costs of drilling. Typically, those who enter into a farmout agreement also
will execute an operating agreement to govern their rights after they have
performed the farmout contract. 10
A support agreement, sometimes referred to as a contribution agreement,
is a contract by which one party agrees to contribute money or acreage to
another party in return for geological information developed by the drilling
6. Hemingway, The Farmout Agreement: A Story Short But Not Always Sweet, 1
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT NO. 2 (1985).
7. C. RUSSELL & R. BOWHAY, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES U 7.02
(1986).
8. Cage, supra note 3, at 153–54. Cage asserts that the court in Petroleum Fin. Corp. v.
Cockburn, 241 F.2d 312, 313 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), first used the term “farmout.”
9. J. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 350 (1983).
10. See infra notes 346–51 and accompanying text.
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operations of the other. 11 Subtypes of support agreements are typically
described by reference either to the conditions upon which payment will be
made or to the form of the contribution. A dry hole agreement is a support
agreement in which the obligation to make payment is conditioned upon the
drilling of a dry hole. 12 A bottom hole agreement is a support agreement
that conditions the obligation to pay upon drilling to total depth and
testing. 13 An acreage contribution agreement typically looks very much like
a bottom hole agreement, except that the contribution for drilling and
testing comes in the form of interests in property that the contributing party
owns, rather than in money. 14
Support agreements are closely related to farmout agreements,
particularly farmout agreements for the purpose of exploration and
evaluation. A well drilled under a support agreement is located on a lease
owned by the drilling party, while under a farmout agreement a well is
drilled on a lease owned by the contributing party. Timing may be the
functional distinction. If the support agreement develops positive
information, the party who agreed to make the contribution may follow it
up by proposing a farmout. Indeed, in a variation upon an acreage
contribution agreement, the contributing party will promise to farm out
designated property if the drilling party will test its own lease.
A seismic option agreement may also be preliminary to a farmout
agreement. A seismic option agreement is a contract in which one party
agrees to conduct geophysical tests on the property of another, with the
option or obligation to farm into or to buy a specified amount of acreage
thereafter. 15 Parties often use a seismic option when they deal with large
leases in unexplored areas.
Many problems are common to operating agreements, support
agreements, seismic option agreements, and farmout agreements,16 all of
11. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 347.
12. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW 255 (1987).
13. Id. at 84.
14. Id. at 14.
15. See Vander Ploeg, Particular Problems in the Structuring of Broad Area
Exploration Contracts, 5 E. MIN. L. INST. § 14.01 (1984); Himebaugh, supra note 3, at 31–
32.
16. See L. MOSBURG, supra note 3, ch. 2 (support agreements); A. DERMAN, JOINT
OPERATING AGREEMENT: A WORKING MANUAL (A.B.A. Sec. Nat. Res. Monograph Series
No. 2, 1986) (operating agreements); Hardwick, AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement—
1982: Changes and Continuing Concerns, 1982 ROCKY MTN. MIN. LAW SPEC. INST, ON OIL
AND GAS AGREEMENTS (operating agreements); Moore, Joint Operating Agreements—Is
There Really a Standard That Can Be Relied Upon?, 5 E. MIN. L. INST. § 15.01 (1984)
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which may be described as “exploration agreements.” Frequently parties
make agreements that encompass more than one kind of contract and blur
the distinctions made here. Nonetheless, these distinctions are helpful for
analytical purposes and they reflect the practice of the oil and gas industry.
II. The Structure of a Farmout
The interaction of two major factors determines the structure of a
farmout agreement, the way that its essential terms are put together. One is
the tax rules applicable. The other is the purposes of the farmor and the
farmee in entering into the agreement.
A. The Applicable Tax Rules
Farmout agreements are drafted with a wary eye upon the Internal
Revenue Code. In fact, complicated tax rules dictate the structure of a
farmout agreement. This section reviews the basic tax concepts that apply
to farmouts and explains how they affect the arrangements that the parties
negotiate.
1. Intangible Drilling Costs
The intangible drilling cost (IDC) deduction provides a very important
incentive to the oil and gas industry. Section 263(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code grants the IDC deduction.17 It permits those who drill oil or gas wells
to take a deduction against current income for the intangible costs of
drilling and completing wells. 18 Intangible drilling costs are generally
defined as those costs that have no salvage value in themselves and are
“incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of
wells for the production of oil and gas.” 19 Intangible drilling costs include
(operating agreements); Vander Ploeg, supra note 15, § 14.01 (seismic options and support
agreements); Young, Oil and Gas Operations: Who Does What, To Whom, For Whom, and
Who Pays, How, and When, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1651, 1652 (1982) (operating
agreements); Young, Oil and Gas Operating Agreements: Producers 88 Operating
Agreements, Selected Problems and Suggested Solutions, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 197,
198 (1975) (operating agreements).
17. I.R.C. § 263(c) (West Supp. 1987).
18. Id. The deduction is subject to many limitations. Noncorporate taxpayers who
deduct IDCs may be subject to minimum taxes and may be limited to the amounts actually at
risk. See C. RUSSELL & R. BOWHAY, supra note 7, 11.01–.06, 14.19. Integrated oil
companies must capitalize a portion of intangible drilling costs under I.R.C. § 291(b), (c)
(West Supp. 1987), and all who claim the deduction are subject to the recapture provisions
of id. § 1254.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
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the costs of wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, and supplies used in drilling,
fracturing and cleaning wells, site preparation, and construction of derricks,
tanks and pipelines necessary for the drilling and preparation of wells for
production. 20 Intangible drilling costs typically amount to between 50% and
80% of the total costs of drilling and completing an oil or gas well. The
IDC deduction makes oil and gas investments attractive to tax-oriented
investors because intangible drilling costs are such a large percentage of the
total costs of drilling and completing a well. The IDC deduction allows
investors to drill up their profits at the end of each year. 21
The IRS has limited the IDC deduction by applying what may be called
the “complete payout” limitation.22 Simply stated, the limitation provides
20. Id. For a list of typical costs incurred in the exploration and development of oil and
gas and a suggested treatment of such costs for intangible drilling costs deduction purposes,
see C. RUSSELL & R. BOWHAY, supra note 7, ¶ 14.12.
21. See C. RUSSELL & R. BOWHAY, supra note 7, H 14.11-A. The percentage depletion
provisions of I.R.C. § 613A are also important.
22. See Rev. Rul. 71-207, 1971-1 C.B. 160; Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1971-1 C.B. 105; Rev.
Rul. 70-336,1970-1 C.B. 145, modified, Rev. Rul. 80-109, 1980-1 C.B. 129; Rev. Rul. 69332, 1969-1 C.B. 87. The language of the first three revenue rulings is virtually identical:
Section 263(c) of the Code, as implemented by section 1.612-4 of the
Income Tax Regulations, provides an option to charge to capital or to expense
the intangible drilling and development costs incurred in the drilling of oil and
gas wells. This option is available only to an operator who is defined as one
who holds a working or operating interest in any trace or parcel of land either
as a fee owner or under a lease or any other form of contract granting working
or operating rights. Section 1.612-4(a)(3) of the regulations, however, provides
the following limitation on the option which is pertinent here:
* * * except that in any case where any drilling or development project is
undertaken for the grant or assignment of a fraction of the operating rights, only
that part of the cost thereof which is attributable to such fractional interest is
within this option. . . .
Thus, the limitation in the regulations is operative if the drilling and
development project is undertaken “* * * for the grant or assignment of a
fraction of the operating rights * * The carrying party will have undertaken the
drilling and development project for the entire working interest only if he holds
the entire working interest throughout the complete pay-out period. If the
carrying party holds the entire working interest for a period that is less than a
complete pay-out period he will have undertaken the drilling and development
project for the fraction of the operating rights that he receives as his
“permanent” share in the mineral property.
Rev. Rul. 70-336, 1970-1 C.B. at 145 (emphasis added). For similar language see Rev. Rul.
71-207, 1971-1 C.B. at 160 and Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1971-1 C.B. at 105.
The language quoted does not address whether an agreement would satisfy the complete
payout test if the definition of payout in the farmout agreement did not require that the
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that one may not claim an IDC deduction except to the extent that (1) one
actually pays or accrues the expense, and (2) one will own the working
interest for which the payment is made for the complete payout period. 23
One cannot take a tax deduction for intangible drilling costs paid for by
another. For example, if a farmor and a farmee were to enter into a farmout
agreement on a 50% “straight-up” basis, with the farmor contributing the
farmed out lease, the farmee paying all costs of drilling and completing the
well, and the farmor and the farmee sharing operating costs and profits
equally, 50% of the total IDC deduction would be lost. The farmee, who
actually paid 100% of the costs, could deduct only the 50% of the IDCs that
it paid because it would earn only 50% of the working interest. The farmor
would be entitled to no IDC deduction because the farmor paid none of the
intangible drilling costs. Thus, a potential tax benefit would be lost24 and
the farmee would suffer a substantial increase in the cost of performing the
agreement.
Because of the complete payout limitation, farmout agreements are
drafted in a way that often seems strange to those who are not aware of the
tax rules. The farmee earns an interest in the working interest of the drill

farmee retain the working interest until payout, but in fact the farmee did retain it. In Rev.
Rul. 80109, 1980-16 C.B. 129, modifying Rev. Rul. 70-336, however, the IRS concluded
that the mere possibility of a premature termination of the farmee’s interest was
disqualifying.
23. Rev. Rul. 70-336, 1970-1 C.B. at 145; Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1970-1 C.B. at 105; Rev.
Rul. 71-207, 1971-1 C.B. at 160. The language of the revenue rulings is virtually identical as
to the definition of the “complete payout”:
The determination of the complete pay-out period requires an interpretation of
the carried interest agreement and the performance of the parties under the
agreement. As a general principle, however, the period ends when the gross
income attributable to all of the operating mineral interests in the well (or wells,
in the case of agreements covering more than a single well) equals all expenditures for drilling and development (tangible and intangible) of such well (or
wells) plus the costs of operating the well (or wells) to produce such an
amount.
Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1970-1 C.B. at 105. See Rev. Rul. 70-336, 170-1 C.B. at 145–46, and
Rev. Rul. 71-20, 1971-1 C.B. at 161, for similar language.
24. The farmee’s tax benefit may not be irrevocably lost, because the farmee could
capitalize the portion of the IDCs not deducted and recover the IDC through cost depletion
over the productive life of the well. The parties likely will substantially discount a deferred
tax deduction in making their deal, however, so that for practical purposes it may be
considered lost. Moreover, if the farmee qualifies for percentage depletion under I.R.C. §
613A, capitalized costs effectively are lost because percentage depletion may be taken on a
zero basis.
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site acreage equal to the percentage of the costs that it pays. The farmee, for
example, would earn 100% working interest for paying 100% of the drilling
and completion costs, 75% working interest for paying 75% of drilling and
completion costs, etc. The farmor, which typically has a substantial
investment in the lease, provides for a flow of income by retaining a
nonoperating interest such as an overriding royalty interest. The farmor will
often retain the right to “back in” to a working interest in the well site
acreage after “payout,” that is after the farmee has recovered all of its costs
of drilling, completing, and producing the well. The IRS has accepted such
transactions as qualifying the farmee to deduct the full percentage of IDC it
pays so long as there is no possibility that the farmee’s working interest in
the drill site acreage will end before complete payout of the costs of
drilling, completing, and operating. 25
2. Sharing Arrangements and Revenue Rule 77-176
The IRS generally recognizes a farmout agreement as a “sharing
arrangement,” which it has defined as a transaction in which one party
makes a contribution to the acquisition, exploration, or development of a
mineral property and reserves as a consideration an interest in the property
to which the contribution is made. 26 A sharing arrangement does not trigger
recognition of income for tax purposes because the transfer of a property
interest for development is treated as formation of a new economic venture,
rather than as a sale of property or services.27 The Internal Revenue Code
contains several sections that permit sharing arrangement treatment to the
formation of new businesses. 28 IRS administrative memoranda, rather than
specific code provisions, have recognized farmouts as sharing

25. See Rev. Rul. 80-109, 1980-1 C.B. 129. For an example of the strictness of the IRS
position, see infra notes 340–43 and accompanying text. Although the logic of the revenue
rulings should permit a farmee to claim a fraction of the IDCs as long as the complete
payout limitation is met for that fraction, the black letter law of the revenue rulings states
that the farmee must hold 100% of the operating rights until payout. See P. MAXFIELD & J.
HOUGHTON, TAXATION OF MINING OPERATIONS U 9.04[5][b][ii] (1987).
26. Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730 (1941). A general counsel memorandum is an informal
statement of principle for guidance of agency personnel.
27. See P. MAXFIELD & J. HOUGHTON, supra note 25, §§ 9.01–.05.
28. See I.R.C. § 351 (West Supp. 1987) (no gain or loss recognition on exchange of
property for stock of corporation); Id. § 721 (no gain or loss recognition to partnership or
any of its partners when contribution of property is made to partnership in exchange for
interest in capital and profits).
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arrangements. 29 The IRS reasons that the exchange of interests for
development in a farmout agreement constitutes a contribution by the
parties to a pool of capital. The parties to a farmout agreement therefore do
not recognize income from the farmout transaction. A farmout is treated as
a tax-free transfer, which has been a very important incentive to its use by
the industry.
The little world of farmout agreements turned upside down in 1977 when
the IRS changed the rules of the game with Revenue Ruling 77-176. 30
29. See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933). In Palmer the United States Supreme
Court characterized oil and gas in place as a reservoir of capital investment of the parties
who agree to share in production. Id. at 557. The Court reasoned that parties to a pool of
capital should consider transactions involving assignments of interests in oil and gas that
required the assignees to assume all or part of the burden of exploitation as contributions. Id.
at 557–58. The IRS adopted the “pool of capital” concept in Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730
(1941). In Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730 the IRS recognized that the drilling party under a
farmout agreement could deduct the full amount of intangible drilling costs paid or incurred
if that party complied with the complete payout limitation discussed above. One source
interprets Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730 to mean that acquiring an interest in a mineral property
in return for services related to development of the property does not result in income either
to the person performing the services or to the person receiving the services if three
conditions are met:
First, . . . if the interest received is an economic interest in mineral in place
for depletion purposes . . . and only if such interest is acquired for services or
equipment related to exploration or development. An interest would, therefore,
not qualify if it was received for services rendered after the property was
developed, if it was not an economic interest in mineral in place, or if it was
otherwise unrelated to development. . . .
....
Second, an economic interest in the mineral in place must be the agreedupon consideration for the services or equipment in order to be received
without tax. . . .
Third, the economic interest must be in the property to which the
contribution is made.
A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INVESTMENTS ¶ 5.02, at 5-2 to
-3 (1985) (footnotes omitted). The typical farmout transaction does not result in realization
of income by either the farmor or the farmee because it meets these three conditions. See
also Linden, Income Realization in Mineral Sharing Transactions: The Pool of Capital
Doctrine, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 487, 508–09 (1981) (discusses income
realization in typical farmout transaction).
30. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77, 79. A revenue ruling is the IRS’s formal
statement of its position regarding a particular fact situation and the reasoning for that
position. A revenue ruling is not law, but effectively warns taxpayers that failure to comply
with the position taken will result in a tax assessment. See M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE H 3.03[2][a] (1981).
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Revenue Ruling 77-176 modified application of the sharing arrangement
concept to farmouts that involved transfers of interests in acreage outside of
the well site by declaring the well site acreage and the outside acreage to be
separate properties. 31 Thus, while the transfer of interest in the well site
acreage in exchange for drilling remained sheltered from tax as a sharing
arrangement, the IRS treated the interest in acreage outside of the well site
acreage as a separate transfer subject to tax.32
An example may help in understanding Revenue Ruling 77-176. Assume
that Y owns a 640-acre lease subject to 40-acre spacing. Assume that Y and
X enter into a farmout agreement by which Y agrees to assign to X 100% of
the working interest in a 40-acre well site plus 50% of the working interest
in the 600 acres outside the well site tract, with Y reserving a 1/ 16th
overriding royalty interest in production from the well site tract and an
option to convert that overriding royalty interest into a 50% working
interest after payout of the initial well. Assume further that Y’s basis in the
50% interest in the 600 acres outside the well site earned by X is $6,000,
but that the market value of the 50% interest in the outside acreage when it
is actually transferred is $100,000 because the transfer occurs after the

31. Rev. Rul. 77-176 reasoned as follows:
Before the assignment of the working interests to X in the instant case, the oil
and gas lease was, within the meaning of section 614(a) of the Code and
section 1.614-1 (a) of the regulations, one property in the hands of Y. Upon
assignment, X received two separate economic interests in the tract or parcel of
land, each such interest being a separate section 614 property [apparently
because of the difference in the percentage of the working interests owned in
the drill site and the surrounding acreage.] The entire working interest in the
drill site to which X made a contribution in the form of drilling was one
property, and the undivided one-half of the working interest in the portion of
the tract exclusive of the drill site was a second property. Likewise, Y retained
two separate properties in the tract or parcel of land. The overriding royalty
interest reserved in the drill site was one property, and the undivided one-half
of the working interest retained by Y in the balance of the tract exclusive of the
drill site was a second property.
Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77, 79.
32. Rev. Rul. 77-176 concluded that:
Because the acreage exclusive of the drill site is a property separate from
that to which the development contribution was made, drilling by X on the drill
site did not represent a capital investment in the development of the acreage
exclusive of the drill site, and the Federal income tax consequences of the
transfer from Y to X of the undivided one-half of the working interest in such
acreage is not determined under the pool of capital concept.
Id. at 79–80.
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drilling of an initial well on the well site tract has proved the outside
acreage.
Revenue Ruling 77-176 reasons that neither Y nor X is subject to any tax
as a result of the transfer of interest or the conduct of drilling operations
upon the well site acreage. Since Y transfers to X an interest in the well site
in exchange for development of the well site, the transaction is a sharing
arrangement. The transfer of the interest in the remaining 600 acres, however, relates to another property. The transfer of that interest does not
qualify as a sharing arrangement because X has made no contribution to the
development of the outside acreage. Drilling the well is viewed as
developing only the separate property of the well site acreage. Revenue
Ruling 77-176 therefore concludes that Y has received taxable income equal
to the difference between its basis of $6,000 in the fractional interest in the
outside acreage assigned and the fair market value of $100,000 at the time
of the assignment. 33 X, on the other hand, is deemed to have received
$100,000 of taxable income, since its drilling expenditures are not a capital
investment in the development of the property of the outside acreage. Both
Y and X therefore have incurred a tax liability, but the transaction has
generated no cash flow for either to use to pay taxes. Tax lawyers call this
nightmare “phantom income.” 34
The IRS made application of Revenue Ruling 77-176 prospective only. 35
In addition, commentators have criticized its reasoning and a successful
challenge may yet be forthcoming. 36 Nonetheless, the ruling is a major tax
33. Y may be subject to tax at ordinary or capital gains rates depending upon whether
the transaction occurred before or after the effective date of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
provisions relating to capital gains and whether Y is considered a “dealer.” Cf. Corn Prods.
Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (corn futures not capital assets since integral
part of taxpayer’s manufacturing business).
34. See D. WINDISH, TAX-ADVANTAGED INVESTMENTS ch. 16 (2d ed. 1985).
35. The revenue ruling specifically states that it will apply retroactively “to transfers
made before April 27, 1977, or to transfers made pursuant to binding contracts entered into
before such date.” Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. at 79–80. In addition, the IRS issued a
technical advice memorandum indicating that it would not apply related theories reaching
the same result to pre-April 27, 1977, transactions. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-11-005 (Nov.
19, 1982).
36. See Crichton & Griffin, Securities Problems and Tax Implications of Oil and Gas
Investments by Non-Industry Financiers, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1333, 1392–97
(1982); Gregg, Oil and Gas Farmouts—Implications of Revenue Ruling 77-176, 29 INST. ON
OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 601 (1978); Note, New Tax Treatment of Oil and Gas Farm-Outs: A
Threat to Domestic Production, 15 HOUS. L. REV. 387 (1978). Most of the criticisms of the
reasoning of Rev. Rul. 77-176 center upon application of § 614 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Note, supra, at 388–414. The revenue ruling describes interests transferred in the drill
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trap for the oil and gas industry, and a variety of devices have been suggested to avoid or minimize it.37 Among the most popular suggestions are
(a) avoiding the transfer of an interest in “outside” acreage; (b) structuring
the farmout to minimize the value of outside acreage transferred; and (c)
redefining the “property” subject to the farmout by use of a tax partnership.
a) Assign No Outside Acreage
Y and X can avoid Revenue Ruling 77-176 entirely if the farmout
transfers no interest in any acreage outside the well site tract. Then there is
only a single transaction relating to a single property, and the sharing
arrangement concept protects both Y and X from recognizing income. No
tax is due if Y and X agree that X will earn 100% of the working interest in a
40-acre drill site tract in exchange for drilling a well on a 640-acre lease,
subject to a 1/16th overriding royalty interest reserved to Y that Y can
convert upon payout of the well to a 50% working interest in the well site
tract.
The problem with this transaction lies with its economic structure, not its
tax structure. Limiting the interest earned to the well site tract strips from
the farmout much of the incentive for X. There is a severe limit on the profit
opportunity for X if the farmout’s purpose is to explore undeveloped leases.
A farmee will not easily decide to take 100% of the risk of drilling a
wildcat well 38 in return for a 50% interest in the well subject to an
overriding royalty burden and no interest in development wells. In order to
make the business deal workable between Y and X, Y will probably have to
provide X with additional incentives. For example, Y may have to accept a
lower overriding royalty and agree to accept a lesser percentage back-in, or
even give up the back-in altogether. These possibilities may make the
transaction less attractive to Y, and yet still be insufficient to satisfy X.

site and in acreage outside the drill site, which are parts of the same lease, as separate
property within the meaning of § 614(a) of the Code. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77, 79.
A strong argument to the contrary is that since both interests were working interests in the
same lease they should be treated as interests in a single property under § 614(b). Only one
reported case, Burke v. Blumenthal, 504 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Tex. 1980), to date has
challenged the validity of Rev. Rul. 77-176. In Burke the plaintiff sued for declaratory
injunctive relief arguing that the revenue ruling appeared “unconstitutional, unlawful, null
and void” because it erroneously interpreted §§ 61 and 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. Burke, 504 F. Supp. at 37 n.l. The federal district court dismissed the case on the
grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 36.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 38–59.
38. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 12, at 974.
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Thus, while the parties can easily avoid the tax consequences of Revenue
Ruling 77-176, the economic cost may be unacceptable.
A less certain variation on the theme of avoiding Revenue Ruling 77-176
by transferring no interest in outside acreage is for Y to agree to assign to X
100% of the working interest in the entire 640 acres in return for drilling a
well on the 40-acre drill site tract. The 640-acre assignment from Y to X
may be subject to a 1/16th overriding royalty, which X can convert upon
payout as to the well site acreage, or at any time as to the outside acreage.
Thus, while X will own the entire working interest in the entire 640-acre
tract, if X decides to drill an additional well on the property, Y will be able
to convert its interest in the additional acreage and participate in drilling as
a working interest owner.
This device is less certain to avoid taxation than the first alternative.
While the form of a transaction that avoids the transfer of an interest in an
outside acreage is maintained, the substance is not.39 It is highly probable
that the initial well drilled on the property will drain no more than the 40acre drilling unit established. That is the purpose of the state in establishing
the drilling unit. If so, X’s contribution to drilling will develop only the well
site acreage and X will receive an extra interest in outside acreage. Y’s right
to convert its overriding royalty interest in the outside acreage will add fuel
to the fire of the argument that the substance of the transaction is the same
as that considered in Revenue Ruling 77-176. Thus, the IRS may regard the
outside acreage as a separate property under Revenue Ruling 77-176 and
assess tax on that acreage. Since the market value of X’s 100% working
interest in the outside acreage subject to y’s right to convert will be roughly
the same as the value of X’s interest after the conversion has taken place,
the tax liability should be approximately the same as if the parties had not
selected the illusory form.
A final variation of avoiding Revenue Ruling 77-176 by assigning no
outside acreage in the farmout agreement is to make the farmee’s earning
an interest in the well site acreage contingent upon performance by drilling,
but to give the farmee a noncontingent option to acquire additional interests
in the outside acreage at an agreed price. 40 The farmout transaction is split

39. That substance prevails over form in taxation matters is well-established. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465, 470 (1935); West v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723, 727 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
795 (1945).
40. The following example illustrates a noncontingent option to purchase an interest in
outside acreage:

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

280

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

into two parts. In one the farmee earns by drilling. In the other, a
supposedly unrelated transaction, the farmee buys an option to drill
additional wells at a fixed price. If the farmor may terminate the option if
the farmee fails to drill the initial well, however, this device may be
attacked as a sham, or IRC section 83 may cause the surrounding acreage to
be valued and taxed to the farmee after the well is drilled.41 In addition, the
purchase option must be at fair market value, or the farmee as well as the
farmor may be required to recognize income. 42
b) Minimize the Value for Revenue Rule 77-176 Purposes
Another general approach to Revenue Ruling 77-176 structures the
farmout agreement between Y and X so that, while the revenue ruling may
still trigger the adverse tax effect, its impact will be minimized. A present
assignment, an assignment of the working interest in acreage outside the
well site contemporaneous with execution of the farmout agreement, is one
method. Another method is to structure the agreement so that the farmee

Farmee, upon execution of this agreement, shall be entitled to purchase an
undivided ____% of Farmor’s interest in the ____ 1/4 of Section ____,
Township ____, Range ____, County ____, ____, limited to the depth stated
above and without warranty of title express or implied. Farmee shall pay
Farmor for such interest at a rate of $____ per net mineral acre, proportionately
reduced. Such payment shall be made no later than ____ from the date of
Farmee’s execution hereof.
41. I.R.C. § 83 (Supp. III 1985), provides in part:
If, in connection with performance of services, property is transferred to any
person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess
of—
(1) the fair market value of such property . . . at the first time the rights . . .
are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property,
shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services in
the first taxable year in which the rights . . . are transferable or not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable.
Id. One commentator has argued that Congress did not intend § 83 to apply to farmout transactions. Linden, supra note 29, at 531–33. The IRS, however, has given some indication that
it does not agree. See Lofgren, Eccentric Orbits—A Tax Overview of Oil and Gas
Transactions, 7 E. MIN. LAW INST. 12-1, 12-25 to -27 (1986).
42. The transaction, structured as a separate sale of the option to drill on the outside
acreage, is subject to tax. I.R.C. § 83 (Supp. III 1985). If the farmee pays a fair price for the
option, it recognizes no taxable income. Id. Whether or not the option price is fair, the
farmor receives taxable income to the extent that the value of the option exceeds its allocated
basis.
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earns a restricted drilling option, rather than a portion of the working
interest in the outside acreage.
(1) Present Assignment
If Y assigns its interest to X at the time that they enter the farmout
agreement, rather than after the earning well has been drilled, the tax effect
should be less burdensome for both Y and X because the value of the
interest in the outside acreage will be less. Suppose that in the hypothetical
situation discussed above 43 Y assigned X 100% of the working interest in
the well site acreage and an undivided 50% of the working interest in the
additional acreage at the time that they executed the farmout agreement. By
the logic of Revenue Ruling 77-176, the value of the additional property
transferred should be determined as of the time the contract was executed. 44
Furthermore, the value should be substantially less since the drilling of the
earning well has not yet proved the outside acreage. For example, assume
that in the hypothetical situation above, the parties agreed to a present
assignment of half the working interest in the acreage outside the well site
tract at the time that they executed the farmout agreement, and that the fair
market value of that interest at the time of assignment was $10,000.
Revenue Ruling 77-176 would cause both Y and X to recognize income for
tax purposes, but Y’s taxable income would be the difference between the
fair market value of $10,000 and Y’s $6,000 basis. X’s income would be
$10,000, rather than $100,000. Both Y and X would receive phantom
income, but at levels with which they probably could cope.45
Present assignment presents both practical and theoretical difficulties,
however. The major practical problem is what Y can do if X does not drill
the well. By its present assignment, Y has given up the control provided by
withholding the assignment of interest until after performance.
Unfortunately, neither of the commonly encountered solutions is entirely
43. See supra text accompanying notes 30–34.
44. Rev. Rul. 77-176 reasons that Y and X’s taxable income is determined by the fair
market value of the interest transferred in the acreage outside the well site at the time of the
transfer, because that is when the transaction is consummated. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1
C.B. 77, 79–80. If the transfer takes place at the time of the execution of the farmout
agreement, the value should logically be set at that time.
45. The present assignment also appears attractive because it should avoid the neverresolved tax issue of whether transfer of an interest in acreage outside the well site after
completion of an earning well under a farmout agreement is transfer of a “proven” property
within I.R.C. § 613A(c)(9) (West Supp. 1987) so that percentage depletion is unavailable to
the farmee. If the transfer of interest takes place before the drilling of the earning well, the
property almost certainly cannot be proven.
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satisfactory. One solution is to draft the agreement so that the interest
assigned to X is regained by Y if X does not drill the earning well. Providing
in the farmout agreement for the reassignment of the interest by X may
accomplish this result. If X is unable or unwilling to drill the earning well,
however, X may likewise be unable or unwilling to make the reassignment.
This problem can be overcome by (1) placing a fully executed reassignment
in escrow at the time that the farmout is executed, (2) by drafting the
present assignment in the form of a sublease that automatically terminates if
the farmee does not perform, 46 or (3) drafting the present assignment in a
nonrecordable form and simply refusing to provide the farmee with a
recordable assignment until the farmee has performed. Whether these
convoluted structures will stand up under the IRS’s scrutiny, however, is a
matter for concern. Only a property lawyer is likely to view as significant
the difference between an interest that is vested in the farmee subject to
defeasance if the farmee does not perform and one that is contingent upon
drilling the earning well.
46. The following example illustrates a sublease that terminates automatically upon a
farmee’s failure to perform:
Farmor hereby subleases and assigns to farmee, its successors and assigns, for
the term hereinafter specified, the following rights in the farmout leases:
(1) All of Farmor’s right, title and interest in the Farmout Leases insofar
as the Farmout Leases cover lands lying within the Drilling and
Spacing Unit within which the Earning Well is located; and
(2) an undivided % of Farmor’s right, title and interest in the Farmout
Leases insofar as the Farmout Leases cover the balance of the
Farmout Lands;
subject, however, to the reservation to Farmor, its successors and assigns, of
Farmor’s Reserved Interest [provided for elsewhere in the agreement], and of
all other interests in the Farmout Leases and Farmout Lands not expressly
subleased and assigned to farmee.
This sublease and assignment will remain in effect until the Commencement
Date [of drilling operations], and so long thereafter as Farmee shall remain in
compliance with the Earning Conditions. Upon satisfaction by Farmee of the
Earning Conditions, this sublease and assignment shall remain in effect for so
long as any of the Farmout Leases, or any extensions or renewals thereof,
remain in effect as to any portion of the Farmout Lands; provided that, upon
completion of the Earning Well, this sublease and assignment shall terminate
insofar as the Farmout Leases cover depths below the Farmout Depth.
Upon the expiration of the term of this sublease and assignment, all rights in
the Farmout Leases shall revert to Farmor, its successors and assigns, free and
clear of all liens, encumbrances, burdens or obligations created by or through
Farmee, its successors or assigns.
L. MOSBURG, PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS IN EXPLORATION AGREEMENTS 218–20 (1982).
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A risk also exists that IRC section 83 will apply to unravel the purpose of
the assignment. Section 83 provides that an interest subject to a “substantial
risk of forfeiture” is to be valued at the time that that substantial risk no
longer applies, rather than when the interest is received. 47 When the interest
assigned to the farmee is subject to reassignment, perfection by recording,
or reverter, section 83 arguably will defer valuation of that interest in the
outside acreage until (and if) the farmee actually fulfills its obligation, and
the outside acreage is no longer subject to a risk of forfeiture.48
A second possible solution is for the farmor to forgo the right to obtain
back the interest conveyed to the farmee, and instead to couple the present
assignment with the farmee’s covenant to drill the earning well secured by a
liquidated damages provision 49 and a performance bond or other security. 50
While this solution will work in theory, it is likely to prove very difficult to
negotiate or to put into effect.
(2) Assign Continuous Restricted Options
Another way to minimize the effect of Revenue Ruling 77-176 is to
structure the farmout agreement so that X earns no working interest in
acreage other than the drill site, but acquires successive options to drill
additional wells on the outside acreage. For example, the farmout
agreement may provide that X, by drilling the initial well, earns a
nonassignable option to drill an additional well at a location of its choice on
the outside acreage within three months of completion of the earning well.
Exercise of the option may earn another option, and so forth.51 As an
47. See supra note 41.
48. Larason, How to Structure the Farmout and Avoid Its Pitfalls, in MATERIALS ON OIL
AND GAS CONTRACTS 127–28 (J. Lowe ed. 1986).
49. For a discussion of liquidated damages provisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 239–41.
50. For an example of a performance bond clause, see infra note 242.
51. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group v. Tarina Oil Co., 664 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1983, no writ), in which the farmout provided that:
You agree that in the event we timely commence the re-entry operations
upon the C-l well, we shall have an option for a period of one-hundred twenty
(120) days from the date said well is recompleted as a producer of oil or gas . . .
to reenter the Cooke B-l well located on the lands described under lease No. 1
above and to re-work said well . . . .
In the event we have timely commenced re-entry operations upon the B-l
well, you grant to us an option for a period of one-hundred twenty (120) days
from the date we either recomplete said well as a producer of oil or gas or abandon same as a dry hole, to re-enter the Cooke A-l well located on the lands
covered by leases Nos. 2 through 5 as listed above, . . . .
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alternative, the parties may draft the agreement so that the farmee earns an
interest in the outside acreage by drilling an initial well in the drill site, but
an interest that automatically terminates unless continuous drilling occurs. 52
Assigning continuous restricted options may avoid Revenue Ruling 77-176,
since it is not within the ruling’s literal terms. More likely, however, this
structure will merely minimize the value of the outside interest earned. A
restricted option possesses some minimal fair market value, but it is
minimal, at least until several successful exercises of the option greatly
increase the value of the remaining acreage subject to the successive
options.
Again, however, the attempt to frame the farmout agreement to avoid or
minimize Revenue Ruling 77-176 has a price that Y and X may not wish to
pay. The restricted option minimizes the effect of Revenue Ruling 77-176
because the economic value of a restricted option is substantially less than
the economic value of an unrestricted working interest in the outside acreage. Both Y and X will take the economic truth into account in their
dealings. All other things being equal, X will find it less attractive to enter
into a farmout agreement with Y in which X takes the risk of drilling to earn
a restricted option to drill rather than an unrestricted working interest. The
result appears to be that either properties that would have been drilled
before the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 77-176 will not be drilled, or Y
will have to give other incentives to induce X to enter into the agreement.
Id. at 174. For a discussion of “completion” and similar terms, see infra text accompanying
notes 189–95.
52. For example:
If the test well is completed as a well capable of producing oil and/or gas in
paying quantities, then, unless Farmoutee shall commence another well within
one hundred twenty (120) days after completion of the test well, there shall be
effective as of the date hereof, an automatic reversion to Assignor of the
interest hereby assigned to all acreage in the farmout area that is not included in
a governmentally prescribed proration or drilling and spacing unit for the test
well.
Subsequent wells must also be commenced within one hundred twenty
(120) days after completion of the preceding well. All such wells shall be
drilled to a depth sufficient to test the same intervals or formations productive
in the test well in which commercial production is established. Cumulative
credit shall be given for faster drilling. Farmoutee shall not be required to drill
any additional wells, but when Farmoutee fails to commence any well within
the prescribed period, there shall be an automatic reversion to Assignor of the
interest hereby assigned, effective as of the date hereof, except as to each tract
(as described above) upon which there is located a well capable of producing
oil or gas in paying quantities.
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c) The Tax Partnership
The most popular device to avoid Revenue Ruling 77-176 is the tax
partnership. By forming a partnership for tax purposes, but not for state
property law purposes because that would expose them to joint and several
liability, 53 Y and X can circumvent the revenue ruling’s conclusion that the
outside acreage earned by X is a separate property. 54 This is done by using
IRC section 721—the same section of the tax code that categorizes
contributions to the capital of a partnership as a nontaxable sharing
arrangement—to designate both the well site acreage and the additional
acreage as the “property” of the tax partnership.55 The parties accomplish
this designation by using a typical farmout agreement with the special
provision that the parties agree not to elect out of Subchapter K of the
Internal Revenue Code 56 and agree to allocate income and deductions
specially on a partnership return.57 The economics of the farmout
arrangement remain virtually the same as before Revenue Ruling 77-176;
only the form is different.
To the nontax lawyer, a tax partnership may sound like a classic example
of form over substance, but it appears that the IRS has tacitly accepted its
effect. Shelter from the ravages of the revenue ruling is not without cost,
however. In order to establish a valid tax partnership, a partnership return
53. See infra text accompanying notes 406–33.
54. For a definitive discussion of tax partnerships, see Gregg, supra note 36, at 627–39.
Mr. Gregg, however, concludes that a formal partnership is the safest way around Rev. Rul.
77-176. Gregg, supra note 36, at 632; see also Priestly, Tax Partnerships in the Oil and Gas
Industry, THE LANDMAN, June 1983, at 9 (discusses formal tax partnerships); Wegher,
Taxation of Earned Interests—The Impact of Revenue Ruling 77-176, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 521 (1978) (discusses tax partnerships).
55. I.R.C. § 721 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
56. The following provision is from a tax partnership agreement attached to a farmout
agreement:
1. Notwithstanding any provisions of the above referred to Farmout Agreement
or Operating Agreement to the contrary, the parties hereto have agreed not to
elect to be excluded from the application of Subchapter K of Chapter 1 of
Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and all amendments thereto
(hereinafter called the “IRC”) and similar provisions of the State Income Tax
Law. The parties further agree to the provisions hereof regarding the reporting
of income, gains, losses, expenses, costs, and credits for Federal and State
income tax purposes.
57. Taxpayers may allocate profits and losses without recognition of income, so long as
these profits and losses cannot be valued immediately. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d
286, 288–91 (7th Cir. 1974). A transfer of property, however, could result in income under
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1 (1956).
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must be prepared and filed annually, so long as the partnership is in
existence. 58 Preparation of the partnership return requires substantial
expenditures for legal, accounting, and administrative support that many
companies begrudge. Furthermore, some are concerned that regulations
recently issued under IRC section 704(b) will interact with section 613A
and section 704(c) to undermine the economic attractiveness of a farmout
where a tax partnership is used. 59
d) Conclusion
Revenue Ruling 77-176 provides a classic example of bad tax policy. It
has not raised substantial revenues. Indeed, it has probably cost the
government taxes, because the major oil companies that are the focus of
IRS compliance audits are well aware of its requirements. They have hired
the necessary lawyers, accountants, and administrative personnel to analyze
farmout proposals for Revenue Ruling 77-176 implications and to prepare
the documents necessary to minimize or avoid it. As a result, major oil
companies rarely violate the tenets of the ruling. In addition, they deduct
the cost of the lawyers, accountants, administrative staff, and support
facilities that they rely upon for compliance. Of course, the IRS must pay
for the auditors and support facilities that it needs to audit for Revenue
Ruling 77-176 compliance, as well. Though no figures are available, it is a
fair bet that Revenue Ruling 77-176 has resulted in a net loss of tax dollars
when compliance and auditing costs are considered.
In addition, the IRS seemingly chooses to enforce the ruling selectively.
Substantial numbers of tax assessments would result if the IRS would audit
the little players, the thousands of “ma and pa” oil companies that have
never heard of Revenue Ruling 77-176 to say nothing of the devices to
avoid it. Such audits have not taken place, however, probably because the
IRS has concluded that it would be politically unpopular and would throw
many companies into bankruptcy while raising little revenue.

58. I.R.C. § 6031 (Supp. III 1985). Some lawyers and accountants that I have talked
with believe that the partners can terminate a tax partnership in the tax year following its
creation. Others are concerned that quick termination may throw into question the
“substantial economic effect” required to make the tax partnership work in the first place.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2) (as amended 1985).
59. See Lofgren, supra note 41, at 12-27; see also Houghton, Braden & Harris, Housing
Your Mineral Activities in the Right Structure, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 6-01, 6-03 to 04 (1985) (discusses substantial economic effect of operation of tax partnerships).
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In short, Revenue Ruling 77-176 should embarrass tax policy makers. As
long as the ruling remains IRS policy, however, there is a major tax trap for
the unwary in farmout transactions.
B. The Purposes of the Parties
Any one or a combination of several factors may motivate the parties to a
farmout agreement. Because the goals of the parties profoundly affect the
structure of the agreement, a brief consideration of the parties’ purposes is
worthwhile.
1. The Farmor’s Purposes in Entering an Agreement
The management of an entity that owns an oil and gas lease may wish to
farm out that lease for a variety of reasons. Any list of reasons must include
(a) lease preservation, (b) lease salvage, (c) risk sharing, (d) exploration and
evaluation, (e) access to market, (f) obtaining reserves, and (g) drilling an
“obligation” well. In each case, the farmor gives up a portion of its interest
in its lease or leases to another to further what it regards as its own interests.
a) Lease Preservation
Oil and gas leases are typically drafted to expire at the end of a primary
term, 60 and oil companies frequently find themselves holding leases that
they evaluate as good risks, but that they cannot test or develop within their
primary terms. The inability to act may result from cash or credit shortages,
inadequate number or skills of personnel, corporate reorganizations, or even
managerial inefficiency. Whatever the precise reason, the lessee’s rights
under a typical oil and gas lease terminate automatically and completely at
the end of the primary term unless the lessee or an assignee is conducting
drilling operations. Automatic termination wipes out in an instant all of the
money that the lessee may have spent acquiring and evaluating the
prospect, and ends the lessee’s prospects of developing the resources
covered by the lease. Though far more oil and gas leases terminate at the
end of their primary terms than are drilled, lease termination is an anathema
to oil companies. Drilling is considered the natural order of things both by
potential farmors and potential farmees. A primary motivation of farmors in
entering into farmout agreements, therefore, is to prevent lease termination.

60. The lease primary term is an option period, during which the lessee can hold the
leased property without obligation to drill. See E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E.
SMITH, supra note 5, at 127.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

288

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

When lease preservation is a strong motivation, one may expect
relatively liberal farmout terms. The object of the contract is to entice the
farmee to drill. The farmor’s main goal is not achieved if that is not done.
Thus, while drilling may be an obligation of the farmee, and completion of
a well capable of production is certain to be a requirement, 61 testing
requirements are likely to be minimal, and the percentage of interest earned
and the acreage earned by the well are likely to be high, though the farmor
will try to retain deep rights.
b) Lease Salvage
Far more frequently than farmors admit, their motivation to farm out is
to try to salvage something of value from a lease that the farmor’s
geologists and geophysicists evaluate as a poor prospect. As one
correspondent wrote me, “We are liberal with farmouts because our goal is
to get anything done on an area we have condemned. If something is found,
we are that much better off.” While this motivation may seem at first blush
to be akin to P.T. Barnum’s “bigger fool” theory, oil and gas exploration is
such an uncertain science that the farmor’s specialists are as likely to be
wrong as to be right. The farmee is free to draw its own conclusions as to
whether and how to proceed. When the farmee suspects that the farmor may
be seeking to salvage its lease, the agreement should provide that the
farmor make its geologic and geophysical information and evaluations
available and, if drilling is an obligation, that the farmee will have a
reasonable period of time after receiving the information to withdraw from
the agreement. 62
A salvage motivation is closely related to a lease preservation
motivation. The distinction is that when lease preservation is the
motivation, the farmor would drill if it could, while when salvage is the
motivation, the farmor has decided that it does not wish to drill. Both
motivations are similar, however, in that the farmor hopes to end up with an
interest in production without spending any more money. Where the
farmor’s purpose in farming out is to salvage its lease, the terms of the
farmout will be similar to those found when its goal is lease preservation,
but may be even more liberal. The farmor’s focus is likely to be the size of
61. To maintain the lease in its secondary term, a well capable of producing in paying
quantities must exist, even if the lease savings provisions are to be relied upon to preserve it.
See id. at 171–80, 187–98. Thus, a “drill to earn” farmout serves little purpose if lease
preservation is the primary goal.
62. For a discussion of farmout clauses requiring the sharing of geological and
geophysical information, see infra text accompanying notes 163–64.
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its retained interest. In addition, drilling is likely to be an option rather than
an obligation, because the farmor has relatively little to lose if the farmedout property is not drilled.
c) Risk Sharing
Modern oil and gas wells are tremendously expensive to drill in
comparison to wells drilled in the earlier years of the United States oil and
gas industry. 63 When confronted with drilling costs that may reach tens of
millions of dollars, few companies are so big that risk sharing is not an
attractive option. While a lessee may prefer a sale of a portion of its lease
coupled with a joint operating agreement, because it permits the lessee to
remain in control of operations, the lessee may also consider farming out,
particularly if the proposed farmee is considered to be a good operator.
Where the farmor’s primary purpose in farming out is risk-sharing, the
parties may structure the farmout agreement much like a joint operating
agreement: drilling will be an obligation rather than an option, the farmee
will earn its interest merely by drilling, the farmor may share a part of the
costs, and the farmout may cover multiple wells.
d) Exploration and Evaluation
Sometimes the goal of a farmor’s management in farming out is to obtain
geological information from its leases so that it can evaluate other leases
that it holds in the same area. Although the farmor in this situation hopes
that the farmee’s operations will yield production, the farmor’s primary
purpose in entering the agreement is similar to its purpose in entering into
an acreage contribution agreement. The farmor wants the information that
drilling operations will produce, whether or not drilling operations locate
hydrocarbons.
When the farmor’s primary purpose in farming out is to develop
exploratory information, the contract will emphasize the tests to be
conducted in the course of drilling, the formations to be tested, and the
depth to be drilled. The number and complexity of the tests that they require
typically distinguish exploratory farmouts from other kinds of farmouts.
Exploratory farmouts are also likely to contain area of mutual interest
clauses, 64 which obligate the farmor and the farmee to share leases on
properties that may look attractive as a result of the exploratory drilling.
Whether drilling is an option or an obligation, whether the farmee will earn
63. See supra note 1.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 372–77.
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by completing a well capable of production or merely by drilling to a
specified depth and testing, and what percentage interest will be earned in
what acreage are all matters that will depend upon the bargaining leverage
of the parties.
e) Access to Market
A lessee is unlikely to drill even good geologic prospects if it lacks
access to market. Though there is always a market for oil, logistical
problems such as lack of manpower or transport in the area may make
marketing impractical. When there is a surplus of natural gas, an operator
may find it impossible to locate a buyer at any reasonable price. Thus,
another possible motivation for a lessee to farm out leases is to acquire
access to markets for the production anticipated from drilling. Giving an
interest to an operator that has the capability to market may be the best deal
available to a farmor.
When access to market is the farmor’s motivation to offer the farmout,
the parties will probably structure the agreement much like an agreement
motivated by lease preservation. Terms are likely to be liberal, testing
requirements are likely to be minimal, and production to earn will be
required. The farmor will insist, however, upon placing the burden of
marketing upon the farmee. The farmor will either retain an overriding
royalty convertible at its option 65 or require the farmee to agree to market
the farmor’s share of production on the same terms and conditions that the
farmee obtains for itself.
f) Obtaining Reserves
Yet another motivation for one who owns a lease to farmout is to obtain
commitment of the reserves that may be discovered by drilling on the lease.
Obtaining reserves is a common motivation for pipelines to farm out leases
they hold, particularly in times of gas shortages. Pipelines have a legal
obligation to make gas available to their customers. Their primary business
is transporting and selling gas, not exploration and production. Therefore,
pipelines often build up inventories of oil and gas leases with the intention
of farming them out to producers who will drill on them and sell the gas
back. Refining companies may follow a similar procedure. Pipelines and
refiners sometimes establish their own exploration subsidiaries.
When obtaining reserves is the farmor’s motivation, the key provision in
the farmout agreement will be a “call” on production by the farmor or a
65. See infra text accompanying notes 301–14.
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commitment to a gas contract.66 The farmor will prefer a firm commitment
to drill from the farmee, and if the farmor has the bargaining leverage, it
may impose onerous testing requirements that will help it evaluate other
leases that it may hold in the area. Commonly, however, the terms of a
farmout agreement motivated by obtaining reserves will be very liberal
except for the call or commitment provisions.
g) To Drill an “Obligation” Well
While oil and gas leases typically impose no express obligation upon the
lessee to drill wells, drilling may be an implied obligation. Even during the
primary lease term, the courts require the lessee to protect against drainage,
if the lessee can do so profitably. 67 When the lease is being held by
production, and a reasonable, prudent operator would drill additional wells
or explore further, the law implies an obligation upon the lessee to protect
the interests of the lessor. 68 When the appropriate means of protection,
development or exploration is to drill, the industry refers to the drilling of
an “obligation well.” 69
The hallmark of an obligation well farmout is that the farmee will have a
binding legal obligation to drill on the farmed-out acreage. Since the
farmor’s primary purpose in farming out is to relieve itself of legal liability
to its lessor, an obligation to drill is essential. All other issues are
negotiable.
2. The Farmee’s Purposes in Entering into a Farmout
The farmee’s purposes in entering into a farmout agreement often mirror
the motivations of the farmor. The farmee may be interested in entering into
66. See infra text accompanying notes 399–405.
67. In most states, this is true even though the lessor has accepted delay rental
payments. Rentals waive the covenant to test, but not to protect against drainage. Texas Co.
v. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872, 875–77 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928, judgmt aff’d). But see. e.g.,
Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmaier, 161 Ark. 26, 255 S.W. 37, 38–39 (1923) (lessor
not entitled to recover damages for lessee’s failure to explore and develop gas wells on
leased premises when lessor accepted payments of annual rentals under oil and gas lease
providing that payment thereof in lieu of drilling well should continue lease).
68. In Texas and Oklahoma, apparently no implied obligation to explore further exists
separate from the implied covenant to develop. But see Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v.
Jackson, 715 S.W.2d 199, 201–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ granted)
(lessee may be obligated to conduct further development operations on leased premises if
further exploration would be beneficial to both lessee and lessor). For discussion of the issue
and its significance see J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 292.
69. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 12, at 563.
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a farmout because (1) the farmout is the quickest or cheapest way to obtain
or expand an acreage position or to obtain reserves; (2) the farmee may
have cash, or equipment and personnel that it wishes to keep busy; (3) the
farmee may highly evaluate a property that the farmor has dismissed as a
poor prospect; or (4) the farmee may want to become active in an area, but
be unwilling or unable to take the risks alone.
In addition, a farmee may be interested in a farmout proposal simply
because it is available. Oil company landmen are inveterate deal makers. It
is not uncommon to find a particular company involved in substantial
numbers of farmouts both as a farmor and as a farmee without any clear-cut
pattern to the trades.
III. Preparing and Analyzing the Farmout Agreement
The process of preparing a farmout agreement or analyzing a proposed or
disputed agreement is very much the same. In each case, the drafter must
scrutinize the essential provisions of the instrument both separately and in
their relationship to the structure of the agreement. This section of this
Article considers that process in relation to preliminary or background
matters, the key characteristics of the farmout agreement, and issues that
must be addressed.
A. Preliminary Matters
1. Reputation and Solvency
Some deals should not be made. The best drafted contract cannot fully
protect a party from another who is a knave or a fool. The farmor and the
farmee must both confront the possibility of substantial losses if the
farmout transaction proves unsuccessful. People in the oil industry
sometimes forget this basic principle, particularly in the press of an attempt
to maintain a lease about to expire. A review of a farmout agreement should
begin by asking questions about the reputation and solvency of the
proposed business partner.
2. Reasonableness of the Proposal
The second step in the review of a farmout proposal or agreement should
be to consider what is reasonable for the parties to agree to do, given the
circumstances of time and economics. How long until the leases to be
farmed out will expire? Are drilling rigs readily available? How likely is it
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that title curative will be required? 70 Will it be necessary to obtain
conservation orders 71 or to comply with special conservation rules? 72 A
transaction that cannot be consummated is not a good business deal.
3. Preliminary Negotiations
Parties often negotiate farmout agreements through an exchange of
letters. Disputes may arise over whether the parties have formed a binding
contract, or whether they have merely engaged in preliminary
negotiations. 73 Smith v. Sabine Royalty Corp. 74 illustrates the problem. In
Sabine Royalty Corp. Sabine, a fractional mineral interest owner, wrote
Smith, another mineral interest owner who had expressed an interest in
acquiring the right to drill, proposing terms under which it “would be
willing” to lease to Sabine’s subsidiary, which in turn would farm out to
Smith. 75 The letter concluded: “If you wish to pursue this arrangement,
please let us know and the appropriate instruments will be forwarded for
your review.” 76 Without replying, Smith drilled on the premises and
claimed the right to a farmout of Sabine’s interest. A Texas court of civil
appeals rejected the claim on the ground that the parties had never agreed to
be bound. 77
70. The farmout agreement should entitle the farmee to all of the farmor’s title information. Often, the farmout agreement specifically provides for this right. See infra note 161 for
an example of language that provides for title information to be delivered to the farmee. As a
practical matter, however, title information may be made available to the farmee before the
parties form the agreement so that the farmee can evaluate the feasibility of drilling within
the time proposed.
71. In Oklahoma, for example, extensive title work prior to obtaining orders from the
Corporation Commission spacing property for drilling is required. See Harry R. Carlile Trust
v. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 732 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3871 (U.S.
June 30, 1987). In Carlile the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that publication notice to those
whose interests are affected by spacing is constitutionally insufficient if the applicant could
ascertain their identity with due diligence, because establishment of spacing units is an
adjudicative function of the Corporation Commission. Id. at 444. Locating those owners and
giving them notice is time-consuming as well as expensive.
72. In Texas, for example, the Railroad Commission may require special proceedings if
the farmout well is to be drilled on an exception tract under rule 37, or if sour gas may be
anticipated under rule 36.
73. See generally Trower, Enforceability of Letters of Intent and Other Preliminary
Agreements, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 347 (1978) (discusses whether parties have
formed binding contract or have merely engaged in preliminary negotiations).
74. 556 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1977, no writ).
75. Id. at 367.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 368–69.
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A more recent case on point is Getty Oil Co. v. Blevco Energy, Inc. 78
Blevco Energy requested a farmout of certain leases from Getty, and Getty
replied that “Getty Oil will farmout to Blevco Energy, providing a mutually
acceptable agreement can be resolved . . . .” 79 Subsequently, however,
Getty drilled upon the property itself and completed an excellent well.
Blevco sued Getty, and the trial court awarded Blevco Energy $2 million in
actual damages and $4 million in punitive damages. The appellate court
reversed on the grounds that no contract existed; the parties had merely an
agreement to agree.80
These cases suggest that the best course is to state clearly in any letter
exchange whether or not the parties intend to create a binding agreement. 81
In addition, an offer to farmout should be subject to a specific termination
date. 82
At least two writers have urged that farmout agreements ought not be
entered into in the form of “letter agreements,” an exchange of letters, or a
letter signed by both of the parties. 83 Letter agreements may be a perfectly
adequate vehicle for a contract, of course, and they are appealing because of
their apparent simplicity. The problem is that “the nature of a letter
agreement makes it improbable that the parties have included detailed
provisions which will apply in the event the transaction does not progress as
expected.” 84 The better practice is to take the extra step of preparing a
formal farmout agreement.85
78. 722 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1986, no writ).
79. Id at 53–54.
80. Id. at 54.
81. See Schaefer, supra note 3, at 18-1, -8; see also infra note 85 (illustrates language
used in this type of farmout agreement).
82. The following clause limits the duration of the farmout offer: “9. EXECUTION.
This Farmout Agreement shall be null and void at Farmor’s option if the duplicate original
hereof enclosed herewith is not executed by Farmee and returned to Farmor within — days
after the date shown below Farmor’s signature.” T. FAY, supra note 3, at 48.
83. Cage, supra note 3, at 156; Scott, supra note 3, at 65.
84. E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 618. Petroleum Fin.
Corp. v. Cockburn, 241 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1957), exemplifies the complications that may
occur with letter agreements. In Petroleum Pin. Corp. the parties disagreed, and the court
found that the letters and telegrams exchanged were ambiguous as to whether the farmor
warranted a present title subject to defeasance or merely agreed to transfer merchantable title
in the future. Id. at 317–18.
85. The parties might include the following language, modeled upon language
suggested by Schaefer, supra note 3, at 18-9, in routine proposal letters:
[insert if the parties intend to be bound] We agree that the copy of this letter
executed by both of us shall constitute a binding agreement between us to all of
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4. Satisfying the Statute of Frauds
Virtually all United States jurisdictions have adopted the statute of frauds
to minimize disputes and fraud. The rationale for the statute is that certain
kinds of agreements are so prone to dispute and outright fraud that they
should be unenforceable unless they are evidenced by a writing. 86
Farmout agreements fall within the scope of the statute of frauds if they
are contracts for the transfer of an interest in land. 87 Most states probably
will so classify farmout agreements, whether the interest created by an oil
and gas lease is viewed as an estate in land or as a profit à prendre, 88 and
whether the form of the contract is an agreement to convey or a conditional
transfer. An oil and gas lease creates an interest in land whether it is
classified as a fee simple determinable estate in the minerals or a profit à
prendre. The lease’s subject matter is an interest in land 89 whether the
farmout agreement is in the form of a bilateral contract or a unilateral
contract. Only in states that treat the oil and gas lease as a mere license can
one argue that the farmout agreement need not comply with the statute of
frauds. Courts will likely apply the statute even in those states, however. 90

the terms and conditions set forth. We anticipate, however, that we will execute
a formal farmout agreement at a later date, the provisions of which will replace
and supersede this agreement in all respects.
[insert if the parties do not intend to be bound] We agree, however, that this
is a preliminary letter of intent that shall not create any legally binding obligations between us until we have executed a formal farmout agreement.
86. The recital to the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1677), stated that its object was
the “prevention of many fraudulent Practices, which are commonly endeavored to be upheld
by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury.” See also Willis, The Statute of Frauds—A Legal
Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427 (1928) (discusses historical background of statute of frauds).
87. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §4 (West 1986). Interestingly, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(4) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1987) applies only to contracts for
the “sale of real estate.” In any event, an oil and gas lease is “real estate” under Texas law,
and a farmout agreement is subject to the statute of frauds. White v. McNeil, 294 S.W. 928,
930–31 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1927, no writ).
88. See E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 109.
89. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 29.
90. Although Kansas, for example, has embraced the ownership-in-place theory of oil
and gas rights, Kansas considers an oil and gas lease as personal property, a mere license.
Nonetheless, Kansas courts have held oil and gas leases subject to the statute of frauds. For
an excellent discussion, see D. PIERCE, KANSAS OIL AND GAS HANDBOOK § 4.11 (1986). See
also Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352 (N.D. 1986), holding that an oral
agreement or bonus, royalty, and delay rentals did not create an enforceable contract even
though the parties agreed to use a “standard form.”
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Compliance with the statute of frauds does not require a formal contract.
Compliance occurs if there is “some memorandum or note thereof . . . in
writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith” or that party’s
agent. 91 On the other hand, it is not enough that there is a formal instrument. To comply with the statute of frauds, a contract must identify the
parties and the subject matter, and a bilateral contract requires
consideration. 92
a) Authority of an Agent
A common statute of frauds issue that arises in a variety of oil and gas
contract contexts is the authority of the agent who executes the contract.
Most oil and gas contracts are between corporations, partnerships,
limited partnerships or other forms of business entities, rather than
individuals, because of the magnitude of the financial obligations involved.
The question of whether or not the individual who purports to act for a
corporation or a limited partnership actually has the authority to act is
always a potential problem.
Representations in the agreement can minimize the problem. While
representations of agency cannot create powers that do not exist, they may
stimulate a disclosure of limited authority from the negotiator. Furthermore,
if others in the negotiator’s organization who have authority to bind it are
aware of the negotiator’s representations, a basis for a finding of apparent
authority may be laid. 93 The only certain way to ensure that the agent
signing the agreement has authority is to require a properly executed power
of attorney or a certified copy of evidence of authority.
b) Designation of the Parties
The statute of frauds requires that the parties to the agreement be
identifiable. 94 Failure to do so will cause the agreement to be
unenforceable. Cohen v. McCutchen 95 provides a good example. In Cohen
the contributing party made and signed a support agreement proposal in a
91. 8 Stat. 405, § 4, 24 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 4; Lynch v. Davis, 181 Conn. 434, 435 A.2d 977,
980 (1980).
92. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 131 (1979).
93. Apparent authority is “[S]uch authority as a principal intentionally or by want of
ordinary care causes or allows third person to believe that agent possesses.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 88 (5th ed. 1979); see also W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §
8(D) (1964) (similar definition of apparent authority).
94. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
95. 565 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1978).
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form that failed either to state the name of the party to receive the
contribution or to provide for his signature. 96 The Texas Supreme Court
upheld summary judgment against the administrator of the estate of the
party who was to receive the contribution on the ground that the statute of
frauds requires that both parties be identifiable from the written agreement
or supporting memoranda. 97
The statute of frauds does not require that the parties to a contract for the
transfer of an interest in land be named. 98 Compliance with the statute
occurs if they are described sufficiently to permit their identity to be
established by parol evidence. Thus, a reference in a farmout agreement to a
“farmor” who is the “owner” of specifically described leases should satisfy
the statute. 99
There are important practical reasons, however, for specifically naming
the parties to the farmout agreement and indicating addresses and telephone
numbers of each in the agreement. Under the terms of the agreement or in
the event of emergencies, notices may need to be given or communication
established. Having the vital information ready at hand in the body of the
agreement will save time and minimize confusion. A well-drafted farmout
agreement will have no difficulty meeting the statute of frauds requirement
that the parties be identifiable.
c) Identification of the Land Covered
The agreement must sufficiently describe the land subject to a farmout
agreement to permit it to be located to meet the standard of the statute of
frauds. 100 This requirement can pose a problem, particularly in those
farmout agreements that are in letter form and refer only generally to the
leases and areas covered. Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil 101
illustrates the principles applicable. In Westland an area of mutual interest
clause in an assignment of the farmee’s rights under a farmout agreement
provided as follows:
5. If any of the parties hereto, their representatives or assigns,
acquire any additional leasehold interests affecting any of the

96.
97.
98.
99.
1982).
100.
101.

Id. at 232.
F. & W. Grand Co. v. Eiseman, 160 Ga. 321, 127 S.E. 872, 876 (1925).
See id., 127 S.E. at 875 (reference to “lessor” as “owner” held sufficient).
See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908–11 (Tex.
Id. at 908.
637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982).
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lands covered by said farmout agreement, or any additional
interest from Mobil Oil Corporation under lands in the area of
the farmout acreage, such shall be subject to the terms and
provisions of this agreement. 102
The Texas Supreme Court held that the reference to “lands covered by said
farmout agreement” satisfied the statute of frauds because the letter
agreement specifically identified “said farmout,” and the farmout
agreement identified contained a specific description of the land subject to
the leases. 103 The court deemed the reference to “lands in the area of the
farmout acreage” insufficient to permit introduction of parol evidence to
determine the intent, however. 104 The court said that parol evidence “should
be used only for the purpose of identifying the land with reasonable
certainty from the data in the memorandum, and not for the purpose of
supplying its location or description.” 105
A similar issue with a similar result arose in Stekoll Petroleum Co. v.
Hamilton. 106 In Hamilton the farmout arrangement extended to the farmee
the right to choose 4000 acres from a 5000-acre block of land, leaving the
farmors with 1000 acres “equitably checkerboarded in a fashion similar to
the checkerboarding in” another block. 107 The Texas Supreme Court held
that the agreement failed to describe adequately the property in question
because the agreement did not clearly define the checkerboard pattern and
because the contract did “not contain the statement of data or means or a
method by which . . . the land will be certainly and clearly identified.” 108
These two cases illustrate that the description of leases subject to the
farmout agreement must be as detailed and explicit as possible. The parties
should use a proper legal description, rather than a plat map. 109 The
description should include the legal description of the property, the source
102. Id. at 905.
103. Id. at 909.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 910; see also Getty Oil Co. v. Blevco Energy, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 1986, no writ) (failure of any writing to identify property allegedly subject
to farmout agreement provided court alternative ground for reversing trial court).
106. 152 Tex. 182, 255 S.W.2d 187 (1953).
107. Id. at 188–90, 255 S.W.2d at 191.
108. Id. at 190–92, 255 S.W.2d at 192.
109. In Heirs & Unknown Heirs of Barrow v. Champion Paper & Fibre Co., 327 S.W.2d
338 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court of appeals held that a map
of a subdivision drawn on a scale of one inch to 800 feet was too uncertain to fix the location
because “even the width of a line drawn upon the map must represent several feet.” Id. at
347.
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of the legal description, the names of the lessor and lessee, and the
recording information for the leases farmed out. The description may also
refer to depth limitations or lease burdens. The information frequently will
be so lengthy that it will be included in an exhibit attached to the farmout
agreement. 110
d) Consideration
The statute of frauds requires that consideration, expressly or impliedly
stated in the agreement, must support a bilateral contract.111 Farmout
agreements occasionally specifically recite that monetary consideration has
been given, 112 though whether it is actually paid is often doubtful. When the
farmout agreement makes drilling an obligation of the farmee, however,
one can find consideration in the promises that the parties make to one
another. Consideration in the form of a promise for a promise is the essence
of a farmout agreement in which drilling is mandatory. The more typical
option-to-drill farmout agreement may be classified as a unilateral contract,
which needs no consideration. 113
5. Coordination with Farmed-Out Leases
It is axiomatic that the farmee can get no better rights under a farmout
agreement than the farmor owns under the leases subject to the agreement.
Often, however, the parties to a farmout agreement fail to examine the
terms and the validity of the leases farmed out. Rarely are proposed farmout
agreements presented with copies of the subject leases attached. The parties
110. For example:
EXHIBIT “A”
Attached to and made a part of that certain Farmout Agreement dated (date),
from (Name of Farmor) to (Name of Farmee)
Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease dated ____, between ____, as Lessor, and ____, as
Lessee, recorded in Volume ____, Page ____ of the Oil and Gas Records of
____ County, Texas, covering the following described lands situated in said
county and State:
____ acres, more or less, being the ____ Survey, ____ of ____ County, Texas,
and described in a Deed from ____ to ____ dated ____, and recorded in
Volume ____, Page ____ of the Deed Records of ____ County, Texas.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 comment h (1979); see also Lynch v.
Davis, 181 Conn. 434, 435 A.2d 977, 979 (1980); Briand v. Wild, 110 N.H. 373, 268 A.2d
896, 897–98 (1970).
112. For example, one major oil company uses forms that begin, “For sufficient
consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged . . . .”
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 comment h (1979). Performance
supplies consideration for a unilateral contract. Id.
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will likely execute the farmout agreement without a close examination of
the leases being farmed out since most farmout transactions make drilling
an option rather than a firm obligation.
The farmor and the farmee both take risks if they fail to examine the
leases subject to the farmout. Isler v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 114 illustrates a
risk to the farmee. In Isler TXO farmed out an oil and gas lease on federal
lands in New Mexico to Isler. TXO made the farmout without warranty of
title. The agreement provided that TXO would make delay rental payments
or give Isler notice before ceasing to make them, but it specifically stated
that TXO would have no responsibility to Isler for a failure to make the
payments. 115 TXO, through oversight, failed to make rental payments, and
the lease expired. Isler completed two wells on the premises before learning
that the lease had expired. Isler sued TXO, claiming damages both on a
theory of breach of contract and on a theory of tort. A federal court jury
awarded damages against TXO for negligence.116 The Tenth Circuit
reversed, applying New Mexico law, on the ground that the farmout agreement meant what it said:
The effect of confusing the concept of contractual duties, which
are voluntarily bargained for, with the concept of tort duties,
which are largely imposed by law, would be to nullify a
substantial part of what the parties expressly bargained for—
limited liability. Unless such bargains are against public policy
(covered either by prohibitory statutes or well-defined, judgemade rules such as unconscionability), there is no reason in fact
or in law to undermine them. Indeed, it would be an unwarranted
judicial intrusion into the marketplace. 117
The farmor may also hurt itself by failing to coordinate the terms of the
farmout with the underlying leases. In Davis v. Zapata Petroleum Corp. 118
Davis farmed out to Zapata under a farmout agreement that required Zapata
to commence drilling and continue either until Zapata achieved production
or until thirty days after Zapata provided Davis notice of its intent to cease
operations. Zapata commenced drilling three days before the end of the
114. 749 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1984).
115. This provision is typical in farmout agreements. The Isler case does not quote the
applicable provisions, but many of the farmout agreements collected included formulations
of similar effect. See infra text accompanying notes 352–53.
116. 749 F.2d at 22.
117. Id. at 23.
118. 351 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
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primary term, but then gave Davis notice of its intent to cease. Davis
accepted the notice, took over the well, and found another farmee. The
lessor subsequently evicted the new farmee from the land on the grounds
that the lease had terminated because operations had ceased for longer than
the period permitted by the lease operations clause.119 Davis sued Zapata
for damages it had incurred, but lost in a jury trial. A Texas court of civil
appeals upheld the judgment on the basis that the farmout agreement set
Zapata’s obligations rather than the lease.120 The court noted that “such
requirements might well have been greater, or less, than those required to
maintain the oil and gas lease in effect.”121
These cases clearly and consistently apply the principle that a farmout
agreement means what it says. The courts will not include by implication in
the farmout agreement requirements of the leases that are farmed out or
motivation of the parties. Thus, it is crucial that the parties to a farmout
identify the important components of the leases being farmed out and
incorporate them specifically in their agreement.
6. Drafting Techniques
Drafting is an art rather than a science. Every drafter has favorite
techniques, and few agree as to what works best. Experts in the area do
agree, however, that “if it may be ambiguous, it is ambiguous.” 122 Clarity of
meaning is the goal, and the following techniques may be helpful.
a) Use of Prefatory Statements of Purpose
When the primary purpose of the farmout can be identified—for
example, to preserve a lease about to expire or to test a particular
formation—one should include a prefatory statement of that purpose. The
courts struggle to make sense of the instruments before them, as do
managers in oil companies and their counsel. A clear statement of the
purpose of an agreement may avoid disputes or lend support to the
interpretation urged.

119. A lease operations clause addresses the problem of drilling operations that are
begun, but not completed by the end of the primary term. The clause defines drilling
operations, generally deemed to be in progress when continuing for more than a 30-, 60-, or
90-day period, as constructive production for purposes of the lease habendum clause. See E.
KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 188–98.
120. 351 S.W.2d at 925.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 4.
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Pasotex Petroleum Co. v. British American Oil Producing Co. 123
illustrates the usefulness of prefatory statements. In Pasotex Petroleum Co.
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a farmee abandoned performance of
a farmout agreement when it failed to drill a well to test a deep formation,
but completed a well in a shallower formation. The court reasoned that:
Our examination of the record convinces us that the paramount
idea and purpose on the part of defendant in negotiating and
making the agreements with plaintiff was to secure a deep test
well that would test the productivity of the Basal Oil Creek
Sand. In addition to the value of a producing well from this sand
there was also the important feature of the geological knowledge
that defendant would acquire and the influence this would have
on defendant in determining whether it would expend the large
sums . . . necessary in securing renewals of a large number of
leases that would soon expire. Such a test well was not drilled.124
The result turned on the finding of the purpose of the agreement. Extrinsic
evidence had to be introduced to prove the point, however. A prefatory
statement might have avoided litigation, and made the result more certain.
b) Use Appendices for Standard or Complex Provisions
Many of the farmout agreements collected did not attempt to deal with
standard or detailed provisions in the body of the agreement, but instead
attached appendices containing these terms. 125 This drafting technique
offers a number of advantages. First, it makes possible an apparently
simple, purpose-oriented farmout agreement. Second, it discourages those
who negotiate the agreement from making changes in provisions that the
lawyers may view as important boilerplate. Third, the technique minimizes
the opportunities for ambiguity or conflict between the terms of the farmout
agreement and related instruments, such as the assignment. 126
123. 431 P.2d 373 (Okla. 1966).
124. Id at 381.
125. See, e.g., Exhibit A to the agreements of Sun Exploration and Production Company
discussed in T. FAY, supra note 3, at 55–58, which includes many of the substantive
provisions addressed in this paper in four pages of fine print.
126. A nightmare for the lawyer or administrator working with farmouts is that the terms
of an assignment made pursuant to a farmout agreement will be inconsistent with the terms
of the farmout. Whether the terms of the assignment comport with the farmout is often a
point of dispute between farmor and farmees. See, e.g., Holly Energy, Inc. v. Patrick, 239
Kan. 528, 722 P.2d 1073, 1074–75 (1986). For a discussion of Holly Energy, see infra notes
129–32 and accompanying text. An obvious problem of merger will arise if that occurs. One
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Use of appendices has a single, but substantial, disadvantage. That
disadvantage is the risk that those negotiating the agreement will regard the
appendices as incidental to the transaction and thus not give them the
attention that they deserve. 127 Negotiators can easily fall into the trap of
regarding appendices as unimportant.
c) Define the Terms Used
Persons active in the oil business often think of the industry as a
monolithic whole, although the better view probably is as a group of
regional industries. Both practices and terminology differ from place to
place. Parties therefore must define carefully the terms used in a farmout
agreement, either in the text of the contract as they are used or in a separate
definitions section. 128
Even commonplace terms may be considered ambiguous. In Holly
Energy, Inc. v. Patrick 129 the farmout agreement provided that a well
capable of producing in paying quantities would earn “that portion of the
captioned quarter section situated within the production unit established
for that well.” 130 The farmor assigned its interest in two full quarter
sections, though the spacing pattern for the two wells was only forty acres.
The farmor later asserted that the farmee should have received only
assignments of the forty-acre well sites. The Supreme Court of Kansas
affirmed a trial court’s refusal to grant the farmor relief on a variety of
claims, upholding the trial court’s finding that the term “production unit”
was ambiguous. 131 The court pointedly noted that “it would have been a
simple matter for Holly to clearly state in the farmout agreement that only
correspondent who responded to my request for comments, Dean Eugene Kuntz, suggested
that the parties might draft the farmout to refer to an assignment to be made “on the attached
form of assignment covering the lands, leases and interests, and subject to the limitations set
forth, in such form of assignment.” This suggestion would minimize the possibilities for
conflict between the terms of the assignment and the terms of the farmout relating to the
assignment.
127. See Lamb, supra note 3, at 141 (criticizing the “conglomerate mess” that may
result).
128. One of the agreements collected devoted nearly two full pages to definition of
terms, including contract lands, leases, earning well, subsequent well, drilling unit, contract
depth, well costs, operating costs, leasehold costs, lease maintenance costs, casing point,
working interest, working interest percentage, and operator. See also art. II of the short form
farmout agreement attached to Bledsoe, supra note 3, ex. 1.
129. 239 Kan. 528, 722 P.2d 1073 (1986).
130. 722 P.2d at 1075 (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 1079.
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one well was contemplated and that if successful Patrick would receive an
assignment as to forty acres only.” 132 A complete definitions section,
though rarely seen, is advisable.
B. Key Characteristics of a Farmout
When one shifts from preliminary matters to substantive analysis, it is
important to determine the key characteristics of any farmout proposal or
agreement. On these provisions may turn the likelihood of the transaction’s
business success or failure. The key characteristics of a farmout agreement
generally include the provisions relating to (1) the duty imposed, (2) the
earning factor, (3) the interest earned, (4) the number of wells to be drilled,
and (5) the form of the agreement.
1. The Duty Imposed: Option or Obligation
People in the industry frequently classify farmout agreements as “option
farmouts” or “obligation farmouts.” An option farmout agreement provides
that drilling is a condition of the farmee’s earning the agreed interest. An
obligation farmout agreement is one in which drilling is a promise by the
farmee. 133 If drilling is an option, it is a condition of earning. If drilling is
an obligation, it is a covenant—a legally binding promise.
All things being equal, the farmor would probably always prefer to
structure the farmout agreement so that the farmee covenants to drill. All
things are rarely equal in negotiations, however, and the vast majority of
farmout agreements make drilling an option rather than an obligation. This
situation may indicate that lease salvage is a common motivation.134 It may
also reflect the attitude of the farmors’ managements as to what is fair.135
Perhaps most likely, drilling as an option results from simple economics. In
132. Id.
133. An obligation farmout should not be confused with a farmout in which the farmor’s
purpose is to have drilled an obligation well. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. The
former refers to the structure of the agreement. The latter refers to the motivation of the
farmor in entering the agreement. In fact, however, a farmout given because the farmor
needs to have an “obligation well” drilled will almost certainly be structured as an
“obligation farmout.” On the other hand, farmouts motivated by other purposes may also be
so structured.
134. See supra text accompanying note 62.
135. The vice president for land of a large independent oil company once told the author
that his company, as a farmor, would never insist that a farmee covenant to drill because it
was as often a farmee as a farmor. While that statement may have been an exaggeration,
what the deal-makers regard as ethical or good business practice certainly may affect the
structure of agreements.
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the usual farmout situation, the farmee holds the bargaining leverage. The
farmor wants to “move” the leases being fanned out and so the farmee,
which is understandably reluctant to make a firm commitment to drill, can
negotiate an option to drill.
The primary significance of classifying a farmout agreement as an option
farmout or an obligation farmout is the effect of failure to perform under
the agreement. When the farmout is structured as an option to drill, failure
to drill will cost the farmee the benefits it might have earned. When the
farmee is obligated to drill, however, failure to drill may expose the farmee
to very substantial liabilities. 136 The classification of the agreement as an
option farmout or obligation farmout may also affect the rights of the
parties in the event of bankruptcy. 137
2. The Earning Factor: Produce to Earn or Drill to Earn
A second way to categorize farmout agreements for analytical purposes
is by reference to what will earn an interest for the farmee. A produce-toearn farmout agreement is drafted so that the farmee earns an interest in the
property being farmed out by drilling and completing a well capable of
producing in paying quantities. A drill-to-earn farmout agreement requires
less. The farmee can earn its interest merely by drilling to a specified
formation or formations and conducting agreed testing.
Lansinger v. United Petroleum Corp. 138 illustrates the importance of the
distinction between produce-to-earn and drill-to-earn farmouts. In
Lansinger the farmee drilled a well under a farmout requiring completion of
a well capable of producing in paying quantities, but the farmee neither
hydraulically fractured it nor equipped it to produce. The court quieted title
in favor of the farmor, noting that it was not sufficient “to complete a well
having some indications of oil, or a well which might be developed into a
well producing oil in paying quantities,” 139 and denied the farmee
additional time to complete the well.140
136. Thus, when drilling is an obligation rather than an option, the farmee must
determine its ability to perform before entering into the agreement. In addition, the farmee
must also have examined the title of the farmed-out properties before committing itself to an
obligation to drill. In the alternative, the agreement may provide that the farmee has a
specified period of time to review title and to reject it without liability. Lamb, supra note 3,
at 160; see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 859–72.
138. 14 Ohio App. 3d 398, 471 N.E.2d 869 (1984).
139. 471 N.E.2d at 871 (quoting Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E.
984, 985 (1904)).
140. Id. at 872.
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The produce-to-earn farmout, which was the subject in Lansinger, is the
more usual because the most common motivation for a farmor to farm out
is to preserve a lease, and a party cannot maintain a lease without a well
capable of producing in paying quantities. A drill-to-earn farmout structure
is usually found in agreements where the farmor is motivated by a desire to
explore. Conceptually, this structure is closely related to an acreage
contribution agreement. 141 Parties will likely use both as part of a
coordinated exploratory program to evaluate an area. Drill-to-earn farmout
agreements may also be used when the well to be drilled is an obligation
well. A dry hole will satisfy the legal obligation as effectively as a
producing well when the farmor farms out to satisfy an implied covenant to
its lessor.
3. The Interest Earned: Divided Interest, Undivided Interest, or
Combination
A divided interest farmout provides that the farmee and the farmor end
up owning interests in separate tracts. A simple example is an agreement by
which a farmee earns all of the farmor’s interest in a specified lease for
drilling. Another example is a farmout, perhaps entered into to preserve a
lease, that allows the farmee to earn the farmor’s interest in a drillsite tract
for drilling and completing a well capable of producing in paying
quantities, yet leaves the farmor with the full leasehold interest in the
acreage outside the drillsite tract. 142 A variation, called a “checkerboard”
scheme, provides that the farmee earns the farmor’s interest in drillsite
acreage plus the farmor’s interest in every other drillsite unit around the
drillsite tract, leaving the farmor the interest in the remaining tracts. 143
An undivided interest farmout provides that the farmee earns an
undivided portion of the farmor’s interest in a tract. For example, a farmee
may earn 75% of the farmor’s interest in only the drillsite in return for
paying 75% of drilling costs, so that the farmor and the farmee become
tenants in common. Such arrangements frequently arise when a farmor’s
primary reason for farming out is lack of cash. By assigning a part of its

141. See supra text accompanying note 14.
142. For examples of well site only assignments, see infra notes 275–76.
143. For an example of a checkerboard assignment, see Stekol v. Hamilton, 152 Tex.
182, 255 S.W.2d 187, 190–91 (1953). See also 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYER, supra note 12,
at 119.
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interest, the farmor gets a lease developed that it would not otherwise be
able to drill, while maintaining a percentage interest. 144
Many farmouts are structured so that the farmee earns a combination of
divided and undivided interests. The classic farmout structure gives the
farmee a divided 100% interest in the drillsite acreage until payout and an
undivided interest in acreage outside the drillsite. 145 Parties frequently use
combination farmouts when the object of the farmout agreement is to test
large undeveloped tracts.
Classification of a farmout as a divided interest farmout or an undivided
interest farmout is of primary significance in determining how much
emphasis analysis should place upon the ongoing relationship of the farmor
and the farmee. If the farmout is of a divided interest, then once the farmee
has earned its divided interest in a given tract, the relationship of the parties
is no more complicated than that of any other two owners of adjacent
properties. Analysis of a divided interest farmout thus should focus on what
the farmee has to do to earn its interest. When the parties are to end up
owning undivided interests, however, the ongoing relationship of cotenants
will require that close attention be given to those provisions of the farmout
and operating agreements that relate to the ongoing duty of the parties to
one another and to their lessors, as well as to what has to be done to earn.
4. The Number of Wells: Single or Multiple Well Farmouts
In the classic farmout arrangement, the farmee earns an interest in the
farmor’s acreage by drilling a single well. When large tracts of land are
involved, however, farmout agreements frequently require that several
wells be drilled.
A multiple well farmout agreement is substantially more complicated
than a single well agreement. The parties must carefully define the timing
of drilling operations for wells after the first well to be certain that the
farmee has adequate time to complete one operation before beginning
another. The farmout’s testing provisions must be considered to determine
whether the tests required in the drilling of the initial well must also be
required in subsequent wells. The parties must include provisions to address
what happens if the farmee completes some, but not all, of the multiple
wells contemplated. Typically, multiple well farmout agreements will

144. See supra text accompanying notes 22–25 for a discussion of the complete payout
tax concept, which is apparently satisfied so long as the farmee maintains an interest in the
well for the payout period equal to the percentage of the IDCs it pays.
145. See supra text following note 32; infra note 277.
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provide that the farmee will keep producing wells that it has completed. 146
Such is not always the case, however; some multiple well farmouts punish
the farmee for failure to perform fully. 147

146. For example:
In addition to any other remedies which may be available to Farmor, its
successors and assigns hereunder, this Agreement shall terminate and be of no
further force and effect should Farmee fail to drill any of the Test Wells
required by, and in the manner specified by, the terms and provisions of this
Agreement. However, this provision shall not cover acreage which has been
previously drilled and subleased in accordance with the terms and provisions
of this Agreement.
(Emphasis added.)
147. The following provision, for example, would give the farmee only half of the
acreage it is to earn if it fails to drill all the wells promised:
If Farmee, as Farmee may so do without breaching its obligations under this
Agreement, shall fail to complete the drilling, testing and equipping of all of
said six (6) net wells in the manner and within the time provided in this
Agreement then Farmee shall have earned, and shall be entitled to receive an
assignment from Farmor covering, the following leasehold interests, to-wit:
(i) As to each of said test wells completed by Farmee for production, an
undivided one-half of Farmor’s right, title and interest (subject to the
proportionate share of presently-existing burdens and obligations) in the
leases set forth in Exhibit “A” insofar as said leases cover the
government-surveyed section of land on which each of such wells is
located, but only insofar as said leases cover the interval from the
surfaceto the base of the ____ Formation; such well, the equipment and
material therein and thereon and the production therefrom shall be owned
equally by the parties hereto and shall be operated in accordance with the
Operating Agreement attached hereto;
(ii) as to each of said test wells completed as a dry hole by either Farmee or
Farmor, Farmee shall be entitled to assignments covering an undivided
one-half of Farmor’s right, title and interest (subject to a proportionate
share of presently existing burdens and obligations) in the leases set forth
in Exhibit “A” insofar as said leases cover the government-surveyed
section of land on which such well is located, and insofar as such leases
cover the interval from the surface to the base of the ____ Formation.
As to each such producing well, Farmee shall retain ownership of the material,
equipment and supplies located therein and thereon; providing, however,
Farmor shall have free use of each such property and the production from each
such well shall be owned equally by Farmor and Farmee; it being understood
that maintenance and operating costs shall be shared by Farmor and Farmee in
accordance with the terms of the Operating Agreement, Exhibit “D” attached
hereto. Should such property be transferred, sold, salvaged or otherwise
disposed of, Farmor shall receive 50% of the proceeds or credits received
therefrom.
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5. The Form of the Agreement: Agreement to Transfer or Conditional
Assignment
Farmout agreements traditionally have taken the form either of an
agreement to convey or a conditional assignment. The essential difference
in the two is the point in time when the farmee acquires an interest in the
farmed-out property. When the farmout is in the form of an agreement to
convey, the farmee obtains its rights only if it performs the conditions made
prerequisite by the contract.148 When the farmout is in the form of a
conditional assignment, the farmee obtains an interest in the farmed-out
property when the agreement is made, subject to an obligation to reconvey
or to automatic termination if the conditions subsequent are not
performed. 149
The farmout’s form may have enormous practical significance to the
parties’ rights and liabilities. The farmor’s primary advantage in structuring
a farmout as a contract to convey rather than a conditional assignment is
that the farmor retains title to the property farmed out until after the farmee
has performed. Administratively, this is simple for the farmor, and it saves
the time and effort required to clear title in the event that the farmee does
not perform. In addition, structuring a farmout as a contract to convey may
mitigate the problems of liens being attached due to the farmee’s default or
of claims as a result of the farmee’s bankruptcy. 150
The farmee’s interests virtually mirror the farmor’s. The farmee, under a
conventional agreement to transfer farmout, may find the farmor slow to
provide the earned assignment or inclined to quibble over whether it is
really due. Further, the assignment when finally made may come burdened
with liens attached while the farmee was drilling the earning well. If the
farmor should go bankrupt before the assignment is made, the farmee may
never get the assignment.

This provision would subject the farmee to the ravages of the complete payout limitation as
well, because the farmee would not earn the full interest in the well site acreage and would
lose a part of the IDC deduction.
148. See, e.g., Lansinger v. United Petroleum Corp., 14 Ohio App. 3d 398, 471 N.E.2d
869, 871–72 (1984); Energy Reserves Group v. Tarina Oil Co., 664 S.W.2d 169, 172–73
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ).
149. See, e.g., Vickers v. Peaker, 227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29, 31–34 (1957) (automatic
termination); Mengden v. Peninsula Prod. Co., 544 S.W.2d 643, 647–49 (Tex. 1976)
(obligation to reassign).
150. For a discussion of bankruptcy and its effects on farmout agreements, see infra text
accompanying notes 459–72.
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IV. Essential Issues of Farmout Agreements
Having considered preliminary matters and having noted the key
characteristics of the agreement, the reviewer or draftsman is ready to
analyze the essential issues that any farmout agreement must address. This
section of the Article discusses the following issues: drilling the earning
well, well information, what is earned, and administrative provisions.
A. Drilling the Earning Well
1. What Is Farmed Out
Generally a farmout agreement covers leases owned by the farmor, but
on occasion mineral rights may be farmed out as well. The leases and lands
covered by the farmout may be described in the body of the farmout
agreement. More often an appendix incorporated by reference contains this
information. When the parties list leases subject to the farmout in an
appendix, they may also include other information, such as existing burdens
and lease terms. The obvious and easily avoidable problem is inaccuracies
or discrepancies in description of the properties.151
The agreement may also provide that the farmee’s rights will extend to
extensions and renewals of the leases covered.152 Extension and renewal
provisions are unnecessary in the farmout if the operating agreement
becomes effective when the farmout is executed, in which case the
provisions in the operating agreement probably supersede those of the
farmout agreement. In any event, extension and renewal provisions of
farmout agreements often parallel operating agreement provisions.153
2. Costs and Expenses
Almost by definition, a farmout is an agreement by which the farmee
agrees to pay the costs of the operations contemplated. Generally that
undertaking is explicitly stated in the farmout. 154 As is discussed below,
151. See supra text accompanying notes 100–10.
152. The following example is a concise renewal and extension provision: “The interests
reserved herein, or in any assignment hereunder, to Farmor shall apply to any renewal,
extension, or new lease covering any part or all of the Contract Acreage that may acquire,
directly or indirectly, within two years after expiration of the Lease.”
153. Compare Art. VIII.B. of the 1982 AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement with
the provisions of the clause quoted supra note 152. Application of extension and renewal
provisions frequently provide a source of dispute between farmors and farmees. See Cage,
supra note 3, at 169–73.
154. For example: “The entire cost, risk and expense of drilling, testing, completing,
equipping and operating the well(s) or of plugging and abandoning the well(s) and restoring
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however, a provision that the farmee will be responsible for all costs and
expenses is not a perfect shield against liability for the farmor. 155
3. Failure of Title
Failure of title is a risk that is customarily imposed upon the farmee in
farmout agreements. While in principle the farmor and the farmee should
negotiate covenants of title from the farmor, farmout agreements rarely
contain a general warranty of title by the farmor. None of the farmout
agreement examples collected included a general warranty, and only a few
contained a special warranty 156 or a specific representation. 157 Indeed, most
the surface if a dry hole shall be borne by farmee.” Of course, the parties must appropriately
modify this language if the farmee will earn less than 100% of the working interest in wellsite acreage and pay only the proportion of costs equal to the interest earned.
155. See infra notes 406–38 and accompanying text.
156. A farmout special warranty follows:
Any assignment from farmor to farmee shall be without warranty except for a
limited warranty as to the farmor’s own acts in favor of farmee, including an
express representation and warranty by farmor that the interest assigned is not
subject to any obligation or burdens by or through farmor, other than the
lessor’s royalty. Also, farmor warrants that the interest to be assigned to farmee
is free of any mortgage or any other encumbrance by or through farmor
including indemnification of farmee from any loss or deficiency under such
warranty or representation.
157. The following represents that the farmor holds title, but stops short of warranting it:
Farmors represent to the Farmee that to their best knowledge after reasonable
investigation they own the working interests and the net revenue interests in the
land and depths covered by said leases described in Exhibit “B”; that the only
Agreements to which Farmors’ interests in said leases are subject are the
Agreements described in Exhibit “B”; that said leases are in full force and
effect except for the following: ____; and that Farmors are free to assign their
interests in said leases to Farmee on the terms of this Agreement without the
consent of any third party. Farmors agree to use their best efforts to maintain
said leases in full force and effect during the term of this Agreement prior to
the commencement of the Initial Earning Well (as defined below) so that such
leases remain in full force and effect during the term of this Agreement.
The following representations focus on the burdens of the leases farmed out, as well as title:
Farmor represents, but does not warrant that as of the date hereof, it owns an
interest in the leasehold interest created by the lease at least equal to an undivided ____ interest therein, and that other than the landowner’s royalties and
one or more overriding royalty interests aggregating ____ percent of 8/8ths
there are no other overriding royalty interests, production payments, net profits
obligations, carried working interests and payments out of or with respect to
production which are of record in the county and state identified on page 1
hereof and with which the lease is burdened as of the date hereof (the “existing
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of the contract examples included a disclaimer of any warranty, 158 and a
few specifically placed the farmee on notice of possible title defects. 159
Some states may imply title warranties from the use of words of grant,160 so
the parties should be specific as to their agreement.
4. Title Information
Because the typical farmout agreement does not include a warranty of
title, the farmee should satisfy itself that the farmor has title before
conducting drilling operations. That task is made easier if the farmor will
agree to share with the farmee title information that it may have, as is
commonly done. 161 One reviewing a farmout agreement for a farmee should
alert the farmee to the importance of actually obtaining and reviewing title
burdens”) so that the existing burdens aggregate a total of ____ percent of
8/8ths of production, and without regard to any non-consent provisions in the
operating agreement and without making any provisions for operating costs,
farmee will be entitled to receive ____ percent of ____ percent of the
production attributable to its interests in the lease.
158. A specific disclaimer of warranty, for example, may state, “Farmor makes no representation with the respect to the status of their title to the leasehold interests covered hereby,
and it is understood that this farmout is being given without warranty of title, either
expressed or implied.”
159. For example:
Farmor hereby expressly advises farmee that there is currently litigation pending which may directly or indirectly raise certain questions concerning title to
the farmed out lands, and hereby specifically refers farmee to the following
cases: ____. It is understood and agreed that any operations undertaken by
farmee pursuant to this agreement are done so at its sole risk and expense
without any representations of any kind or character made by farmor as to title
to the farmed out lands.
160. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.023 (Vernon 1984).
161. Bledsoe, supra note 3, at N-5. For example:
Upon request by Farmee following execution of this Agreement, Farmors shall
provide the Farmee copies of said leases and copies of all title documentation
material to the acreage subject to this Agreement in Farmor’s files relating
thereto, including without limitation copies of all title opinions and reports,
rental receipts, and title curative documents. Such title documentation shall be
provided without warranty by Farmors as to accuracy. Any title examination
performed by Farmee with respect to the Initial Earning Well referred to below
to be drilled on said leases shall be performed at the sole cost of Farmee and the
Farmee shall deliver copies to Farmors of any title opinions or reports acquired
by Farmee with respect to such well.
Id. For a discussion of Isler v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1984), which
illustrates the risk to the farmee of an inadequate title examination, see supra text
accompanying notes 114–17.
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documents relating to the leases farmed out. Particularly when the farmout
agreement obligates the farmee to drill, rather than merely giving it an
option, the agreement should provide that the farmee can withdraw from the
agreement if it is not satisfied with title.162
5. Geologic Information
The farmor will frequently agree to provide the farmee with whatever
geologic and geophysical information and interpretations it has developed.
The farmout agreement should specifically provide for the sharing of such
information, 163 subject to disclaimers of accuracy and requirements of
confidentiality. In the alternative, the agreement should specifically indicate
that the farmor will not share geologic and geophysical information.164

162. An example of a clause giving the farmee a right to avoid the agreement in the event
of defects is:
Farmor has furnished to farmee all material in farmor’s possession relevant to
the determination of farmor’s title to the leases subject to this agreement. If
farmee does not object to farmor’s title of the leases in the manner described
below by ____ farmee will be deemed to have accepted farmor’s title to the
leases. If farmee raises reasonable objections to farmor’s title to the leases by a
writing delivered to farmor by ____, farmor will have until ____ to cure any
title objections to the reasonable satisfaction of farmee. Should farmor fail in
this respect, this agreement shall become null and void.
163. For example:
Upon request of Farmee, Farmors shall provide Farmee with reproducible
copies of any geological, geophysical or other information which Farmors have
acquired with respect to said leases and which Farmors have the right to
provide. Such information will include, but will not be limited to, maps, cross
sections, and geological interpretations; field tapes and associated support data,
final record sections (processed using standard processing techniques), shot
point location maps and other materials related to any seismic operations
conducted by Farmor; and well information, such as logs, drilling and
completion reports, and engineering information.
The farmor would probably prefer to make geologic information supplied by the farmor
specifically subject to a continuing confidentiality obligation of the farmee. See infra text
accompanying notes 271–72.
164. An example of a clause specifically disclaiming any obligation of the farmor to
provide geological or geophysical information follows:
Farmor shall not be required to provide farmee with any geophysical or
geological information that farmor may have, and farmee shall likewise not be
required to provide farmor with any such information except the information
specifically set forth in § — hereof, whether such information is presently in
the possession of farmor or farmee or is hereafter acquired.
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6. Location of the Well
If a farmor’s purpose in entering into the farmout agreement is to save its
lease, it may be willing to let the farmee drill at a location of its choice. 165
If, however, the farmor’s purpose is to obtain geologic information or to
satisfy an express or implied covenant of a lease, the farmor may designate
the location precisely. Moncrief v. Martin Oil Service, Inc. 166 illustrates the
importance of clearly designating the location of the well if a specific
location is important to the parties. In Moncrief Martin farmed out to
Moncrief in a farmout agreement that provided that “the interest earned by
operator [Moncrief] hereunder shall be in consideration for the drilling of
the well on lands belonging only to Martin.” 167 The agreement also
contained a proportionate reduction clause that provided that the interest
earned by Moncrief in the Martin acreage would be reduced to the
proportion that the amount of the Martin acreage within the participating
area for the test well bore to the total acreage within the participating area.
After Martin and Moncrief executed the agreement, Martin agreed to
amend it so that “if our acreage on the first Test Well does not earn your
Company its full interest under the Agreement, . . . the drilling of
subsequent tests can earn the interest agreed to.” 168 Moncrief then drilled
several wells, spending between $13 and $14 million dollars in the process.
Martin refused to assign the interest that Moncrief claimed he had earned
because the additional wells drilled were not located “on lands belonging
only to Martin.” 169 The trial court found in favor of Moncrief, the farmee,
because the amending letter did not specifically embrace the requirement of
the initial contract.170 The appellate court upheld this position on the ground
that the agreement did not require positively that subsequent tests be
located on Martin’s acreage, so that the trial court’s decision was not plain
error. 171

165. An example of a clause permitting the farmee to select the location of the earning
well follows: “Farmee’s Choice: Farmee shall have the right, but not the obligation, to
commence on or before ____, operations for the drilling of well (the “Initial Earning Well”)
at a location of Farmee’s choice on the ____ of Section ____, Township ____, Range ____,
____ . . . .” The discretion given the farmee will be illusory if the tract identified is small.
166. 658 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1981).
167. Id. at 769–71.
168. Id. at 771.
169. Id at 773.
170. Id at 770.
171. Id.
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Even when the farmor and the farmee can agree that the location of the
well is an essential part of their agreement, they may encounter practical
problems in formulating the designation. Exact locations are hard for the
farmee to satisfy and will lead to dispute. A mathematically determinable
point (e.g., “the center of the SE/4 of the NW/4”) may be difficult to locate
when it comes time to spud the drilling rig. A general location (e.g., “within
330 feet of the center of the NW/4” or “in the NW/4”) will generally be
adequate to protect the interests of both parties. The farmee must satisfy
itself, however, that it can meet lease restrictions and conservation agency
rules by drilling in the general area identified.
Farmout agreements often provide for the initial well’s location “at a
legal location of farmee’s choice.” 172 This language is appropriate where
the farmor’s purpose is to extend the farmed-out lease. If the geological
information obtained from drilling is important to the farmor, however, this
language may not accomplish the farmor’s goals, particularly if the tract is
large. Geological information from a well drilled near the edge of the tract
may not be as valuable as that from its center. A risk likewise arises that
describing the location as “a legal location of the farmee’s choice” will
permit the farmee to earn its interest by obtaining an exception tract drilling
permit 173 to drill close to the edge of the farmed-out acreage near a
producing well outside the farmout area. 174
In farmout agreements as in other contracts, a drafter should never use
the phrase “at a mutually agreeable location.” If the parties cannot
subsequently agree upon a location, the courts will probably hold the
farmout agreement to be an unenforceable agreement to agree.175

172. See T. FAY, supra note 3, at 7.
173. State oil and gas conservation agencies generally issue exception tract drilling
permits either to protect correlative rights, when strict adherence to the rules would result in
drainage, or to prevent waste when strict adherence would result in oil or gas never being
produced. E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 79. Whether
either rationale would justify issuance of a permit in the circumstance described is
problematic.
174. T. FAY, supra note 3, at 6. Fay suggests the language used should read “at a legal
location as required under the spacing requirements in effect at the time of the execution of
the farmout agreement.” Id. at 7.
175. Cf. the discussion of Getty OH Co. v. Blevco Energy, Inc., supra notes 78–80; see
also Klein & Burke, supra note 3, at 494. For a discussion of the Statute of Frauds, see supra
text accompanying notes 86–113.
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7. Choice of Contractors
Farmout agreements usually make drilling an option or obligation of the
farmee. Since few farmees own their own drilling rigs, the parties must
ordinarily contemplate that the farmee will subcontract the drilling
operations. The agreement’s language needs to reflect this intention by
providing that the farmee “will commence or cause to be commenced actual
drilling.” When read with the restrictions on assignment usually included in
farmout agreements, the reference to “cause to be commenced” will permit
the farmee to subcontract.
At least three alternatives exist to a general agreement to permit the
farmee to subcontract. First, the farmor may choose the subcontractor. A
farmee will rarely accept this option, however, because it will give the
farmor control of a crucial provision of the agreement. Second, the farmee
may select the contractor subject to certain articulated standards that the
chosen contractor must meet. Third, the farmor and farmee may agree on a
contractor; for example, the farmee may be given the right to choose the
contractor, subject to approval by the farmor. This last alternative is
acceptable only if the parties avoid the agreement to agree problem by
providing that the farmor can withhold approval only for reasonable cause.
8. Commencement of the Well
Most farmout agreements specify a date by which the farmee must
commence drilling in order to satisfy the agreement. If the parties anticipate
title problems or if equipment appears to be in short supply, the agreement
may provide for an extension of the commencement date.176
Commencement provisions vary in their terminology. Such provisions
sometimes parallel those usually found in oil and gas leases and merely
require that the farmee commence “operations”177 or “drilling.” 178 The
requirement more frequently is that the farmee “commence the actual drilling” of a well. 179
176. An example of a clause permitting extension of the commencement date follows:
Provided, however, that the commencement date shall be extended for any
period reasonably necessary for farmee to satisfy itself that title to the proposed
drill site for the initial well is safe for drilling purposes and for up to thirty days
in the event a suitable drilling rig is not available by the commencement date.
177. See supra note 165.
178. For example: “On or before ____, Farmee agrees to commence the drilling of a test
well in accordance with all of the terms and provisions of the Agreement . . . .”
179. For example: “On or before ____, Farmee shall commence the actual drilling of a
test well (Initial Well) at the following location: . . . .”
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a) Commencement of Operations
When the farmee is required merely to commence operations, all that is
likely to be required of the farmee is that before the date specified it do
something on the farmed-out land that directly relates to or is preparatory to
actual drilling. 180 In addition, those activities must be pursued diligently and
in good faith until a well is actually spudded181 and completed. This is the
usual interpretation of the meaning of “commencement of operations” in an
oil and gas lease. 182 One of the classic cases cited to support that rule
involved a farmout. In Vickers v. Peaker 183 deep rights under a lease were
assigned to the farmee. The assignment required that the assignee
“cornmence the drilling of a well” before a specified date.184 The farmee,
before that date, entered into a drilling contract, surveyed and cleared the
location, constructed a road to the location, obtained a drilling permit, and
moved material to the drill site. The drill bit did not actually pierce the earth
until nearly a month after the date specified, however. The Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the time of spudding was immaterial, asking the
now famous rhetorical question: “Does ‘baking a cake’ begin with the
preparation of the dough, or only with the actual placing of the dough in the
oven?” 185 By this analysis, virtually any activity of the farmee on the land
will be sufficient to commence the well properly, extend the lease, and
satisfy the farmout agreement.186
b) Commencement of Actual Drilling
When the farmout agreement provides that the farmee must commence
the “actual drilling” of a well, however, something more is probably
required. Reference to commencement of “actual drilling” is likely to
180. See E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 157–62.
181. “Spudding” refers to the first boring of the hole in drilling a well. 8 H. WILLIAMS &
C. MEYERS, supra note 12, at 843.
182. Id.
183. 227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29 (1957).
184. 300 S.W.2d at 30–32.
185. Id. at 32.
186. Professor Williams summarizes the law as follows:
In brief, drilling operations may be described as any work or actual
operations undertaken or commenced in good faith for the purpose of carrying
out any of the rights, privileges or duties of the lessee under a lease, followed
diligently and in due course by the construction of a derrick and other
necessary structures for the drilling of an oil and gas well, and by the actual
operation of drilling in the ground.
3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 618.1, at 323–24 (1986).
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require that a drill bit have pierced the ground.187 A more certain variation
requires that the well be “spudded” by a particular date. 188
9. Completion of the Well
Farmout agreements often specify, in addition to a commencement date,
a date by which the earning well must be completed. The primary reason
for specifying a completion date is to insure that the farmor will possess the
information obtained from drilling so that it can evaluate other leases that it
may have in the area. Like “commencement,” the term “completion” may
lead to dispute, particularly when the farmout agreement provides for the
drilling of several wells, or when the farmee seeks to drill a substitute well.
Two cases illustrate the point well. In Seale v. Major Oil Co. 189 a farmout
agreement obligated Seale to drill two wells, the second within 45 days
after “completion” of the first. Seale drilled the first well to the objective
depth and abandoned it as a dry hole. He then refused to drill the second
well, contending that he was unable to “complete” the first well since it was
a dry hole, and that therefore he had no obligation to drill the second. The
court held that the contract as a whole did not use “completion” to mean
completion as a producing well, however, but to mean “completion of the
required work on the well whether it became a producer or not.” 190 In a
recent case, Modern Exploration, Inc. v. Maddison, 191 the court interpreted
a lease provision requiring the lessee to drill a well within 270 days of
“completion of drilling on the first well” or lose its rights to all undrilled
acreage. 192 The court held that “completion of drilling” was unambiguous
and meant “when the well’s total depth [was] reached, not when the
operator [chose] to perforate the cement plug that he chose to insert into the
well.” 193

187. For a discussion of the federal regulations and cases interpreting “actual drilling
operations,” see 1 LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES § 14.05[2] (1986).
188. See T. FAY, supra note 3, § 2.1(b) of the farmout agreement.
189. 428 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1968, no writ).
190. Id. at 869.
191. 708 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
192. Id at 876–77.
193. Id. at 876. The reasoning of the court is unclear because the words just before the
quoted phrase read “‘[c]ompletion of drilling’ logically imports the time when no further
drilling is needed, when oil or gas has been reached and the well is capable of
producing . . . .” Id. The reference to “the well is capable of producing” is not the equivalent
of “when no further drilling is needed.”
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The parties to a farmout agreement will probably have different expectations of the meaning of “completion” in different contexts.194 When the
farmout agreement requires the farmee to complete a well capable of
producing in paying quantities in order to satisfy the agreement, as in cases
when the primary purpose of the farmout agreement is to maintain a lease
about to expire, “completion” probably means drilling to total depth,
testing, fracturing or acidizing, and equipping the well for production. Until
those steps have all been taken, the well is not capable of producing.
Conversely, when the farmee can earn by merely drilling and testing, as is
often the case when the primary purpose of the farmout agreement is to
obtain geologic information, “completion” likely requires only that the
farmee has drilled the well and performed the agreed tests.
Farmout agreements obviously should define “completion.” Surprisingly,
only a few of the example agreements collected do so. A draft AAPL Form
provided the following definition: “A ‘completed well’ is a well which has
been fully equipped for the taking of production, through and including the
tanks for an oil well and through and including the Christmas tree for a gas
well, or plugged and abandoned, as a dry hole.” 195
10. Time Measurement
The farmout agreement’s commencement and completion provisions are
susceptible to disputes over the point from which time is to be measured.
This appears particularly true when time is measured by reference to some
other event. For example, if completion is required within “90 days after
commencement of drilling,” the parties may not agree either when
particular actions were taken or whether those actions were sufficient to
commence drilling. Provisions that the farmee must commence actual
drilling “90 days after acceptance of this offer” or exercise its option for a
substitute well “within 60 days after release of the drilling rig” may also

194. Cf. Edwards v. Hardwick, 350 P.2d 495, 500 (Okla. 1960) (court concluded that
term “completion” means well drilled to specified sand or depth, and such well so prepared
for use of various methods of treatment to obtain production of oil and gas).
195. AAPL draft Form 635, § 2(a) (Kraftbilt, Tulsa 1987). The quoted provision is
appropriate for a “produce to earn” farmout. Another phrasing of the provision could read: “
‘Completion’ means the point at which testing is completed as required in order to receive a
production allowable from the Texas Railroad Commission.” For a “drill to earn” farmout,
the following phrasing might be appropriate: “ ‘Completion’ of a well for the purposes of
this Agreement shall be defined as the release of the completion rig, if the well is completed
for production, or release of the drilling rig, if the well is plugged and abandoned.”
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lead to factual disputes as to when acceptance occurred or the rig was
released.
Measuring time by reference to events may lead to disputes as to how the
parties are to count days. An accepted principle of general contract law
holds that the day a contract is executed is not counted in measuring time,
while the party required to perform has until the end of the last day to
perform. 196 Only a few cases apply that principle to oil and gas leases,
however. 197 In the interests of certainty, a specific calendar date is
preferable, whether the parties are referring to commencement or
completion of the well. If the farmout agreement specifies a calendar date,
the farmee must be careful that the date inserted is reasonable. By the time
negotiations are completed, the date provided for, even if reasonable when
the parties began negotiating, may no longer provide the farmee adequate
time to perform.
Farmout time measurement issues are made more important by “time is
of the essence” provisions found in most farmout agreements. In Texas one
court has held that commencement of drilling operations in a timely manner
under an operating agreement was not essential to maintaining the
agreement because nothing in the agreement indicated that the parties
intended it should be. 198 A different result probably would be reached under
most farmout agreements, however, either because time is specifically
made of the essence 199 or because the agreement requires absolute
performance of all of the terms and conditions of the agreement for the
farmee to earn. 200 All but a small percentage of the example agreements
collected contained one or the other of these clauses, and some contained
both. An alternative to providing for specific time periods is to require
“diligent operations” or “diligent and continuous operations.” The
opportunities for disagreement as to the meaning of those terms are
obvious, however.

196. See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 26 Cal. 2d 753, 161 P.2d 217, 220 (1945);
Pitcock v. Johns, 326 S.W.2d 563, 565–66 (Tex. App.—Austin 1959, writ ref’d).
197. See, e.g., Winn v. Nilsen, 670 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1983).
198. Argos Resources, Inc. v. May Petroleum, Inc., 693 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). But see United Carbon Co. v. Monroe, 92 F. Supp. 460, 465
(W.D. La. 1950), holding that time is implicitly of the essence in drilling contracts,
presumably including farmout agreements.
199. An example of a “time is of the essence” clause is: “Time is of the essence to this
agreement and to all its terms and conditions.”
200. See infra note 261.
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11. Objective Depth
a) Footage vs. Formation
The “objective depth,” or the “contract depth” as it is sometimes called,
is the depth that the farmee must drill under the terms of the farmout
agreement in order to earn its interest under the farmout agreement.
Objective depth usually is described either by reference to the number of
feet to be drilled or by description of the formation to be explored. Either
may cause interpretive difficulties.
(1) Footage
The farmout agreement sometimes will describe the objective depth by
the feet to be drilled. For example, the farmor and the farmee may agree
that the farmee will drill the test well to 5,000 feet. A footage description of
objective depth is inherently flawed, however, unless the agreement also
addresses how footage is to be measured. No industry custom or usage
exists. The intention of the parties may be that the reference be to measured
depth, the distance down the hole actually drilled, which can be determined
by measuring the drill pipe utilized. This method is probably the easiest.
The reference to footage, however, may also refer to the vertical depth.
Vertical depth will be different from measured depth, because inevitably
the hole drilled will deviate somewhat from the perpendicular.
Even if the parties plainly intended the footage reference to refer to
measured depth or to vertical depth, ambiguities remain as to how to
determine those depths. Is the reference to objective depth, the deepest
point reached by drilling, or to completion depth, the depth to which the
well is plugged back for testing and a completion attempt? Furthermore,
from where is the depth to be measured? It will make a difference whether
the starting point for measurement is the kelly bushing, 201 the surface, or
sea level.
There are relatively few disagreements over how to measure footage.
The farmor and the farmee usually have an unspoken or oral understanding
as to how to make the measurement. The lawyer drafting or reviewing a
farmout agreement should not rely upon the innate desire of the parties to
get along, however. The agreement itself should define how to measure the
footage.

201. The kelly bushing is a device fitted to the floor of the drilling platform through
which passes the steel pipe that transmits torque from the rotary table to the drill string and
rotates the drill bit. S. PALMER, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY GLOSSARY 109 (1st ed. 1982).
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(2) Formation
A second method of describing the objective depth in a farmout
agreement is to refer to a formation that the farmee will test or to one in
which a well is to be completed. A common formulation states that “farmee
agrees to drill . . . to a depth sufficient to adequately test the ____
formation . . . .” 202 An objective depth described by reference to the
formation to be tested is more common than one described by footage. The
farmor may not be certain that the information or production that it wants
can be developed within a footage limitation, since geologic formations are
often tilted or broken. On the other hand, the farmee will not want to be
obligated to waste money by drilling deeper than is necessary to test or to
obtain production. Therefore, unless the farmor and farmee are certain that
the farmee will find their objective at a particular depth, description of the
objective depth by reference to the formation to be tested will be the
favored method.
Description of the objective depth by formation may also lead to
misunderstandings. There may be ambiguity as to what the formation is
called. The same formation may have different names even in the same
general area. Similar names may describe very different formations. Even if
there is no ambiguity as to the formation to be tested, recognizing it when it
is found may be difficult. The same formation may have different
lithological characteristics in different areas. 203 In addition, a formation
may be broken or overthrust, so that it is found at several widely separated
depths in the same area.
The solution to these problems again is precise drafting. A drafter may
minimize problems in recognizing the formation by referring (1) to a
“control well,” another well that has tested the formation sought, 204 or (2) to
a description of the formation published by a state or federal geological
surveyor or bureau of mines. A description of the formation to be drilled
and tested may also be combined with footage limitations. This device
avoids dispute and limits the farmee’s obligation in case the formation is

202. When drilling in an unexplored area, the reference may be “to the basement rock,” if
a specific objective formation cannot be identified.
203. Lithology is the study of rocks. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
698 (9th ed. 1985). Geologists often describe rocks by their overall physical characteristics,
which they refer to as their “lithological characteristics.”
204. Note, however, that if the control well is a substantial distance from the well to be
drilled, the farmout earning well may not encounter the formation tested by the control well.
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encountered at substantially different depths. 205 Such a combination is
probably the most frequently used method of describing the objective
depth.
b) Standard of Testing
The farmout agreement’s clause describing the objective depth often requires that the objective depth be tested “to the farmor’s satisfaction.” 206
The courts would impose a standard of reasonableness upon the farmor. 207
The farmee would clearly prefer, however, that the agreement express the
standard of testing by what the reasonable, prudent operator would do under
the circumstances or “to the farmee’s satisfaction.”
c) What About Shallow Production?
A recurring problem in farmout agreements is determining the rights of
the parties if the farmee encounters production in a formation at less than
the objective depth. There are at least three possible solutions. The
agreement may require the farmee to drill to and test the objective depth
notwithstanding the shallow discovery. Completion of a shallow well,
perhaps with limitations imposed upon the depth earned, may satisfy the
objective depth provision.208 Finally, production from the shallower depth
may satisfy the objective depth of the requirement if the farmee tests the
objective depth or drills a substitute well.
d) What About Drilling Deeper?
Farmout agreements less frequently address whether the farmee can drill
deeper than the objective depth. The farmee may want to drill deeper
205. A provision in the farmout agreement may state, for example, that “[t]he Test Well
will be spudded by Farmee on or before ____ and will be drilled to a true vertical depth of
____ feet below the surface or ____ feet below the bottom of the ____ formation, whichever
is less . . . .”
206. See infra note 261.
207. A fundamental principle of contract interpretation applied by courts is the standard
of reasonableness. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 492 (1982).
208. An example of a clause permitting the farmee to complete in a shallower formation
than the objective depth is:
If during the drilling of the Earning Well, operator shall encounter what it believes to be potential production in a zone encountered at a depth shallower
than Contract Depth, then if operator elects not to drill deeper, operator may
test and/or make a completion attempt in such shallower zone. For the purposes
hereof, such shallower zone shall be deemed to be a Contract Depth and
thereby fulfill the drilling commitment created hereby.
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because geological information obtained in drilling the well suggests that
the productive formations will not be found where they were expected.
Geologic information may indicate that deeper drilling will result in better
production.
Again, there are at least three options. The farmor, which is entitled to all
drilling information, may prefer to keep deeper rights. Second, the farmor
may allow the farmee to drill deeper only if the farmee tests the objective
depth as well as the deeper formation, 209 or if the farmee later drills a
substitute well to test the objective formation. Finally, the agreement may
give the farmee an option to drill a deeper well after a test of the objective
formation. 210 Whatever is the intent of the parties, the agreement should be
specific.
12. Produce to Earn or Drill to Earn
What the farmee has to do to earn its interest under the farmout
agreement is a key characteristic of the agreement, 211 as has been discussed
above. The farmee’s obligations also present substantial interpretative and
drafting problems. These problems are somewhat different in produce to
earn farmouts than in drill to earn farmouts.
a) Produce to Earn Farmouts
The primary problem with produce to earn farmouts is in the choice of
language used to express the production requirement. Some farmouts

209. For example, the following language specifically permits the farmee to drill beyond
the objective depth.
Farmee shall drill the Earning Test Well to a depth sufficient to thoroughly test
the ____ formation, or to a maximum depth of seven thousand three hundred
(7,300) feet below the surface, whichever is the lesser depth; provided that
nothing contained in the foregoing shall prevent Farmee from drilling to such
deeper depth below the provided depths as Farmee may elect.
(Emphasis added.)
210. An example of a clause giving the farmee an option to drill a deeper well after
completing a well in the objective formation is:
Farmee shall have the option for a period of ____ days after the release of the
drilling rig from the initial well to drill any well on the subject lands to any
depth deeper than the depth drilled in the initial well. In the event that farmee
exercises its option and drills a well to such deeper depth, farmor shall, subject
to the other provisions of this agreement, grant to farmee the leasehold interest
in the lands subject to this agreement to a depth of 100 feet below the
stratigraphic equivalent of the total depth reached in such deeper drilling.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 138–41.
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require merely a capability of “production.” 212 Others require capability of
“production in paying quantities” 213 or “production in commercial
quantities.” 214
The meaning of such terminology is not precise. In the context of oil and
gas leases, courts have reached a variety of interpretations of similar terms.
For example, courts have held that the term “commercial quantities”
requires that operating revenues be greater than operating costs, 215 that
there be production merely “of sufficiently large amount to be sold by the
owner to a buyer for transport elsewhere,” 216 or that there be a probability
that the revenues of offset wells will pay back the cost of their drilling plus
a profit. 217 “Paying quantities” is also a term that may have different
meanings in different contexts. When the issue is whether a lease is
maintained by marginal production, “paying quantities” generally requires
merely that the revenues from production exceed operating costs.218 When
the issue is whether the lessee owes the lessor a duty to develop or to
protect against drainage, the term generally requires that the probable
revenues from drilling pay the costs of drilling, completing, and operating,
and return a reasonable profit. 219
212. For example: “If the Test Well is commenced and thereafter drilled to Contract
Depth and completed and equipped for production in accordance herewith, Farmor will
assign to Farmee . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
213. For example:
In the event you are successful in completing a well or wells capable of
producing oil or gas in paying quantities on said land and in compliance with
all of the terms and conditions hereof, then farmor, upon your written request,
shall execute and deliver to you an assignment of its rights, title, and interest in
and to all of the oil and gas held under said lease in and to each governmental
proration unit of said land upon which you finally complete a well capable of
producing oil or gas in paying quantities . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
214. See Landauer v. Huey, 143 Colo. 76, 352 P.2d 302, 308 (Colo. 1960); see also U 2
of the farmout agreement attached at Scott, supra note 3, at 84.
215. Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 228 Kan. 589, 618 P.2d 844, 847 (1980) (“commercial
quantities” synonymous to “paying quantities” for purposes of maintaining lease in
secondary term).
216. State v. Wallace, 52 Ohio App. 2d 261, 369 N.E.2d 781, 785 (1976) (issue was
propriety of plugging order of state conservation agency).
217. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 455 P.2d 12, 14–17 (Alaska 1969) (issue
was whether blowout constituted “discovery in commercial quantities” so that lessee of state
lease became entitled to pay reduced royalty rate).
218. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 90–92, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690–92 (1959).
219. See 5 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 58.3 (1964) (discusses
appropriate cases).
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Each of these definitions may be appropriate in a produce to earn
farmout. The meaning of the terms may differ according to the
circumstances in which they are used. When the farmout’s purpose is lease
maintenance, the agreement serves that purpose so long as operating
revenues are greater than operating expenses over a reasonable time. 220
When the purpose of the farmout is to satisfy an obligation of the farmor to
drill an offset, development, or exploratory well, drilling and attempting to
complete satisfy the obligation, so that any production should be sufficient
to earn. When the purpose of the farmout is to obtain exploration of its
leases, discovery of a formation that will permit the drilling and profitable
operation of additional wells may well be the intent of the parties. In
addition, a case can be made that the parties intend that rights will be
earned under a produce to earn farmout only when a well is drilled and
completed capable of producing enough to pay costs of drilling,
completing, and operating, plus a reasonable profit; this makes sense, for
example, when joint development of a field or dedication of reserves is the
business purpose of the farmout agreement.
The first definition of production is the one most likely to be intended by
farmor and farmee, because it is the definition generally used in leases. It
therefore comes to mind first. In addition, the most common reason for a
farmout agreement is lease maintenance. Often, however, the terms of the
agreement suggest nothing about the intent of the parties. To avoid
ambiguity and dispute, the parties should carefully define whatever term is
used to describe “produce to earn.”
b) Drill to Earn Farmouts
Parallel interpretative problems arise with drill to earn farmout
agreements. The term “drill,” whether couched as a covenant or a condition,
may require drilling to an objective depth and testing the formation found.
For example, that may be the parties’ intent when the farmout’s purpose is
to drill a court-ordered “obligation” well to satisfy an implied covenant to
develop or to protect against drainage. The same term may require only
drilling to the objective depth, with a decision at the casing point 221 to test

220. As long as operating revenues are greater than operating expenses, the underlying
lease is maintained. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 176.
221. The casing point is the point where “a well has been drilled to the objective depth
stated in the initial notice, appropriate tests have been made” and a decision is to be made
whether to complete it and equip it for production. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note
12, at 109.
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or not, 222 when the purpose of drilling is to satisfy an implied covenant to
drill an exploratory well. A case may even be made that the farmor and the
farmee intend that the drill to earn farmout be satisfied when the farmee has
timely commenced in good faith and diligently pursued drilling operations,
even though the objective depth is never reached. Such a definition would
be appropriate, for example, when a court order is satisfied if impenetrable
substances or conditions are encountered that make abandonment
necessary. Again, specificity is the watchword for the drafter.
13. Performance as an Option or Obligation
As discussed above, whether performance of the farmout provisions is
the farmee’s option or obligation is one of the key characteristics of the
farmout agreement. 223 In addition, that choice presents significant problems
for the lawyer drafting or reviewing the agreement. The problems begin
with classification of language in farmout agreements.
a) Classification Problems
Classification of farmout language as making drilling a covenant to
perform or a condition of earning may be difficult. Many drafters word
farmout provisions relating to commencement of initial drilling as a
covenant, but then follow with language that transforms the obligation to
drill into a mere condition of earning. 224 One must read the agreement as a
222. For an example of the type of agreement, see Modern Exploration, Inc. v.
Maddison, 708 S.W.2d 872, 875–76 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no writ), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 191–93.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 133–37.
224. Lamb, supra note 3, at 154. One example agreement provides:
2. Initial Test Well. On or before ____, Farmee shall commence or cause to
be commenced the actual drilling with suitable rotary equipment of a well . . .
and shall thereafter continuously prosecute such drilling operations in a diligent
and workmanlike manner until the well reaches a depth sufficient in Farmor’s
judgment to test ____.
***
12. Failure to Drill. Farmee shall not be liable in damages to Farmor for
failure to commence, drill, test, complete or equip the Initial Test Well as
herein provided, but any such failure shall result in the loss to Farmee of all
rights under this agreement. The foregoing shall not be construed to preclude or
limit any rights Farmor may have in law or in equity, by virtue of Farmee’s
negligence or willful misconduct, or for any breach by Farmee of any other
obligation under this agreement (including, without limitations, the obligations
to provide information to Farmor and to indemnify Farmor as hereinafter
provided).
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whole to determine whether drilling is an option, an obligation, or a bit of
both. 225
b) Option to Drill
When the farmout agreement gives the farmee an option to drill, difficult
practical and conceptual problems arise. For the farmor, one problem is
whether the farmee that has commenced drilling may choose to forfeit its
right to earn under the farmout agreement in order to avoid sharing valuable
information obtained in its drilling operations.226 If drilling truly is an
option, the farmee presumably may choose to abandon operations at any
time and for any reason. 227 The abandonment provisions of the farmout,
which typically give the farmor the right to take over drilling operations,
Scott, supra note 3, at 83, 87. The last sentence of the quoted ¶ 12 makes that paragraph
something less than a complete release of the farmee from liability, however. The farmee
does not have to drill under the example language, but if the farmee does drill, it must
comply with the contractual provisions or face liability. See infra text accompanying note
229.
225. For example, the language following makes drilling a clear-cut obligation:
Farmee shall drill a well, hereinafter called the Earning Well, strictly in accordance with the following well specifications:
(a) Location: ____
(b) Spudding Deadline: ____
(c) Required Depth: ____
(d) Completion/Plugging Deadline: ____
The obligations of Farmee hereunder are firm obligations and covenants as well
as conditions to earning the assignment(s) provided for.
In contrast, the following language indicates that drilling is a condition for earning, and that
a failure to drill will not result in liability:
“Farmee shall have the option, but not the obligation, to drill a well at the
location designated below and thereby earn the rights set forth below to the
leases described at Exhibit ____, all subject to the terms, limitations and
conditions set forth below.”
The possibility exists to make commencement of drilling an option, but to make completion
of a well commenced an obligation. For example:
If the test well is commenced, farmee agrees to drill the test well to a depth at
which the ____ formation has been properly tested therein or to a depth of ____
feet, whichever is first reached (objective depth) and to complete the test well
for production or plug and abandon the well as a dry hole, in full compliance
with the terms and provisions of section ____ below.
226. Hardwick, Operational Agreements in the Shadow of Bankruptcy—What Can Be
Done to Structure Agreements in Order to Minimize the Problems of a Party that Later Goes
Bankrupt, 1986 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. SPEC. INST, ON PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES DURING
HARD TIMES IN THE MINERALS INDUSTRY 6-1, 6-2.
227. Id.
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may minimize this problem. 228 Releasing the farmee from liability for not
drilling, but specifically providing for liability for failure to provide
promised information, may also solve the problem. 229
c) Obligation to Drill
When dealing with a farmout agreement that makes drilling the farmee’s
legal obligation, the issue of liability for failure to perform is of crucial
importance to both farmor and farmee. There is a split of authority as to the
measure of damages for breach of an express promise to drill. In a majority
of states, including Oklahoma and Louisiana, the remedy is apparently the
cost of drilling the promised well. 230 In a minority of states, including
Texas, the remedy is the benefit that the one party would have received had
the other drilled the well as promised.231 That remedy may be the “lost
royalty,” which is defined as the royalty that would have resulted had the
well been drilled as promised. 232 Other available measures of damages

228. See infra note 357.
229. See supra note 224.
230. Fite v. Miller, 196 La. 876, 200 So. 285, 286 (1940); Ardizonne v. Archer, 72 Okla.
70, 178 P. 263, 265–66 (1919). These cases, like most of those cited in this article, deal with
breach of a drilling covenant in a lease. Professors Williams and Meyers have asserted,
however, that the problems are the same in the context of breach of a farmout as they are in
breach of a lease, so that the rules should be the same. See 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW § 432.2 (1985). Professors Williams and Meyers also cite cases from the
federal courts, as well as courts in Colorado, Kansas, and Montana, as adopting the cost of
drilling rule. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 885.1 (1985).
231. See Guardian Trust v. Brothers, 59 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland
1933, writ ref’d). Professors Williams and Meyers cite cases from the federal courts, as well
as from courts in California, Alberta, and Kentucky, as adopting the lost royalty rule. See 5
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 230, § 885.2. See also Stinnett v. Damson Oil Corp.,
813 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (a recent case applying the rule).
232. For an excellent analysis and collection of the cases dealing with the measure of
damages, see Annotation, Right and Measure of Recovery for Breach of Obligation to Drill
Exploratory Oil or Gas Wells, 4 A.L.R.3D 284 (1965). In Guardian Trust a Texas court of
civil appeals reasoned, “The true and ultimate purpose of all parties to the lease was ‘the
mutually profitable production of oil, gas or other valuable mineral.’” 59 S.W.2d at 345
(citation omitted). The court concluded, therefore, that the lost royalty was the appropriate
measure of damages, noting that the cost of drilling would be inappropriate because such a
measure is not the value of performance to the obligee but “the cost of performance by the
obligor.” Id. at 346. The “lost royalty” rule is not rigidly applied, however:
After an early adoption of the cost of drilling as the measure of damages, the
Texas courts have apparently rejected any mechanical application of that rule
and have now adopted a flexible test under which the plaintiff is entitled to
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include the value of the retained interest 233 or the value of the information
that drilling would have developed.234
The Texas rule that the remedy for the breach of an express promise to
drill is the value of the performance to the obligee is better law than the
majority rule. 235 The Texas rule places a heavy burden of proof upon the
farmor whose farmee has failed to perform, however. Martin v. Darcy is a
case in point. 236 In that case Martin promised to drill a well under an
assignment of a farmout from Darcy but failed to do so, though the well
was later drilled and completed as a dry hole by another. Darcy sued and
recovered $3000 on the theory that the interest that he had retained had
possessed a market value of $6000 and that he would have sold half of it
before completion of the well had Martin drilled it. The appellate court
reversed the award on the basis that to recover Darcy would have had to
have shown (1) that the profits he claimed had been contemplated by the
parties when the agreement was made and (2) that he actually would have
sold his interest. 237 The problem, as the court in Martin v. Darcy noted, is
that at the time the farmout is negotiated no one knows what the farmor will
do with its interest, including the farmor. Therefore, at least the second
element of proof required to establish a basis for recovery of damages can
rarely be proved. 238
Because of the difficulty in a state like Texas of proving actual damages
for breach of a farmout agreement obligating the farmee to drill, the parties

recover the value of the performance of the contract to him, such value to be
determined in the light of the peculiar facts of each case.
Annotation, supra, at 299 (footnotes omitted).
233. See Martin v. Darcy, 357 S.W.2d 457, 459–60 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1962,
writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 230, § 885 (discusses
other measures of damages). A value of retained interest measure would be particularly
appropriate, in the author’s view, in a “lease salvage” type farmout.
234. See Atlantic Oil Prod. Co. v. Masterson, 30 F.2d 481, 482 (5th Cir. 1929). Using the
value of the information that was to have been obtained would be particularly appropriate in
what the author calls an “exploration and evaluation” farmout.
235. The Texas rule is “better” law because it is the usual rule for recovery of damages
for breach of contract. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 26 Eng. L. & E. 398 (1854). In
fact, Hadley v. Baxendale formed the basis of the decision in Whiteside v. Trentman, 146
Tex. 46, 170 S.W.2d 195 (1943).
236. 357 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
237. Id. at 460.
238. Id. A detailed statement of the purpose of the farmor in entering into the farmout
would help significantly in meeting the burden of proof. See supra text accompanying notes
123–24.
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may include a stipulation of liquidated damages in the agreement.239 It is
difficult to draft a liquidated damages clause with certainty that it will be
enforced, however. 240 Of particular concern in drafting liquidated damages
provisions in farmout agreements is the need when setting damages to take
into account the extent of performance. The extent of performance would
be important in determining actual damages, and stipulated damages might
not be awarded if they grossly exceed actual damages. 241 An agreement to
pay the estimated cost of drilling an obligation well, therefore, probably
would be classified as an unenforceable penalty when the breach occurs
after drilling to the casing point.
Other alternatives for the farmor worried that a farmee will fail to
perform a farmout agreement drafted as a covenant to drill include
obtaining security for performance, escrow of drilling funds, and requiring
a performance bond. 242 However, negotiating any of these is likely to
239. An example of a liquidated damages clause is: “FAILURE TO DRILL; DAMAGES. If farmee fails to drill the test well as required by § ____, farmee shall pay to farmor
on or before ____, ____ dollars ($ ) which shall be deemed farmor’s liquidated damages
arising out of farmee’s failure to perform.” In the author’s opinion, the more detail included,
the better the agreement.
240. Agreements for stipulated damages are enforceable if courts determine such
damages to be estimated compensation for injuries, but not if courts classify them as
penalties. Courts have often said that the distinction between a penalty and liquidated
damages is that a penalty is not a measure of compensation for breach, but a security for
actual damages. See, e.g., Gregory v. Nelson, 147 Kan. 682, 78 P.2d 889, 892 (1938); Jones
v. Mays, 248 S.W. 129, 130–32 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1923, writ dism’d); Bourland v.
Huffhines, 244 S.W. 847, 848–52 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1922, writ dism’d). To be
enforceable, a liquidated damages provision must meet two requirements. First, the court
must find that the amount of damages to be reasonably anticipated would be difficult to
ascertain because of uncertainty or indefiniteness. The contract provision should contain a
specific statement of agreement of the parties to this effect. Second, the stipulated amount
must be either a reasonable estimate of probable damages or reasonably proportionate to
actual damages.
241. Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952) (“The universal rule
for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or
damage actually sustained. . . . A party has no right to have a court enforce a stipulation
which violates the principle underlying that rule.”).
242. An example of a clause requiring a surety bond to guarantee performance of farmout
agreements follows:
You agree to deliver to farmor a bonded form attached hereto as Exhibit —
executed by you as Principal and by a corporate surety acceptable to farmor. In
the event you should fail to comply with the obligations contained in this
farmout agreement to pay all persons who furnish labor or material for use in or
in connection with the drilling of the initial or any subsequent test well hereun-
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complicate forming the agreement. Furthermore, it is an axiom of the
industry that when performance guarantees are necessary, they are
unobtainable.
14. The Substitute Well Clause
Another axiom of the oil and gas industry is that “if something can go
wrong, it will go wrong.” That maxim particularly applies to well drilling,
especially drilling exploratory wells. Mechanical breakdowns are almost
inevitable. No matter how thorough and professional the geologic and
geophysical analysis, there is always a risk of encountering unexpected
conditions or impenetrable formations. Farmout agreements, therefore,
almost always contain a substitute well clause that sets forth circumstances
that excuse the farmee from drilling the earning well and give it the right to
drill another earning well.
a) Escape Provisions
When the agreement obligates the farmee to drill the well, both parties
will be vitally concerned with the escape provisions—the terms of the
substitute well clause that set out the circumstances in which the farmee
may abandon its drilling operations.243 Without such provisions, the farmee

der, or fail to prevent the filing of liens against the leasehold estate subject
hereto, then you and the surety on your bond shall be jointly and severally
liable to farmor in the amount of ____ payable forthwith upon such default at
____. Upon your completion of the initial test well and all subsequent test
wells, if any, at the location, within the time, in the manner and to the depth
specified and upon your furnishing to farmor evidence, satisfactory to it, that all
persons have been paid for labor performed or material furnished in connection
with or in the actual drilling of such well(s) and that there are no other claims
for damages or liens of whatsoever nature against the above described leases
resulting from the drilling of such well(s), you and your surety shall be
discharged from any obligation thereunder.
243. The escape provisions of the substitute well clause must be read in conjunction with
the force majeure clause, if any, in the farmout agreement. A force majeure clause may
broaden the circumstances under which a party may excuse a failure to perform. For
example, the following clause is substantially broader than most substitute well clause
escape provisions:
If Farmee is rendered unable, wholly or in part, by force majeure to carry
out its obligations or to meet its deadlines under this agreement, other than the
obligation to make money payments, it will give to Farmors prompt written
notice of the force majeure with reasonably full particulars concerning it;
thereupon, the obligations or deadlines of Farmee, insofar as they are affected
by the force majeure, shall be suspended during, but no longer than, the
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that fails to perform covenanted drilling operations may be liable. Even if
drilling under the farmout is merely an option of the farmee, the escape
provisions of the substitute well clause are important. The farmee that fails
to drill an option well will lose its rights to earn under the farmout, unless
the escape provisions provide for a right to drill a substitute well.
Escape provisions vary widely. Some farmouts excuse performance
where “igneous rock or other impenetrable substances are encountered at a
lesser [than the objective] depth.” 244 Others let the farmee escape its
obligations when it encounters “a formation or other physical condition in
the well which renders further drilling impracticable.” 245 The agreement
sometimes spells out what will render the drilling impracticable.246
continuation of the force majeure. Farmee shall use all reasonable diligence to
remove the force majeure as quickly as possible.
The requirement that any force majeure shall be remedied with all
reasonable dispatch shall not require the settlement of strikes, lockouts or other
labor difficulty by Farmee contrary to its wishes; how all such difficulties shall
be handled shall be entirely within the sole discretion of Farmee.
The term “force majeure” as employed herein shall mean an act of God,
strike, lockout or other industrial disturbance, act of the public enemy, war,
blockade, public riot, lightening, fire, storm, flood, explosion, governmental
restraint, governmental inaction, nonavailability of drilling equipment or other
equipment or personnel, and any other cause whether of the kind specifically
enumerated or otherwise, which is not reasonably within the control of Farmee.
The following is a farmout force majeure clause keyed to the force majeure clause of the
underlying oil and gas lease:
Force Majeure—any obligation of a party to this Agreement shall be
suspended, and any time deadline provided in this Agreement shall be
extended, for any period during which performance of such obligation or the
meeting of such deadline shall be prevented by the occurrence of any force
majeure circumstance. For purposes of this paragraph, a “force majeure
circumstance” shall mean any of the events described in paragraph ____ of the
Oil and Gas Lease attached hereto as Exhibit ____. The party affected by a
force majeure circumstance shall give notice to the other party the occurrence
of such circumstance and shall take all reasonable action to remove such force
majeure circumstance.
244. R. Olsen Oil Co. v. Fidler, 199 F.2d 868, 869 (10th Cir. 1952).
245. See Scott, supra note 3, at 83. One commentator has described any language that
refers to impracticality or defines impracticality as a “Gulf Coast Clause.” See Glass, supra
note 3, at 6. “Impractical” and “impracticable” are apparently used interchangeably in such
clauses. It is not clear to me that they have precisely the same meaning; they do not in plain
English.
246. For example:
loss of circulation, partial loss of circulation, water flow, domal formation, abnormal pressures, heaving shale, or similar formation, salt or other similar con-
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Farmout escape provisions are often vague and ill-defined because the
parties are attempting to provide for the unknown. Strictly speaking, for
example, no substance is “impenetrable.”247 One should note, however, that
the focus of most formulations is upon physical conditions in the hole 248 or
mechanical difficulties not caused by the farmee’s negligence. The cost of
conducting operations, the farmee’s economic circumstances, or market
conditions do not generally provide a basis for escape from a drilling
obligation. 249
The parties may negotiate broad escape provisions to relieve the farmee
from a drilling obligation or to preserve its right to drill substitute option
wells. Escape provisions may take into account the costs of drilling, 250 time
expended, 251 technology, 252 or make reference to what the reasonable,
prudent operator would do in the circumstance.253 Indeed, it is common for

dition, is encountered which makes drilling abnormally difficult or hazardous,
causes sticking of drill pipe or casing, or other similar difficulty which
precludes drilling ahead under reasonably normal procedures . . . .
Another example makes drilling impracticable when drilling gets “to such lesser depths at
which pressures are encountered which would cause a reasonable prudent operator to require
the utilization of a mud weight of 16.0 pounds per gallon or greater . . . .”
247. At least one commentator has said flatly of “impenetrable substances” that “I am
uncertain as to its meaning.” Lamb, supra note 3, at 157.
248. In R. Olsen Oil Co. v. Fidler, 199 F.2d at 870, the court defined the phrase “igneous
rock and other impenetrable substances” as used in farmout agreements in New Mexico and
Oklahoma to mean “to reach a geological formation . . . which, in the business of production
of such minerals, it is recognized will reasonably preclude the probability of finding oil or
gas in or below such formation.” (Emphasis in original.)
249. John Scott, however, notes that drafters of escape provisions often do not refer to
physical conditions in the hole and that such formulations may arguably be stretched into
broad force majeure clauses. Scott, supra note 3, at 83 n.33.
250. For example: “If in drilling . . . a condition or formation is encountered which
renders further drilling impracticable for the reason that the cost per foot of such further
drilling would be in excess of 150 percent of the cost per foot anticipated in the AFE . . . ,
Farmee may cease drilling operations . . . .”
251. What some have called a “72 hour continuous efforts” clause will permit the farmee
to cease operations if it has made a good faith continuous effort for 72 hours to solve the
problem. L. MOSBURG, supra note 3, § 3.03.
252. For example:
Operator shall use its best efforts to drill or cause to be drilled the earning well
to be situated on a drilling unit comprising a portion of the contract lands, and
which well shall be drilled to (i) Contract Depth or (ii) a depth where there is
encountered a practically impenetrable substance making further drilling in
light of existing technology impossible or impracticable.
253. For example:
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option farmouts to provide that the farmee can abandon drilling of the
initial well “for any reason.” 254
While the use of general terms in drafting escape provisions is probably
unavoidable because of the uncertainties inherent in drilling, the parties
should be as specific as possible. When the farmor and the farmee have
established a working relationship in prior dealings, the farmor may agree
to escape provisions that give the farmee substantial discretion. When the
parties have no prior relationship, or when the farmor’s experience with the
farmee suggests that the farmee is inefficient or untrustworthy, the parties
should state objective criteria. Both the drafter and his client must
recognize, however, that even specifically enumerating the circumstances
that will excuse the farmee from drilling will not preclude factual disputes
over whether or not the enumerated circumstances have occurred.
b) Substitute Well Provisions
(1) Option or Obligation
The initial issue in any substitute well clause is whether drilling a
substitute well is an option or an obligation. If the initial well is an
obligation of the farmee, the farmor will probably wish to make the
substitute well an obligation. The factors that led the farmor to bargain for a
covenant to drill are likely still to apply if the farmee abandons the initial
attempt. The farmee, on the other hand is likely to want an option to walk
away from the deal if its efforts and expenditures have been unsuccessful,
at least unless it has reason to believe that the same circumstances will not
arise in drilling a second well.
Most farmout agreements make a substitute well an option, even though
the parties structure the drilling of the earning well as a covenant of the
farmee. An alternative is to make drilling the substitute well an obligation
of the farmee unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that conditions
similar to those that caused abandonment of the earning well will also arise
in drilling the substitute well. 255
If, in the drilling of the initial test well, operator encounters a drilling condition
or substance before reaching the above specified depth or formation which
cannot be overcome by means or methods customarily used by prudent
operators in the area, then and in such event, the test well may be plugged and
abandoned at the depth at which the substance or condition is encountered and
operator is hereby granted and given an option to commence and drill a
substitute well for said well.
254. Glass, supra note 3, at 6.
255. L. MOSBURG, supra note 3, at 186–88.
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(2) Well Details
The agreement should also address the requirements of drilling
operations for a substitute well. In providing for a substitute well’s
commencement date, the parties must take into account the termination date
of the lease farmed out. They must also allow for the practical problems of
arranging to drill; typically farmors and farmees agree to allow 60 to 90
days. If the agreement provided a completion deadline for the earning well,
the parties will need to modify that date appropriately for a substitute well.
The location of the substitute well is likely to be a troublesome matter. If
adverse conditions encountered in drilling were the farmor’s reason for
abandoning the initial well, it is likely that similar conditions will be
encountered in any substitute well drilled close by. On the other hand, if the
farmor’s geologic information suggests that hydrocarbons are most likely to
be found at the location of the initial well, or if the farmor particularly
wants information from that location, the farmor will not want to give the
farmee discretion to drill elsewhere.256
One way to break an impasse either as to the location of the substitute
well or as to whether the farmee is to be obligated to drill it, is to provide
the farmee an incentive in the form of a larger percentage, deeper depth, or
more acreage in the earning provisions. If the farmee that has tried in vain
to drill an initial well in a location tries a second time and succeeds, it may
make sense to the parties that the farmee should earn more than it would
have had the initial well been successful.
15. The Performance Standard
a) Conduct of Operations
Since a farmout agreement is a business transaction similar to a
construction contract, a “good and workmanlike” standard of performance
may be implicit. 257 Many agreements specifically define the standard to
which the farmee must work, however, usually by reference to due

256. A formulation that farmees should avoid is what one may call an “illusory”
substitute well right, such as would be created by a substitute well provision that called for
the farmee to have the right to drill a substitute well “at a location acceptable to farmor.”
Such a provision may not be enforceable at all. If enforceable, it gives the farmor complete
control of the substitute well.
257. Cf. True Oil v. Gibson, 392 P.2d 795, 797–800 (Wyo. 1964) (drilling not “commenced” under terms of lease when preliminary activities not performed with good faith
intention of completing performance).
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diligence and good and workmanlike conduct. 258 Obviously the standard set
may affect substantially the farmee’s potential liabilities and chances of
earning.
b) The Earning Standard
The farmee has the burden of proving that it has met the standard set by
the farmout to earn its interest. 259 Absolute performance will be the
presumed requirement. It has been held that substantial compliance is
inappropriate for farmout agreements.260 Most farmout agreements
specifically require absolute performance by the farmee to earn its
interest. 261 On occasion, however, the farmor will accept the farmee’s
substantial performance. 262 A farmee’s representative should certainly
negotiate the issue.
258. A typical example of a clause defining the standard of performance in the conduct
of operations is:
All test well and substitute well operations will be conducted with due
diligence, in a good and workmanlike manner, in compliance with all laws,
rules, regulations and orders of governmental authorities asserting jurisdiction,
with the terms and provisions of the leases affected and with the provisions of
all third party agreements relating to such operations, including any agreements
with other parties in the chain of leasehold title, and without cost, risk, liability
or obligation to farmor, expressly or by implication. Farmee will pay all bills
before delinquency and will keep and preserve the lease free of all liens,
charges and encumbrances arising out of their acts and operations thereon . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
259. See Inexco Oil Co. v. Crutcher-Tufts Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (W.D. La.
1975); see also Klein & Burke, supra note 3, at 494–95 (discusses Inexco Oil and the
parties’ interest in depth as substance of farmout agreement). But see Vickers v. Peakers,
227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29, 32 (1957) (court found “unless” assignment pursuant to
farmout had not terminated although drilling never reached objective depth).
260. Inexco Oil Co. v. Crutcher-Tufts Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (W.D. La. 1975).
261. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 84 (requires assignment by farmor only “If
Farmee . . . complies fully with all the provisions of this agreement to Farmor’s
satisfaction.”).
262. For example:
In drilling all wells under this Agreement, Farmee shall conduct all operations
connected therewith in accordance with the standards of a reasonably prudent
operator. Farmee shall employ such practices as are consistent with sound engineering, effective geological exploration, and oil field safety. Farmee shall substantially comply with all applicable laws and governmental rules and
regulations.
***
For all wells drilled under this Agreement, Farmee shall substantially perform
and comply with all of the material covenants, terms, and provisions contained
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Farmees should avoid two performance standards occasionally found in
farmout agreements. One requires that the farmee perform “to the farmor’s
satisfaction” in order to earn the interest.263 Though a standard designated
by reference to the discretion of one of the parties will probably be limited
by reasonableness, 264 such a standard is an invitation to litigation. A second
pernicious performance standard requires that the farmee must request
assignment of its earned interest in writing within a specified period and
that it forfeits the interest if it fails to do so.265 Such a provision may well
be enforceable on the theory that a court’s function is to give effect to the
agreement that the parties have made, rather than to write the contract that
the parties should have written. 266
B. Well Information
The second major group of important issues addressed in farmout
agreements relates to the information that the parties develop in the course
of drilling the well. What tests are to be conducted? What information is to
be shared by the farmee with the farmor? When and under what conditions
is the sharing to take place? These issues fundamentally affect the farmee’s
cost of performance. They also affect the value of the farmout transaction to
both the farmor and the farmee.
1. Tests to be Conducted
The parties often list tests that the farmee must perform in the course of
drilling in an appendix attached to the farmout agreement. Because of their
physical location and because the lawyers who draft or review farmout
in Exhibit “B”, entitled “Provisions Applicable to Test Wells”, attached hereto
and made a part hereof by reference.
***
Upon substantial compliance with each of the material covenants, terms, and
conditions set forth in this Agreement, each Farmor shall upon written demand
by Farmee, assign or cause to be assigned to Farmee . . . the following:
(Emphasis added.)
263. See, e.g, supra note 261.
264. Supra note 207.
265. See Scott, supra note 3, at 84. For example: “Farmee shall request any assignment
earned hereunder in writing within 30 days from completion of the earning well. If such
timely request is not made, all rights and interests which farmee may then have under or by
virtue of this agreement shall automatically terminate.” Id. Several of the agreements collected contained similar language.
266. Cf. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 755 F.2d 1151, 1154–55 (5th Cir.
1985); Royal Bank of Canada v. Joffre Resources Ltd., [1985] 5 W.W.R. 75, 80–81 (Alberta
Q.B.).
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agreements often do not understand the technical terms that are used to
describe the tests, the testing provisions tend to get little attention. That
oversight can be very expensive for both the farmor and the farmee.
The tests required under the farmout are important to the farmee because
the farmee is obligated to pay the costs of testing. If the farmout requires
extensive and expensive testing, the burden of drilling increases greatly. An
attorney drafting or reviewing a farmout agreement on behalf of a farmee,
therefore, must either understand the necessity for and the probable costs of
the tests required or specifically defer to the business judgment of the client
on these matters.
A “blank check” requirement that the farmee test “to the farmor’s
satisfaction” should be avoided. When possible, the contract should set out
the specific tests to be conducted. When that is not possible because the
parties cannot agree or cannot foresee what will be necessary, reference to
the prudent operator standard may be advisable.267
The farmor is equally concerned about what tests are to be conducted.
Even if the farmor’s primary purpose in farming out is to get a well drilled
to preserve its lease, the testing information is likely to be important for
what it may tell the farmor about other leases that it may own in the area.
Where the farmor’s goal in farming out is to get leases explored, the
information developed from testing may prove more important to the
farmor than whether or not the drilled wells produce in paying quantities.
One drafting or reviewing a farmout agreement for a farmor, therefore,
needs to understand equally as much as any counterpart working for the
farmee what the various kinds of tests that the agreement may specifically
require and what kind of information they may develop.
Farmout agreements commonly provide that the farmor’s representatives
will have “the freedom of the rig floor,” which in the trade means that the
farmor has the right to all information derived from testing in the course of
drilling. 268 In addition, many agreements will specifically require the
farmee to provide testing information. 269

267. For example: “In the course of drilling the initial well or any substitute well
provided for herein, farmee agrees to do such evaluation and to have made such electric,
radiation and porosity surveys as a prudent operator would do, or have made, under the
same or similar circumstances . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It may also be advisable, at least
from the farmee’s view, to provide specifically that testing need not be done if there are no
commercially viable “shows” of hydrocarbons.
268. Cage, supra note 3, at 165; Klein & Burke, supra note 3, at 502.
269. For example:
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As a practical matter, the importance of testing to both the farmee and
the farmor means that the attorneys representing the parties cannot work in
a vacuum. They must consult with their clients’ scientific personnel. They
must ask the hard questions. Is there a clear understanding as to what the
terminology used to describe the testing means? What will it cost? Will the
information produced be worth the cost? When and under what conditions
is information to be supplied?
2. When Must the Farmee Supply Testing Information?
When the farmee must supply information derived from testing may be
crucially important to the farmor. The farmor may have leases in the area
that it needs to evaluate before their primary terms expire. The farmee may
“steal a march” on the farmor by withholding testing information until the
farmee can use it in evaluating its leases or formulating its lease acquisition
program for the area. Farmout agreements, therefore, commonly set time
limits for the farmee to provide testing information.270 When the agreement

Farmees shall afford the duly authorized representatives of farmor, at their sole
risk, access to the Test Well on all operations incident thereto and shall furnish
farmor all information pertaining to or obtained from all operations conducted
in connection therewith, including daily drilling reports, copies of any sample
analyses made, all reports to government agencies, all test results and copies of
all logs (including casing logs) and surveys (including velocity surveys) made,
together with such other notices and information as are customarily furnished
by the operator to a non-operator working interest owner.
(Emphasis added.)
270. For example:
The party drilling any well provided for in the Agreement to which this exhibit
is attached, agrees and binds itself to observe and comply with the provisions
hereinafter contained; failure to comply with such provisions shall release
Farmor from its obligations and covenants contained in said agreement.
***
2. During the drilling of any well:
***
c. As soon as available, furnish Farmor with records and representative samples of all cores taken; copies of the results of cores.
d. Furnish Farmor daily progress reports by telephone or telecopy giving the
nature of all work done and depth and formation penetrated beginning with the
date actual work is commenced at the location and continuing until drilling,
logging, testing, completing and equipping is completed or if a dry hole, the
well has been plugged and abandoned.
***
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requires absolute performance to earn, the farmee should give careful
consideration to these time limits.
3. Confidentiality
The parties may also want to bar or limit the dissemination of the information developed in testing by including confidentiality provisions. 271
While damages may be difficult to prove, confidentiality clauses should be
enforceable if damages are proved.272 In addition, their very presence is
likely to avoid disputes.
C. What Is Earned?
There are four dimensions to what is earned by drilling under a farmout
agreement: the surface area earned, the depth limitations, substances
covered, and the percentage of interest earned by drilling. In addition, both

f. Notify Farmor immediately when a show of oil or gas has been encountered
in drilling or coring, and before any formation is tested or electrical surveys are
run, notify Farmor in sufficient time for farmor to have representatives present.
(Emphasis added.)
271. For example, the following confidentiality provision is from an offshore farmout
agreement:
A. The seismic data acquired pursuant to this farmout agreement will be the
sole property of farmee and its participants, although black line copies of
display sections and a map showing the location of shot points used shall be
furnished to farmor for its information and use only.
B. Except as provided in subsection A immediately above, the parties hereto
agree that all geophysical, geological, engineering, technical, production tests
or other data obtained from all wells drilled under this agreement shall be the
property of farmor and farmee and shall be maintained as confidential information for a period of five (5) years from the date hereof, or until such information
is made public by the Minerals Management Service, unless both parties agree
in writing to a lesser period of time. It is understood that the filing of reports by
farmee which are required by governmental agencies shall not constitute a
breach hereof. It is also agreed and understood that farmee will be permitted to
provide each participant named in Section X below, with a copy of the information and data referred to in this paragraph, subject to the confidentiality
provisions of this paragraph.
C. It is understood and agreed that in the event that farmee agrees to relinquish
all of its rights under this agreement, the provisions of this section shall not
apply to farmor and farmor shall be able to use such data in such attempt or
attempts to further farmout this lease.
272. Cf. Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner, 12 S.W.2d 847, 848–49 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Austin 1929, writ ref’d) (covenant to reassign held enforceable); see infra text
accompanying notes 362–65.
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the farmor and the farmee must concern themselves with the farmor’s
overriding royalty, the “carried” costs, pooling provisions, conversion
rights, the payout definition, and proportionate reduction provisions.
1. Area Earned
In principle, the farmor’s and the farmee’s interests under a farmout
agreement will always conflict with respect to the acreage that is to be
earned. In practice, however, the parties negotiate the area to be earned by
the farmee so that it bears a fair relationship to the risks that must be taken.
As a general rule, the greater the risks that the farmee must take, the greater
the area earned by drilling under the farmout agreement.
The most narrow assignment that may be earned under a farmout agreement may be called a “borehole assignment.” A borehole assignment conveys to the farmee only the area actually drained by the borehole drilled.273
The farmee does not earn the right to participate in infill drilling. 274
A second form of limited assignment, and one very commonly seen in
the industry, is a “drill site assignment.” A drill site assignment provides
that the farmee earns the rights to a specified amount of acreage that is
designated as the drill site. Generally, the drill site includes the acreage
dedicated to the drilling or spacing unit that is approved by the state agency
with jurisdiction. When there is no state designated drilling or spacing unit,

273. An example of a borehole assignment is:
Assignor . . . does, subject to the terms and provisions herein contained, hereby
transfer, sell, assign and convey unto the said Assignee, its successors or
assigns, without warranty of title, express or implied, all of Assignor’s right,
title and interest in and to the oil and gas rights only as covered by the oil, gas
and mineral lease described in Exhibit “A”, attached hereto and by reference
made a part hereof . . . insofar and only insofar as such lease covers rights
specifically limited to the well bore of the ____ well located in Section ____,
____ County, ____ together with such interest’s part of all the production, if
any, produced under such oil, gas and mineral lease from such well bore and a
like interest in all personal property, fixtures and equipment located on the
lands described in Exhibit “A” or used or obtained in connection with such
well bore of the ____ well.
(Emphasis added.)
274. An unresolved question is whether the assignee of a borehole assignment under a
farmout agreement acquires any right to prevent the farmor from drilling an infill well or to
recover damages as a result of the drilling of an infill well that will cause substantial
drainage. There may also be question about whether a borehole assignment meets the
complete payout test. See supra text accompanying notes 22–25.
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the parties may describe a drill site assignment as a square 275 or a circle 276
around the top of the borehole.
Finally, the farmor may assign the farmee not only the drill site acreage,
but acreage outside of the drill site. 277 Assignment of outside acreage is
particularly common when the farmout is primarily for exploratory
purposes. As discussed above, the practice presents special tax problems. 278

275. The following describes the assigned tract as a square:
If Farmee [drills] . . . then Farmee shall have acquired all of Farmor’s undivided right, title and interests to an undivided ____ leasehold interest in and to
the Lease and the Lands, insofar and only insofar as the Lease and Lands cover
and affect the proration unit established for the Test Well, which proration unit
shall be established in accordance with the rules prescribed or permitted by the
Railroad Commission of Texas. In the absence of a designation of a proration
unit by the Railroad Commission of Texas, then if the Test Well is classified as
an oil well, then the acreage assigned thereto shall be 80 acres; if the Test Well
is classified as a gas well, the acreage assigned thereto shall be 320 acres. In
either case, the acreage assigned to a well shall be in the shape of a square, as
nearly as practicable, with a Test Well in the center thereof. For the purposes
of determining whether the Test Well is an oil well or a gas well, the
classification thereof in any form filed in respect thereto with the Railroad
Commission of Texas shall be conclusive.
(Emphasis added.)
276. The following describes the tract assigned as a circle:
[After drilling the earning well] you will upon written request to the farmor be
provided with an assignment with farmor’s interest in its lease(s) or portion of
lease(s) under that portion of the Farmout Area included in the unit established
for the earning well. Should a unit not be established, said assignment shall
cover farmor’s interest under that portion of the Farmout Area included in an
area having a radius of 300 feet around the earning well.
277. An example of an earning provision that would give the farmee acreage outside of
the drill unit, which might be appropriate for use in an exploratory “drill to earn” agreement,
follows:
If [the farmee earns] . . . the farmor will assign to farmee:
(a) an undivided 50 percent of the operating rights and working interests of
farmor in the leases subject to this agreement; (b) if, and only if, the test
well is completed for production of oil and/or gas, 100 percent of the
remaining operating rights and working interests of farmor in the land
within the designated drilling and spacing unit established by the ____
Commission for the test well, excepting and reserving to farmor [an
overriding royalty interest convertible upon payout] . . . .
278. See supra text accompanying notes 30–34.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

344

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

2. Depth Limitations
Just as oil and gas leases may be subdivided into separate surface tracts,
they can be subdivided into deep and shallow rights. Farmout agreements
often sever leases by placing depth limitations upon what the farmee earns
by drilling. Depth limitations may be stated on a footage basis; for example,
“6000 feet” or “the total depth drilled.”279 In the alternative, earned rights
may be limited by reference to a described formation, generally either the
deepest penetrated by drilling operations280 or the deepest actually
producing. 281 The strictest limitation, rarely seen but often discussed, limits
the farmee’s rights to those formations actually producing. Yet another
alternative limits what the farmee earns to the stratigraphic equivalent of
the well drilled.282 Finally, the parties may use some combination of
limitations.
279. An example of a total depth drilled limitation is: “All acreages assigned shall be
limited to a depth equal to one hundred feet (100') below the total depth penetrated by the
test well drilled on the drilling unit acreage.” (Emphasis added.) The reason for reference to
a specified depth below that actually penetrated is to give the farmee a right to drill deeper, if
need be, in order to maintain the production on its well. Sometimes, agreements will grant a
specific easement for such purposes:
[The assignment shall] reserve to Farmor all rights below the stratigraphic
equivalent of the base of the deepest producing sand as defined in the well
completion form filed with the Texas Railroad Commission, except for a
vertical easement which shall be assigned to Farmee for operational purposes
only in the upper one-hundred feet (100') of those reserved depths.
280. An example of a deepest formation penetrated limitation is:
If Farmee timely commences the drilling of the Initial Test Well, drills it to the
contract depth and fully and completely complies with all the other terms,
conditions and requirements of this Agreement, upon the completion of the
Initial Test Well or Substitute Well as a well capable of producing oil and/or
gas in paying quantities, Farmee will have earned an assignment of 100% of
Farmor’s interest in 160 acres around the drill site tract, being the ____ quarter
of section ____, township ____, range ____, ____ County, ____ and limited
from the surface to the base of the deepest formation penetrated.
(Emphasis added.)
281. An example of a deepest producing formation limitation, taken from a draft AAPL
Form 635 farmout agreement, is “if an assignment is earned, the rights earned will be as
follows: “limited to the interval from the surface down to and including, but not below, the
base of the deepest producing formation in the earning well.” This approach appears more
limited than a deepest penetrated formation limitation because it is quite likely that a well
drilled will be produced from a shallower depth than the deepest depth penetrated.
282. An example of a stratigraphic equivalent limitation follows:
If the Earning Test Well is drilled and completed as a well capable of
producing oil or gas in paying quantities, each Farmor shall assign to Farmee
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All of these limited assignments present potential problems. All are susceptible to interpretative disputes similar to those that arise in describing
the objective depth.283 When what is earned is limited to a specified depth
expressed in feet, the method used to measure the depth may be ambiguous.
The drafter should take care to describe the limitation by reference to
vertical depth or measured depth and to define precisely how to measure
depth. 284
If the depth limitation is stated by reference to a formation, the identity
and location of the formation may be open to question. In addition, a
special problem is likely to be confronted. When the agreement limits the
assignment to the base of a specified formation or to some specified number
of feet below the base of the formation, the formation must be identified
and located, and its base must be clearly discernible. That task may be
relatively easy, particularly in areas in which many wells have been drilled
or where the lithology at the base of the formation changes abruptly and
distinctly. In exploratory areas or in geologically complex areas, however,
stating a depth limitation by reference to a formation may be an invitation
for geologists to disagree.
A similar problem arises when the description of the assignment refers to
the “stratigraphic equivalent” of the depth drilled or of the formation
penetrated. The term “stratigraphic equivalent” is used frequently in areas
in which noncontiguous parts of the same formation may be found at
substantially different depths because of overthrusting or faulting. The
general effect of a reference to stratigraphic equivalent is to give the farmee
the right to the benefits of its risk-taking by giving it the right to
sedimentary strata it drilled, wherever found.
The specific effect of limiting the depth earned to the stratigraphic
equivalent may not be clear, however. There are several potential problems.
First, the term has a deceptively reassuring sound; it suggests a
one hundred percent (100%) of the right, title and interest of such Farmor in
those portions of the oil and gas leaseholds described in Exhibit “A” (down to
and only down to the stratigraphic equivalent of the total depth drilled in the
Earning Test Well) which are included within the spacing unit for the Earning
Test Well as established by the applicable state oil and gas regulatory agency or
by statute . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
283. See supra text accompanying notes 201–05 (discusses objective depth); see also
Niblack, Some Consequences of Horizontal Division of Oil and Gas Leaseholds, 8 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1963) (discusses how segregation is effected and rights and duties
incident to operations of segregated estate).
284. See supra text accompanying note 201.
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straightforward scientific test that in fact does not exist in every case.
Reasonable geologists may disagree as to whether particular formations or
zones are stratigraphic equivalents, and even articulate geologists may have
difficulty explaining its application to judges and jurors in terms that they
can understand. 285 Second, the term stratigraphic equivalent is potentially
ambiguous because it has at least three different meanings. Geologists
recognize time-stratigraphic, 286 biostratigraphic, 287 and rock-stratigraphic
equivalents. 288 The parties to a farmout generally wish to refer to rock285. As I have worked as a consultant, arbitrator, and expert witness, I have formulated
(with tongue only partly in cheek) what I call the “reasonable prudent law professor rule of
complexity.” I am a reasonable, prudent law professor, of better than average intelligence
and education, and if I cannot easily understand a concept or its application, neither will a
judge or jury. “Stratigraphic equivalent” fails my test.
This is not to say that “stratigraphic equivalent” should not be used as a limitation. One
lawyer who replied to my request for comment said:
Obviously, the term “stratigraphic equivalent” is less definite than a fixed
measured depth, but it is no more indefinite than naming a particular formation
(e.g., the ‘Upper Morrow Formation’) as the objective to be tested by the earning well—which, of course, is a common way to describe how deep the farmee
must drill. In either case, geologists could (but usually do not) disagree.
286. Time-stratigraphic equivalents are the sediments deposited and the rocks formed
during a specific time; i.e., in a given era, epoch, or age. North American Commission on
Stratigraphic Nomenclature, North American Stratigraphic Code, arts. 80, 81, in 67 AM. A.
PETR. GEOL. BULL. 841, 869 (1983) [hereinafter Strat. Code]. The Stratigraphic Code uses
the term “chronostratigraphic” rather than “time-stratigraphic.” Petroleum geologists
generally use the latter term, however. For a comprehensive, practical discussion of
terminology, see Owen, Commentary: Usage of Stratigraphic Terminology in Papers,
Illustrations, and Talks, 57 J. SEDIMENTARY PETROLOGY 363 (1987). For example,
geologists refer to sands deposited during the Pennsylvania Era, a time interval, as
Pennsylvanian sandstones, a time-stratigraphic interval measured by thickness. Strat. Code,
supra, arts. 66 and 67, at 868. Time-stratigraphic intervals are generally thicker than
individual rock-stratigraphic intervals, which form most petroleum reservoirs. Consequently,
they are not of immediate importance to petroleum geologists. A time-stratigraphic interval,
therefore, will rarely be what the parties intend when they refer to “stratigraphic equivalent”
in a farmout agreement; their reference is more likely to be to the potentially petroleum
bearing rock layers themselves.
287. Bio-stratigraphic equivalents are rocks that contain similar fossils. WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 218 (3d ed. 1981). See also Strat. Code, supra note
286, arts. 48 and 49, at 862. “Zones” are examples of bio-stratigraphic units. Id. art. 53, at
863. Geologists frequently use zones as references.
288. Rock-stratigraphic equivalents are mappable rock layers with distinctive top and
bottom boundaries. Strat. Code, supra note 286, arts. 22 and 23, at 855–58. (The
Stratigraphic Code uses the term “lithostratigraphic,” but geologists generally use the term
“rock-stratigraphic.”) The “formation” is the primary rock-stratigraphic unit. For example,
the “Caseyville formation” is described in H. WILLMAN, E. ATHERTON, T. BUSCHBACH, C.
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stratigraphic equivalency, and the way they identify the objective depth
may suggest their intention. 289 The parties should specifically define the
term “stratigraphic equivalent,” however, as biostratigraphic or rockstratigraphic and, where possible, refer to well-defined “marker
formations.” 290 Third, a stratigraphic equivalent may not exist. A limit on
depth earned to the “stratigraphic equivalent,” therefore, may not be a limit
at all. 291 To avoid this possibility, the farmout agreement should state a
maximum depth to be earned. 292

COLLINSON, J. FREY, M. HOPKINS, J. LINEBACK & J. SIMON, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS
STRATIGRAPHY 163–83 (Illinois Geological Survey Bulletin No. 95, 1975). Formations may
contain smaller rock-stratigraphic intervals that are designated as “members.” Strat. Code,
supra note 286, art. 25, at 858. For example, in southern Illinois, the Pennsylvania-age
Caseyville formation comprises four separate members. From top to bottom they are the
Pounds Sandstone Member, the Drury Shale Member, the Battery Rock Sandstone Member,
and the Lusk Shale Member. Stratigraphic sequence, or position, is the primary criterion
used to distinguish between the sandstone members and the shale members. The distinctions
are difficult to make; they cannot be made with only a short core sample, a hand specimen,
or a small outcrop of the formation. Furthermore, none of the sandstone members is
comprised only of sandstone or even one type of sandstone. For a discussion of local
variability within the Pounds Sandstone and the Battery Rock Sandstone over a distance of
eleven miles, see Koeninger & Mansfield, Earliest Pennsylvanian Depositional
Environments in Central Southern Illinois, in DEPOSITIONAL AND STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF
THE PENNSYLVANIAN SYSTEM OF THE ILLINOIS BASIN, PART 2; INVITED PAPERS; NINTH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CARBONIFEROUS STRATIGRAPHY AND GEOLOGY 76–81 (J.
Palmer & R. Dutcher eds. 1979). Alternatively, geologists may describe rock-stratigraphic
equivalents by reference to the type of sedimentary rock they constitute; e.g. the Caseyville
Sandstone or the Battery Rock Sandstone.
289. The most common way to designate an objective depth in a farmout is by naming
an objective rock-stratigraphic unit, whether it is a formally designated formation or member
(formally designated rock-stratigraphic units are listed in G. KEROHER, LEXICON OF
GEOLOGIC NAMES OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 1936-1960 (United States Geological Survey
Bulletin No. 1200 (1966)) or some other informally designated but locally recognized unit,
such as the Red Fork Sandstone in Oklahoma. (The Red Fork Sandstone is informally, but
effectively described in L. JORDAN, SUBSURFACE STRATIGRAPHIC NAMES OF OKLAHOMA 165
(Oklahoma Geological Survey Guidebook No. 6, 1957)). As indicated above, a formation is
a rock-stratigraphic unit. See supra note 288. This suggests that the parties intend that
“stratigraphic equivalent” in the portion of the agreement limiting what is earned is meant to
be “rock-stratigraphic equivalent.” If the objective depth is defined as a zone, the inference
is that “stratigraphic equivalent” means “bio-stratigraphic equivalent.” No inference arises if
the objective depth is stated in feet.
290. See supra note 289.
291. For example, a formation that has been broken by faulting may also have been
pushed laterally a substantial distance so that an offset well drilled may never encounter the
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3. Substances
An assignment of interest in a lease under a farmout agreement may
cover all substances covered by the lease. A farmout that is not specifically
limited will have this effect.293 Sometimes, however, an assignment of
interest under a farmout specifically limits the substances covered to oil and
gas, or to one or the other. 294 The special circumstances of the parties will
determine what substances a farmout covers. For example, the owner of a
lease in a known oil producing area may be willing to farm out gas rights,
but not oil rights. 295
“stratigraphic equivalent” of the formation or zone in the earning well in any of the three
senses discussed above.
292. For example: “In no event will Farmee earn any rights below a depth of
feet.”
293. The rule of construction that a description that is not limited by reference to a
fractional interest or to minerals or surface will be construed to be without limitation has
been called the “100% rule.” See Ellis, Rethinking the Duhig Doctrine, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 947, 954 (1982).
294. For example, the following assignment is for gas rights alone:
RIGHTS ASSIGNED: Subject to the terms and conditions set out herein, Owner
hereby grants to Operator the exclusive right and privilege of exploring, testing,
and developing the Operating Area for gas and, in connection therewith
Operator shall be entitled to exercise all the rights and privileges granted the
Lessee under the terms of said oil and gas lease as concerns gas and all of the
gas production from the Operating Area as shall be owned by Operator subject
to the following [royalties reserved].
(Emphasis added.) The following language conveys oil rights only:
It is expressly provided that this farmout agreement only covers “oil and oil
rights” and all rights, titles and interest ancillary or pertinent thereto, including
without limitation all right, title and interest of farmor in and to casinghead gas.
“Casinghead gas” as used herein is hereby defined as the same defined in the
statutes, regulations and judicial decisions of the State of Texas to which
reference is here made.
(Emphasis added.)
295. Severing oil rights from gas rights can lead to dispute between the parties as to
whether production is “oil” or “gas.” A precise chemical or scientific definition is difficult
because variations in temperature and pressure both in the reservoir and at the wellhead
determine whether hydrocarbons will be produced in liquid or gaseous state. The distinction
can have enormous economic consequences, however. An example is the “white oil” dispute
in the Texas Panhandle, in which owners of oil rights have argued that overproduction of gas
has caused lighter components of oil to vaporize, and owners of gas rights have argued that
gas was being produced as oil after artificial cooling. For general discussion, see Cartwright,
Texas Tea on Ice, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 1985, at 98. Owners of oil rights appear to be
winning that particular dispute. See Hufo Oils v. Railroad Comm’n, 717 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1986, no writ) (white oil was not oil for well classification purposes); Hufo
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When the interest earned by the farmee is limited to gas or to oil, the
agreement should address the definition of the substances covered. A
simple way is by reference to the classification of the farmout well by the
conservation authority; e.g., anything produced from a well classified as a
gas well is considered to be “gas” for purposes of the farmout. 296 If this
approach is chosen, the agreement should also deal with what will happen if
the conservation authority changes the classification of the well. An
approach that protects the interests of both the farmor and the farmee is to
continue the farmee’s rights to production from the well drilled, but to
modify the acreage earned to conform to the spacing approved for the new
classification of the well.297
A farmout that covers oil but not gas, or gas but not oil, is an invitation
to controversy. Because the meaning of “oil” and “gas” and “oil well” and

Oils v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 802 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1986) (white oil production may
not be used to classify a well as an oil well under an operating agreement).
296. For example:
the term “gas” as used herein shall mean gas, including all liquid hydrocarbons
and other constituent elements produced from a gas well or gas pool, and the
classification of a well as a “gas well” or a pool as a “gas pool” by the Oil
Conservation Division of the Energy and Minerals Department of the State of
New Mexico, or other governmental agency exercising like jurisdiction, shall
be conclusive.
297. For example:
It is specifically agreed that if the [name of well] located in [description] is
hereafter reclassified by the [conservation agency] as an oil well or if the pool
from which said well is producing is hereafter reclassified by the [conservation
agency] as an oil pool, then, and in that event, this Contract and Operating
Agreement shall be automatically contracted and modified as of the date of
such reclassification to cover an Operating Area consisting only of the
[description] containing 40 acres, more or less, as concerns oil rights from the
surface to the subsurface depth of 2,900 feet, but in no event below the base of
the Formation.
The term “oil” as used herein shall mean any petroleum hydrocarbon produced from a well in the liquid phase and which existed in a liquid phase in the
reservoir and any gas or vapor or both gas and vapor indigenous to and
produced from a pool classified as an oil pool by the [conservation agency].
If this Contract and Operating Agreement is contracted and modified in
accordance with this Article X, at every place where the term “gas” or “gas
rights” is used in this Contract and Operating Agreement, the term “oil” or “oil
rights” shall be substituted therefor on and from the date of such contraction
and modification. Except as expressly stated in this Article X, this Contract and
Operating Agreement shall remain otherwise unchanged and unamended by the
operation of the provisions of this Article X.
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“gas well” is unclear in many states, a drafter should avoid the distinction
unless the business deal requires it. 298
4. Percentage Earned
The percentage earned by the farmee in the leases assigned is also of
obvious importance to the parties. The higher the percentage, the better for
the farmee. As discussed elsewhere, the working interest earned by the
farmee in the well site acreage must at least equal the percentage of the
drilling costs paid by the farmee if the farmee is to claim the intangible
drilling cost deduction. 299 Only rarely do farmout agreements fail to meet
this standard. 300
The size of the percentage interest earned by the farmee in farmed-out
acreage outside of the drill site unit, as well as the interest retained by the
farmee after the farmor’s “back-in,” is subject to negotiation. One generalization that can be made, however, is that the interest earned by the farmee
in drilling tends to be greater in times of economic downturn. When marketing conditions make drilling less attractive, the farmor must sweeten the
pot to entice the farmee to take the risk. On the other hand, the better the
prospect being farmed out, the more attractive drilling becomes to the
farmee, even for a smaller percentage of interest. Farmees must evaluate
offers with common sense and an eye upon the market in the area.
5. Nonoperating Interest Reserved
Most farmout agreements provide that the farmor reserves a
nonoperating interest in production from the earning well or wells during
the payout period. Usually, the interest reserved is in the form of an
overriding royalty interest, 301 but other types of nonoperating interests may
also be encountered. One author has suggested that the interests of the
farmor may be better served in some circumstances by reserving a net
profits interest rather than an overriding royalty. 302

298. See Cage, supra note 3, at 160.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 17–25.
300. The intangible drilling cost deduction is of great importance to the farmee.
Depriving the farmee of this deduction is worth nothing to the farmor, since the farmor
cannot claim the deduction unless it pays the costs. See id.
301. An overriding royalty is a royalty interest, an interest in production or proceeds free
of the costs of production, carved out of the lessee’s interest in an oil and gas lease. E.
KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 427–28.
302. L. MOSBURG, supra note 3, at 283–84. Net profits interests frequently are reserved
in California farmouts. See Himebaugh, supra note 3, at 23–24.
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The reason for the retained nonoperating interest is the complete payout
tax rule; the farmee must hold a working interest in the earning well until
payout in order to obtain the full benefit of intangible drilling cost
deduction. 303 The farmor, on the other hand, will want to realize a cash flow
from the farmout. Since the tax rules effectively bar the farmor from
owning a portion of the working interest until payout, the farmor generally
will reserve an overriding royalty interest. Thus, the interests of the farmee
in obtaining full tax benefits and the interest of the farmor in obtaining a
cash flow are both served when the farmor reserves a nonoperating interest.
The economic impact of the nonoperating interest reserved by the farmor
is extremely important to the parties’ business deal. In this respect the
interests of the farmor and the farmee are in direct contradiction. The
farmor will invariably seek a larger retained nonoperating interest rather
than a smaller one. In boom times, the farmor commonly retains a l/8th
overriding royalty. The farmee generally seeks to minimize the size of the
nonoperating interest retained by the farmor. When the industry is in
recession, farmees are usually more successful than when the industry
enjoys prosperity.
One commentator has suggested compromising the interests of the
farmor and the farmee by providing for a sliding scale overriding royalty
interest keyed to production. 304 Another has noted that sliding scale
overriding royalties do not work well in practice because “part of the
incentive to improve production was taken away, there was an open
invitation to questionable, if not fraudulent production control methods, and
the accounting headaches were multiplied.”305 Today, the more common
approach is an overriding royalty that increases after payout. 306
Drafting for a retained nonoperating interest presents interesting
problems. One of the most important is whether the retained interest is to be
inclusive or exclusive of existing burdens. A retained interest that is
inclusive of existing burdens, typically the landowner’s royalty and
overriding royalties created for landmen or geologists, places the risk of
303. For a discussion of the complete payout principle, see supra text accompanying
notes 22–25.
304. Hemingway, supra note 6, at 3, 5.
305. Cage, supra note 3, at 164.
306. For example, the following clause would increase the farmor’s retained overriding
royalty after payout: “At payout (i.e., after such Well has paid to you from the working
interest 100 percent of your expenses of drilling, completing, equipping and operating said
well) farmor’s overriding royalty interest will increase to the difference between 30 percent
(30%) and the royalties, overriding royalties, and/or other leasehold burdens.”
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excess burdens upon the farmor, at least in part. 307 Consider for example,
the farmor that reserves an overriding royalty equal to the difference
between existing burdens and 25% of total production because it believes
that the lease is subject only to a 3/16th landowner’s royalty, when in fact
the lease is also subject to a 1/16 overriding royalty reserved by the lease
broker who originally took the lease. The overlooked “excess” overriding
royalty will consume the farmor’s retained interest. 308 In contrast, a retained
interest that is exclusive of existing burdens places the risk of excess
burdens upon the farmee from the start; the interest reserved is in addition
to other burdens upon production. 309
A second problem relates to the possibility that the farmee will want to
drill an additional well on the farmed-out acreage before the earning well
has paid out. Will the farmor have the right to participate in the drilling of a
second well, or should the farmor be limited to its nonoperating interest?
The farmor and the farmee are likely to have conflicting economic interests
at stake. If a farmor reserves a nonoperating interest convertible at payout
to a working interest, the agreement should address what the rights of the
farmor in a subsequent well drilled before payout will be. 310
307. An example of a retained nonparticipating interest that is inclusive of existing
burdens is: “The assignment shall reserve to farmor an overriding royalty equal to the
difference between existing lease burdens of record as of the date of this agreement and
____ percent.” Another version states:
Until farmee has recovered out of the proceeds from the sale of production
from the Initial Test Well or Substitute Well all of the costs and expenses
farmee incurs in the drilling, testing, completing, equipping and operating the
Initial Test Well or Substitute Well, farmor will retain and reserve 6.25 percent
overriding royalty interest, inclusive of all other overriding royalty interest and
lease burdens above the normal 12.5 percent land owners royalty interest.
308. Of course, if known and unknown burdens exceed 25%, the excess burden will fall
upon the farmee, unless there has been a warranty of title by the farmor.
309. An example of a retained interest exclusive of outstanding burdens is:
Assignor reserves unto itself, its successors and assigns over, above and in
addition to all royalties, overriding royalties and other burdens, if any, against
the production from said leases, an overriding royalty of ____ of all of the oil
and ____ of all of the gas, casinghead gas, condensate and other liquid or
gaseous hydrocarbons produced and saved from or attributable to said leases
during the terms thereof, including any extension or renewals taken within six
months of termination of said leases . . . .
310. An example of a farmout provision reserving to the farmor the maximum flexibility
with respect to additional wells drilled before payout is:
If farmee decides to drill an additional well on any assigned acreage prior to
payout of the earning well, farmor shall have the option to either (1) participate
in the well or (2) be carried in the well while reserving the overriding royalty
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Third, is the problem of pooling. The farmout agreement should make it
clear that the farmee has the right to pool the farmor’s retained interest.311
Otherwise, a question arises as to whether the farmee may pool and bind the
farmor, particularly in Texas. 312
Finally, the clause providing for the retained nonparticipating interest
should specify what costs, if any, the retained interest must bear. Overriding
royalty interests are generally free of costs of production, but may be

and option to convert to a working interest as provided in [reference to
reservation provision]. Should farmee choose (1) above, this choice shall be
effective with respect to all of the assigned acreage, but farmor shall continue
to be carried to payout on any well previously spudded. Should farmor choose
(2) above, farmor’s election at payout shall be effective with respect to all of
the assigned acreage when the first well to payout on the assigned acreage pays
out, but farmor shall continue to be carried to payout on any well previously
spudded.
(Emphasis added.)
311. For example:
[Pooling] Assignor grants Assignee, insofar as Assignor has the right to do so
and subject always to the terms and conditions of the Leases herein assigned,
the right to pool or combine said Leases with other leases or lands so as to
establish units containing not more than 640 surface acres (plus 10% tolerance)
for the production of gas well gas. In the event any Lease or Leases assigned
herein is (are) pooled or unitized with other leases or lands for production of
gas as hereinabove provided, the overriding royalty reserved herein shall, as to
the lands covered by this Partial Assignment which are so pooled, be paid to
Assignor in the proportion that the number of acres assigned herein and so
pooled bears to the total number of acres in such pooled unit.
It would be preferable for the clause to provide specifically that pooling by the farmee would
bind the farmor’s reserved nonparticipating interest.
312. In Texas a pooling or unitization agreement does not bind the owner of a prior outstanding royalty interest. MCZ Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 49, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Brown v. Getty Reserve Oil Co., 626 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 1982, writ dism’d). Contra 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 230,
§ 221.1(7); Williams, Stare Decisis and the Pooling of Nonexecutive Interests in Oil and
Gas, 46 TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1015–27 (1968). This doctrine originated in Brown v. Smith,
141 Tex. 425, 431–32, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46–47 (1943). The court in Brown noted that an
overriding royalty owner’s interest is real property under Texas law and that a pooling
agreement involves a cross-conveyance of the joining parties interests. Id. Proceeding from
this basis, the court held that absent any showing of intent on the part of the reserved royalty
owner, the conferring of a mineral leasehold did not confer the right to dispose of the royalty
owner’s property. Id. at 47. See Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569, 571,
598–606 (1948) (discusses implications of Brown case).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

354

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

subject to costs subsequent to production. 313 The law on the issue is not so
clear as to make specific drafting unnecessary, however. The meaning of
the terms net profit interests, production payments, and carried interests is
even less clear. Use of such terms invites litigation unless they are
specifically defined. 314
6. Conversion
The conversion provision of a farmout agreement addresses whether the
retained nonoperating interest that the farmor retains to provide a cash flow
will be converted at some point in time to a share of the working interest.
There are three possibilities: no conversion, mandatory conversion, and
optional conversion. Which of these the farmor or the farmee may prefer
will depend upon circumstances and the goals of each.
When the agreement lacks any conversion provision, the nonoperating
interest retained by the farmor will continue as long as production from the
well continues. That may be attractive to a farmor needing additional cash
flow or commitment of reserves, or to one distrustful of the business
acumen of the farmee, or anticipating marginal production. Omitting a
conversion provision may also be attractive to a farmee expecting prolific
production. A nonoperating interest (for example, a 1/16th overriding
royalty) will be less of an economic burden if production is prolific than if
it is marginal. Generally, however, the parties to farmout agreements are
actively involved in the oil business and have a predilection in favor of full
participation. Relatively few farmouts omit conversion provisions for the
nonoperating interest retained by the farmor. 315
If the nonoperating interest retained is convertible to a working interest,
the farmee generally prefers mandatory conversion. 316 Mandatory
313. See Cline v. Angle, 216 Kan. 328, 532 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1975). Often, a farmout
clause that reserves an interest in the farmor will specifically state that the interest is free of
all production costs. For example: “This overriding royalty shall be free and clear of all costs
of production, gathering, completion, dehydration, trucking, transportation, marketing,
treating, and taxes except applicable windfall profit, excise, ad valorem, gross production
and severance taxes.”
314. See Aminoil USA, Inc. v. OKC Corp., 629 F. Supp. 647, 650–54 (E.D. La. 1986). In
Aminoil the farmor and the farmee disagreed over whether actual or imputed interest and
legal expenses were properly chargeable against the net profits account. Id. at 648. The jury
was permitted to consider expert accounting testimony, since the agreement was not explicit.
Id. at 650.
315. If the farmor does not have the right to convert its overriding royalty, the agreement
may provide to increase it after payout. See supra note 306.
316. An example of a mandatory conversion provision follows:
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conversion, or no conversion, gives the farmee additional certainty. The
farmor, in contrast, generally prefers to maintain flexibility by retaining an
option either to retain its overriding royalty or to “back in” to a working
interest. 317 The structure adopted usually reflects nothing more than the
bargaining leverage of the parties.
The conversion structure adopted may present some special drafting
problems. One is whether the farmor that either elects not to convert its
nonoperating interest into a working interest or is barred from doing so, has
a right to participate in in-fill drilling. This is similar to the problem
discussed above of whether the farmor should participate in drilling before
payout, and similar drafting devices will deal with this situation. 318 Another
problem is the effective date of the conversion, whether mandatory or
optional. Farmout agreements often make the conversion effective on the

If and only if, the test well is completed for the production of oil and/or gas,
farmor shall assign to farmee 100 percent of its operating rights and working
interest in the acreage within the designated drilling and spacing unit
established by the Commission for the test well, excepting and reserving to
farmor, in addition to any other overriding royalties or nonoperating burdens on
production, an overriding royalty of 1/16th of an 8/8ths of all oil, gas and
associated substances produced and saved from the test well until payout of the
well, at which time the reserved overriding royalty of farmor shall terminate
and 50 percent of the operating rights and working interest of farmor assigned
under this subsection will automatically revert to farmor, and the test well, the
material and equipment therein and thereon, and all production thereafter
recovered therefrom and the operating rights and working interest in the farmed
out lands in the drilling and spacing unit will be earned thereafter by farmor
and farmee in equal 50 percent shares.
(Emphasis added.)
317. An example of a conversion option is:
If the Initial Well or any Subsequent Earning Well reaches the Objective Depth
and is completed as a commercial well, and if it has been drilled in accordance
with all of the terms and conditions of this agreement, farmee shall have
earned, and farmor will deliver upon farmee’s written request an assignment of
the oil and gas rights as defined in this Article. The assignment shall:
***
6. Reserve to farmor the option after payout to convert its overriding royalty to
a ____ percent (____%) working interest in the assigned acreage and in all
leasehold equipment, materials, and production.
See also Scott, supra note 3, at 84–85 (¶ 6(d) of example agreement).
318. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

356

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

first day of the month following payout. 319 While that approach may be
administratively convenient, the delay may cost the farmor a substantial
amount. The farmor with an option to convert will prefer to have its
election effective immediately. 320
7. Payout
As discussed above, the payout definition in a farmout agreement is of
crucial importance if the farmee is to obtain the benefits of the intangible
drilling cost deduction. 321 For the farmee to obtain the full benefit of the
deduction, it must own a share of the working interest of the well drilled
equal to the percentage of the intangible drilling costs claimed until
recovery of all of the costs of drilling, completing, equipping, and operating
attributable to that interest. 322 Conversion of the farmor’s retained interest
must not occur before complete payout. Drafters have devised no “magic”
language to express the complete payout definition.323 No tax problem
should arise, however, so long as it is apparent that the complete payout test
is satisfied. 324
Whatever the definition of payout adopted, the parties face the practical
problem of determining whether payout has occurred. Most farmout agree-

319. For example: “Any such exchange [of an overriding royalty interest for a working
interest] shall be effective as of 7:00 a.m. on the first day of the month after the month in
which payout occurred.” See Cage, supra note 3, at 165.
320. See supra note 310, in which the quoted optional conversion provision continues:
“The party shall promptly execute a recordable instrument setting forth farmor’s election,
which shall be effective as of 7:00 a.m. on the first day following payout.”
321. See supra text accompanying notes 17–25.
322. For the language of the revenue rulings’ definition of complete payout, see supra
note 22.
323. Some definitions do not even mention the term “payout”:
At such time as Farmee has recovered out of its share of production from the
Earning Test Well an amount equal to all costs to Farmee for all services and
material necessary for developing, equipping, operating, and maintaining the
Earning Test Well, including all drilling, testing and completion costs of said
Earning Test Well, and for ad valorem, severance, and other taxes upon or
measured by production and applicable to Farmee’s working interest share of
production, each Farmor shall have the separate right to convert its reserved 1
/16th of 8/8ths overriding royalty, as proportionately reduced pursuant to the
provisions of Section ____ above, into a like proportion of an undivided fifty
percent (50%) share of the working interest in the Earning Test Well site or
portion thereof to which its said overriding royalty applied . . . .
324. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of “Payout” for tax purposes, see P.
MAXFIELD & J. HOUGHTON, supra note 27, U 9.04[5],

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/4

2017]

Farmout Agreements

357

ments provide for periodic reports from the farmee to the farmor. 325 In addition many agreements give the farmor specific audit rights for an agreed
time. 326 Still, interpretive disputes frequently arise. In Humble Exploration
Co. v. Amcap Petroleum Associates—1977 327 the parties disagreed over
whether the Windfall Profit Tax should be included with “production,
severance or other similar taxes” in calculating payout.328 The court of
appeals held that it should because for the farmee the tax was a liability that
reduced the proceeds of production it actually received. 329 In Continental
Oil Co. v. American Quasar Petroleum Co. of New Mexico, Inc.330 the issue
was whether expenses incurred by a farmee as the result of a blowout were
to be taken into account even though they were covered by insurance. 331
The Tenth Circuit held that they were, because the farmout agreement did
not require the farmee to obtain insurance, and the farmee could not claim
the premiums paid as a cost in computing payout. 332 In Mengden v.
Peninsula Production Co. 333 the dispute was whether production from
pooled units was to be allocated wholly to payout of the farmout upon
which the wells were located or apportioned between the farmouts in
proportion to the acreage that each contributed to the units.334 The Texas
Supreme Court held that apportionment was required on the basis of a
labored interpretation of the agreement.335 These cases clearly suggest that
payout should be defined as fully as the parties can agree.

325. See Scott, supra note 3, at 85:
Each calendar month following each assignment requested hereunder, and until
the final notice of payout, Farmee will furnish Farmor a report showing in
reasonable detail the monthly and cumulative status of payout and the
supporting data therefor. Promptly after payout occurs, Farmee shall so notify
Farmor and advise that the option is exercisable.
***
Id.
326. The agreement attached at Scott, supra note 3, at 85 continues, “For two years
following each payout, Farmee shall maintain, and Farmor shall have the right to audit, all
records pertaining thereto.”
327. 658 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
328. Id at 862.
329. Id. at 863.
330. 599 F.2d 363 (10th Cir. 1979).
331. Id. at 364.
332. Id at 365.
333. 544 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1976).
334. Id. at 644.
335. Id at 648.
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Another problem is how to handle money contributions that may be
received by the farmee. Most farmouts are silent on this issue. When the
farmout does address the issue, generally the parties will agree that the
farmor and the farmee will share money contributions proportionately to
their ultimate interests in the farmed-out acreage. 336 The farmee would
prefer to reserve contributions for itself, and that is sometimes done,
particularly in agreements in which the farmor retains only a nonoperating
interest without right of conversion. 337 Of course, if the operating
agreement is made effective upon the execution of the farmout agreement,
the provisions of the operating agreement will govern. 338

336. The most common way of accomplishing this is to credit the amount of cash
contributions to payout. For example:
Farmoutor hereby relinquishes to farmoutee all of farmoutor’s working interest
in said well and the production therefrom until such time, hereafter called the
“payout”, as the gross revenue from said production (or market value, if taken
or sold by farmoutee) equals the cost of drilling, testing, completing, equipping
and operating said well, plus the cost of marketing production therefrom, but
less any cash contribution for or on account of the drilling of said well.
(Emphasis added.) Note, however, that the language does not address acreage contributions.
337. The parties probably assume that the farmee is entitled to keep contributions if the
agreement does not address the issue. They should explicitly address this issue, however, to
avoid argument as to whether an implied obligation to share contributions exists. Cf. Smith,
Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest
Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1 (1986) (discuss implied duties).
338. See art. VIII.C. of the AAPL 1977-610 Model Form Operating Agreement. This
model provision provides:
While this agreement is in force, if any party contracts for a contribution of
cash toward the drilling of a well or any other operation on the Contract Area,
such contribution shall be paid to the party who conducted the drilling or other
operation and shall be applied by it against the cost of such drilling or other
operation. If the contribution be in the form of acreage, the party to whom the
contribution is made shall promptly tender an assignment of the acreage,
without warranty of title, to the Drilling Parties in the proportions said Drilling
Parties shared the cost of drilling the well. If all parties hereto are Drilling
Parties and accept such tender, such acreage shall become a part of the Contract
Area and be governed by the provisions of this agreement. If less than all
parties hereto are Drilling Parties and accept such tender, such acreage shall not
become a part of the Contract Area. Each party shall promptly notify all other
parties of all acreage or money contributions it may obtain in support of any
well or any other operation on the Contract Area.
Id. The AAPL 1982-610 Model Form Operating Agreement contains a similar agreement.
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a) Requiring More Than the Tax Rule
Often the farmee and the farmor negotiate a variation on the payout
concept. Depending upon the adversaries’ respective bargaining powers,
they may define payment more liberally or more restrictively.
So long as the complete payout tax rule is satisfied, the farmee is entitled
to the full intangible drilling cost deduction. Thus, a farmout agreement
drafted so that the event that will permit the farmor to convert its
nonoperating interest to a working interest is some multiple of the cost of
drilling, completing, equipping, and operating the earning well, will result
in no adverse tax effect upon the parties.
One circumstance in which the parties may agree that the payout
definition should include expenses not required by the tax rules is when a
substitute well has been drilled. So long as the substitute well is not
considered to be a continuation of the initial well, 339 tax law does not
appear to require that the initial well’s costs be considered in computing
payout. The farmee will certainly want them to be considered, however.
Surprisingly, farmout definitions of payout rarely focus upon this issue. A
farmout that contains a substitute well clause should specifically address
whether the costs of drilling an unsuccessful initial well are to be taken into
account in computing payout of the successful substitute well.
b) Requiring Less Than the Tax Rule
If the parties choose a definition of payout not as restrictive as that of the
Internal Revenue Service, the farmee may lose a portion of the intangible
drilling cost deduction. A classic example, called the “basket payout”
problem, 340 arises in the context of the multiple well farmout. In Revenue
Ruling 80-109, the IRS denied deduction of 25% of IDCs incurred by a
farmee who entered into a farmout agreement to drill wells on two
noncontiguous tracts in exchange for 100% of the working interest in each
tract until the aggregate income from both tracts equaled payout, after

339. One could conceivably view a substitute well as a continuation of initial drilling
operations, however, particularly when the farmee is obligated to drill the substitute well.
See, e.g., Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 780–81 (5th Cir. 1986)
(sidetracking operation part of drilling of initial well under art. VI.A. of 1977 Model Form
Operating Agreement). Article VI.B.4 of the 1982 Model Form Operating Agreement
attempts to clarify the ambiguity.
340. The term “basket payout” is used to describe the situation where the revenues from
more than one well are used to compute payout. Brand, Acreage Contribution Trades,
LANDMAN, May 1982, at 16.
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which the farmee was entitled to a 75% working interest in each tract. 341
The IRS reasoned that because it was possible that one of the properties
would pay out for the other, the complete payout principle was not
satisfied. 342 The basket payout problem can be avoided by drafting the
payout provision of the multiple well farmout agreement so that payout is
determined on an individual well basis. 343
8. Proportionate Reduction
Farmout agreements generally contain proportionate reduction clauses
for the same reason that they are found in oil and gas leases. In leases, the
proportionate reduction clause protects the lessee against having to pay
more than the percentage of royalty and the amount of other lease payments
bargained for. 344 If the lessor owns less than 100% of the mineral interest,
the clause will proportionately lessen his royalty. In a farmout agreement,
the proportionate reduction clause works to reduce the farmor’s retained
nonoperating interest and the working interest to which it may be converted
if the farmor owns less than the percentage lease interest that it purportedly
has farmed out.
Proportionate reduction clauses in leases and farmout agreements also
involve much the same interpretative problems. The most common dispute
is whether the parties intended that the proportionate reduction clause
should apply in a particular situation. A farmout agreement typically deals
with three “blocks” of property interests of different sizes and types
belonging to the farmor. One block is the interest farmed out to the farmee.
The second block is the nonparticipating interest reserved. The third is the

341. Rev. Rul. 80-109, 1980-1 C.B. 129.
342. Id.
343. The following is a well-by-well payout provision:
For these purposes, “payout” shall be deemed to occur when proceeds or
market value of production from any well completed on the above described
lands, (after deducting production taxes, royalty, overriding royalty and like
burdens) shall equal 100% of Second Party’s actual cost of drilling, testing,
equipping and completing the well, including the actual cost of any reworking,
deepening or plugging back, plus 100% of the actual cost of operation of the
well; the proceeds of production and the cost of such development and
operation to be attributable only to the undivided interest subject hereto if less
than the full interest in the oil and gas. Payout shall be determined and the
option shall be exercised separately as to the proration unit around each well
drilled on the above described land.
(Emphasis added.)
344. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 251.
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interest to which the nonparticipating interest reserved converts after
payout. An agreement can define all of these blocks as “net” percentages,
without proportionate reduction, or it can state them as “gross” numbers,
subject to proportionate reduction. Disputes arise when the parties mix
these situations.
Consider a situation in which a farmor signs a farmout agreement purporting to farm out 100% of the working interest, subject to a 6.25%
overriding royalty interest convertible to 50% of the working interest after
payout, but the farmor only owns a 25% working interest. The stage is set
for trouble if proportionate reduction provisions do not specifically apply to
all three interests. If the proportionate reduction provision does not apply
specifically either to the overriding royalty reserved or to the after-payout
conversion right of the farmor, the farmee may find the economics of its
deal substantially less attractive than it originally anticipated. If
proportionate reduction does not apply to the interest farmed out, and the
farmor has warranted title, the farmor may be liable.
The drafting technique is easy to state, but difficult to apply consistently.
The technique requires either that the farmout state all three of the farmor’s
interests, the leases farmed out, the nonoperating interest reserved, and the
after-payout conversion, in gross and then proportionately reduce them, or
that all three interests be stated as “net” and none be reduced.345
D. Administration
Farmout agreements may include a variety of administrative provisions.
Administrative provisions are not generally essential to the structure of the
contract; the parties could perform under a farmout agreement if they were
omitted entirely. Properly drafted administrative provisions make the
parties’ relationship under the agreement smoother, however, and may be
crucial to the business success of the agreement. Administrative provisions
may be as important in particular situations as any of the essential issues of
farmout agreements.

345. The most common way of stating proportionate reduction provisions in farmout
agreements is to provide that the farmout covers, and the farmee can earn, “all of Farmor’s
right, title and interests” in operating rights and working interests in specified leases, and
then to provide for proportionate reduction of the overriding royalty reserved and the
working interest to which it may be converted in separate provisions. “Cleaner”
draftsmanship would include a single proportionate reduction provision applicable to all
three blocks of property interests.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

362

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

1. Operating Agreement
Because the farmor and the farmee are likely to end up owning working
interests in a producing well or in leases that they may jointly develop,
operating agreements accompany most farmout agreements. 346 The parties
often attach an operating agreement as an exhibit to a farmout agreement. 347
The parties may also incorporate the operating agreement by reference or
refer to it in an agreement to agree.348
An issue that the parties must address is when the operating agreement
should become effective. The more common approach makes the operating
agreement effective at the time that the farmor and the farmee become
cotenants of the working interest. That may be after drilling of the earning

346. Of course, if the farmor retains only a nonconvertible nonparticipating interest such
as an overriding royalty, an operating agreement is not necessary.
347. For example:
Farmor and Farmee agree to execute an Operating Agreement, in the same
form as the instrument attached hereto as Exhibit B, which shall govern the
conduct of operations pertaining to the Earning Well. Except as otherwise
expressly provided in this Agreement, the terms and provisions of the
Operating Agreement shall apply to and govern the rights and obligations of the
parties with respect to all of the land included in the Drilling Unit for such well,
the Leases included in such Unit, the Earning Well drilled thereon, the
production therefrom, and the rights and obligations of the parties relating
thereto, and shall be effective as of the date of commencement of operations for
drilling the well with respect to which the Operating Agreement is executed. In
the event of a conflict between the terms and provisions of the Operating
Agreement and this Agreement, then the terms and provisions of this
Agreement shall prevail and control. Any delay in executing the applicable
Operating Agreement shall not prevent it from controlling the rights and
obligations of the parties, and in such event the parties shall have the same
rights and obligations as if the applicable Operating Agreement had been
timely executed.
(Emphasis added.)
348. For example:
If Farmor elects to exchange its reserved overriding royalty interest for a leasehold interest as provided for in Paragraph ____ above, then from the effective
date of such exchange any and all further operations on the lands covered by
the assigned lease(s) shall be pursuant to the terms of a mutually acceptable
operating agreement which shall (a) designate you as operator; (b) use an
identical accounting procedure as that attached hereto as Exhibit ____, except
that the adjustment of overhead rates provided for in said accounting procedure
shall be adjusted from the date of this Agreement and (c) provide for a 300%
cost recoupment provision for non-consent operations through the wellhead.
(Emphasis added.)
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well when the farmee earns an interest as a cotenant with the farmee in
acreage outside the drill site. When the farmee earns no interest in outside
acreage, the operating agreement may become effective only when the
farmor’s retained nonparticipating interest in the well converts to a working
interest. 349
Another approach makes the operating agreement effective from the
execution of a farmout, insofar as it does not conflict with the farmout
agreement. 350 This approach is appropriate when the farmee pays less than
all the costs of drilling in return for a proportionate part of the working
interest or when a conditional transfer occurs at the time the farmor and the
farmee sign the agreement. Even when the farmor and the farmee are not
co-owners, this approach offers the advantage of applying to what is often a
very informal agreement the very detailed provisions of the model form
operating agreement. The detailed provisions may not fit, however, and the
farmor and the farmee may disagree as to whether they apply. Moreover,
making the operating agreement effective upon execution of the farmout
increases the risk to the farmor of vicarious liability. 351
2. Handling Lease Payments
An administrative problem that most farmout agreements address is
whether the farmor or the farmee is to make payments that may come due
under the farmed-out leases. The most common structure provides that the
349. The following is an example of a clause providing that the operating agreement will
become effective only when the farmee and the farmor become cotenants:
The Joint Operating Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit “C” and by
reference made a part hereof will become applicable to all the Subject Lands to
the depth provided in the assignment as provided in this agreement as follows:
A. As to the Earning Test Well Site in which a Farmor may elect to convert its
reserved overriding royalty interest to a working interest as provided in §
11.2(b) above, upon the election of such Farmor to so convert.
B. Immediately upon Farmee receiving an assignment of interest as herein
provided as to all other of the Subject Lands and Subject Leaseholds.
In the event of a conflict between the provisions of this Farmout Agreement
and the Joint Operating Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit “C”, the
provisions of this Farmout Agreement shall control; provided that the
provisions of the Operating Agreement concerning payment of rents, royalties,
expenses, construction costs, drilling and exploration costs, judgment claims,
liabilities, and liens and defense of lawsuits, and any other costs or liabilities
incurred in respect of operations conducted pursuant to such Operating
Agreement shall control with respect to such operations.
350. See supra note 347.
351. See infra text accompanying notes 406–38.
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farmor will make all payments until the earned interest is assigned, subject
to total or partial reimbursement by the farmee. 352 This structure makes
administrative sense even when the farmor assigns the interest upon
execution of the agreement rather than after the drilling of the earning well.
The risk of losing a lease as a result of making improper payment of delay
rentals or shut-in royalties is minimized by having the farmor, which
already has the leases “set up” on its administrative records, continue to
make payments. Of course, the parties may agree to the contrary, as for
example when the farmor is farming out and withdrawing from the active
conduct of business.
A related issue is what liability, if any, the farmor has if loss of title
results from the farmor’s failure to make lease payments properly. Farmout
agreements usually disclaim any liability by the party handling the
payments for loss of title as a result of a failure to make payments
properly. 353 The rationale for limiting liability is that administration is
undertaken as an accommodation, rather than for a profit from the
administrative activity.
3. Compliance with Leases
Farmout agreements typically include general language obligating the
farmee to comply with all express or implied covenants of the leases farmed
352. For example:
Farmors shall continue to pay delay rentals or shut-in royalties coming due
after the date of this Agreement required to maintain in force any of said leases,
and until completion of the Initial Earning Well or the earlier termination of
Farmee’s rights hereunder, Farmee shall within thirty (30) days after receipt of
billing by Farmors reimburse them for 50 percent of any delay rentals or shutin royalties so paid. Farmors shall also make any and all shut-in royalty
payments that may become due to perpetuate any of said leases on which the
Initial Earning Well is drilled hereunder, and will furnish Farmee within thirty
(30) days from the date thereof copies of receipts evidencing timely payment.
Farmee will reimburse Farmors for 100 percent of such shut-in royalty
payments made with respect to the Initial Earning Well. Delay rentals and shutin royalties payable with respect to said leases (other than those within the
spacing unit containing the Initial Earning Well) following the completion of
the Initial Earning Well shall be borne 50 percent by Farmors and 50 percent by
Farmee and shall be paid as provided in the Operating Agreement.
353. Scott, supra note 3, at 86, ¶ 10. This provides that: “Farmor shall pay any delay
rentals, shut-in royalties or minimum royalties which may become due . . . [but] Farmor
shall never be liable as a result of any failure to make such payments, or portion thereof, in a
proper and timely manner.” Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 114–17 (discusses
case with similar clause).
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out. 354 The genesis of such language is probably the farmor’s concern that
courts will classify the transaction as a sublease so that the farmor will
remain liable to its lessors for breach.355 A farmee should be aware that
such language may impose upon it a risk of loss of its rights under the
farmout, especially when the agreement requires absolute performance in
order to earn. 356
4. Abandonment and Takeover
Most farmout agreements contain provisions requiring the farmee to give
notice of its intention to abandon a well that it is drilling or operating, and
allowing the farmor to elect to take over operations. The reason for abandonment and takeover provisions is that commencement of drilling
operations or production is a substantial potential benefit to the farmor,
which the farmor does not want to lose because of premature abandonment
by the farmee. Abandonment and takeover provisions give the farmor a
second chance to drill or operate the farmed-out property.
The abandonment clause commonly provides that the farmee has the
right to abandon, if the farmee gives notice of its intent to abandon. 357
354. For example:
Assignee hereby assumes and agrees to comply with all obligations and
covenants, express or implied, imposed upon the lessee in the herein above
identified Leases or contained in any intermediate assignments thereof insofar
as concerns the interests and premises included in this Partial Assignment, and
agrees to indemnify and save harmless Assignor from any risk, liability or
expense of whatsoever kind accruing thereunder from and after the effective
date hereof.
355. A farmout may well be classified as a sublease because of the rights that the farmor
retains. See Klein & Burke, supra note 3, at 486–88. If so, the farmor may remain liable to
its original lessor for breach by the farmee on a theory of privity of estate despite the
language found in most oil and gas leases relieving the lessee of liability to the lessor after
assignment of its interest.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 259–62.
357. The following provisions of § 5.1 of the draft AAPL Form 635 farmout agreement
are typical:
In the event any farmout well is completed as non-productive of oil or gas, or
as one not capable of producing oil and/or gas in paying quantities or ceases
production, farmee shall immediately give farmor written notice of the
proposed plugging and abandonment. Farmor shall have thirty (30) days after
receipt of such written notice within which to elect to take over the well for the
purpose of conducting additional operations as it desires; except that if a
drilling rig is on location, notice to plug and abandon may be given by
telephone and farmor’s response shall be limited to forty-eight (48) hours,
exclusive of Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays. In the event farmor fails to
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When this approach is taken, the clause usually gives the farmor a specific
period of time after receipt of notice within which to express its consent or
to elect to take over. Consent is implied after the time has run.
The farmee should note carefully the timing and procedures set forth for
notice, because failure to comply will likely result in liability. 358 In
addition, the farmee will prefer that the takeover provisions relieve it of
liability for the cost of rig time and plugging. Also, the farmee will want
payment for the value of salvageable equipment that it leaves in the hole or
on the lease after a takeover by the farmor. 359 The farmor must examine the
notice provisions carefully to insure that it has adequate time to make a
decision about taking over the well, and that it can man an operation it takes
over within the time provided.

advise farmee of its respective election within the predescribed period of time,
then such well shall be plugged and abandoned by farmee in accordance with
the terms hereof. Farmor shall have the right to take over such well using so far
as necessary, at farmor’s expense, the tools and workmen of farmee. Farmor
shall pay reasonable salvage value of material and equipment in and on said
well, less the cost of salvaging same and acquire said well for its own use and
purposes.
The preceding language might not give the farmor the right to take over a well that the
farmee abandoned before completion, for example, a well that the farmee abandoned under
the escape provisions of the farmout agreement. The following language would avoid that
limitation:
Neither the Earning Test Well nor any Substitute Well shall be abandoned
without the prior written consent of farmor first had and obtained or without
forty-eight (48) hours prior notice having been given by farmee to farmor.
Farmor may elect within said forty-eight hour period to examine and make tests
of said Earning Test Well or a Substitute Well at its sole cost and risk. Farmor
may within said forty-eight hour period or prior to the conclusion of its tests,
whichever occurs later, but in no event later than three days after its receipt of
notice from farmee, elect to take over from the farmor, said Earning Test Well
or a Substitute Well so examined . . . .
358. Cf. Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner, 12 S.W.2d 847, 848–49 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Austin 1929, writ ref’d) (oil company held liable for a failure to reassign lease as contract
required). See infra text accompanying notes 362–65. Proof of damages would be difficult,
since a well that the farmee decides to abandon probably has little demonstrable market
value. Arguably, however, a court might measure the damage as the cost of drilling a well to
the depth at which the farmee abandoned operations. See Fite v. Miller, 196 La. 876, 200 So.
285, 289–90 (1940); Ardizonne v. Archer, 72 Okla. 70, 178 P. 263, 265–66 (1919).
359. Glass, supra note 3, at 16. For appropriate language, see supra note 357.
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5. Reassignment Provisions
The obligation of the farmee to reassign the lease rights subject to the
farmout agreement goes hand in hand with the right of the farmor to take
over drilling operations and the right of the farmee to abandon drilling or
operations. If the farmout is of the conditional assignment form, reassignment provisions are necessary to clear title, even if the assignment is structured as a determinable interest that automatically terminates if the farmee
does not perform. 360 Reassignment is particularly important if the original
assignment was recorded. Even if the farmout is of the agreement to
transfer form, release and reassignment of rights that may have been earned
are desirable to bar title claims at a later date. The reassignment clause may
also become important when the lease farmed out has ceased to produce in
paying quantities. If the farmee decides not to work over, recomplete, or
redrill, the farmor may wish to get back its operating rights so that it may
act, but may not feel safe in asserting the right to operate without formal
reassignment. 361
Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner 362 illustrates the role of the reassignment
clause. In Gladys Belle the court held a company that failed its
reassignment obligation liable for damages equal to the value of the leases
that should have been reassigned. 363 The farmout agreement provided that
“if the [farmee] should desire . . . to surrender any of said leases or not to
prosecute development . . . he will reassign said lease or leases . . . not less
than ninety days before [they] will expire . . . .” 364 Both the farmor and the
360. The well takeover clause often includes reassignment provisions. For example:
“Farmee shall, if requested to do so by Farmor, reassign said lease acreage insofar as it
covers the portion being surrendered, expiring or abandoned to Farmor free of any
encumbrances suffered by, through or under Farmee.” Or the clause may provide:
We shall thereafter [after notice] have the portion for thirty (30) days to require
you to make a reassignment of the assigned premises or that portion thereof
that you wish to surrender or abandon. Such reassignment shall be free and
clear of all lease burdens, overrides and payments out of production in excess
of or in addition to those previously existing.
361. Of course, if the farmor and the farmee have operated the producing property as
cotenants, the operating agreement reassignment provisions will apply. See, e.g., art. VIII.A.
of the 1982 AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement.
362. 12 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1929, writ ref’d); see also McLaughlin v.
Ball, 431 S.W.2d 305, 306–07 (Tex. 1968) (suit by assignor against assignee of oil and gas
leases for failure of assignee to give assignor written notice of assignee’s election to
surrender leases resulting in assignor being denied opportunity to reacquire leases).
363. 12 S.W.2d at 848–49.
364. Id. at 847.
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farmee assigned their interests. Ultimately, the farmee’s assignee permitted
one of the leases to expire, and the farmors’ assignees sued. The appellate
court sustained damages awarded by the trial court, noting that though the
parties to the suit were not in privity of contract, the rights and obligations
created by the contract were independently assignable.365 The reassignment
clause is not mere space filler.
Generally, reassignment provisions require that the farmee represent that
the leases reassigned are free of liens or warrant clear title except as to
clouds that existed before the farmee took the property. 366 This approach is
consistent with the obligations typically imposed upon a farmee to “conduct
operations at no cost to the farmor” and to indemnify the farmor against
loss. Some farmout agreements have no reassignment provisions, however,
relying upon the abandonment and takeover provisions alone. Specific
reassignment provisions can be classified into at least three different
general forms: (a) perpetual assignment with reassignment obligation, (b)
automatic reversion, or (c) reversion by declaration. Each may present
problems.
a) Perpetual Assignment with Reassignment Obligation
The most common reassignment form is a contractual obligation to reassign, like that in Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner. 367 The advantage of such a
formulation, particularly when it is coupled with an assignment placed of
record, is that it imposes upon the farmee the duty to plug an abandoned
well and restore the premises. 368 The disadvantage of a contractual
obligation to reassign is that the farmor may have difficulty compelling the
farmee to reassign, particularly if the farmee has subleased or assigned
interests to others.
b) Automatic Reversion
A second common formulation is to draft the reassignment provision so
that the farmed-out interests revert automatically to the farmor if the farmee
abandons or ceases production. 369 One problem with this approach is that
365. Id at 849.
366. See supra note 360.
367. See supra text accompanying note 362. For the language of an example clause, see
supra note 360.
368. Of course, the agreement of the farmor and the farmee as to responsibility for plugging or restoration will not preclude the state from asserting its police powers to the
contrary. See infra text accompanying notes 436–38.
369. For example:
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terms like “abandonment” and “cessation of production” may not have clear
meanings, and litigation may result. Furthermore, the right of reversion may
expose the farmor to liability for plugging or restoration just as surely as
owning a contractual right to reassignment. 370
c) Reversion upon Declaration
A theoretical drafting alternative is to provide that after no production for
some specific time, or after production has fallen to some agreed level for a
specific time, the farmor can cause the farmed-out interest to revert to the
farmor by filing a declaration of reversion. Language similar to that found
in lease pooling clauses might be used. 371
6. Area of Mutual Interest Provisions
Because the farmor and the farmee become “economic partners” under a
farmout agreement, farmouts sometimes include “area of mutual interest”
provisions, usually referred to as “AMI provisions.” An AMI provision
gives the farmor and the farmee the right to share in interests acquired by
the other in a designated contract area, which may be the same as or larger

[The assignment shall] [b]e effective as of the date of well completion and provide for reversion to Farmor of ail rights assigned upon the earlier of (a) thirty
(30) days after cessation of all production from or allocated to the assigned
premises unless production is restored or operations for restoration of
production are commenced within the thirty (30) days and production is
restored within a reasonable time after commencement of such operations, (b)
forty-five (45) days prior to any lease termination, or (c) the shut-in of the last
producing well on the assigned acreage for more than one (1) year. Farmee
shall evidence the reversion by a reassignment to Farmor, free and clear of all
liens, claims or encumbrances, except those existing at the date of this
agreement; provided, however, the reversion shall be effective whether or not
Farmee reassigns to Farmor.
(Emphasis added.)
370. See infra text accompanying notes 434–38.
371. There are practical difficulties, however, with providing for reversion of the
farmee’s interest upon the filing of a declaration by the farmor. First, since the procedure is
not specifically authorized by statute, it may merely cloud title. Second, recording officers
may refuse to accept such declarations or refuse to index them where they will appear in the
chain of title. Perhaps the most workable method of obtaining reassignment at the will of the
farmor is to have the reassignment executed and delivered to the farmor at the time of the
initial assignment, subject to the understanding that it will be recorded only upon default. It
is likely that few farmees will agree to this, however.
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than the farmout contract area, upon agreed terms. 372 AMI clauses are
particularly common in exploratory farmouts.
Area of mutual interest provisions are not peculiar to farmout
agreements, and have been the subject of analysis elsewhere.373 Two
particularly important problems should be noted in this discussion of
farmout agreements, however. One is whether an AMI provision that is not
limited in time violates the rule against perpetuities. A Kansas case holds
372. An example of an area of mutual interest clause follows:
Article X. (a) If either farmor or farmee acquire, during the period from
execution of this agreement to the expiration of one year from the completion
of the last earning well (i.e., either the initial earning well or a subsequent
earning well) under this agreement, any oil and/or gas interest or right to
acquire such interest in lands within the Area of Mutual Interest depicted on
Exhibit “A” hereto and within a spacing unit containing a well drilled or
proposed to be drilled under this agreement and containing a portion of Said
Leases, the acquiring party shall offer the non-acquiring party, in the manner
provided for in Article XV.F. of the operating agreement, an undivided 50
percent so acquired to the extent contained within such spacing unit. All
operations on any such interest in which the non-acquiring party elects to
participate shall be governed by Exhibit “C” hereto and the operating
agreement.
(b) If during the period described in Article X.(a) above either farmors or
farmee acquire any oil and/or gas interest or right to acquire such interest in
lands within the boundaries of the area of mutual interest and outside all
spacing units containing wells drilled or proposed to be drilled under this
agreement, then (i) if the interest is acquired by purchase, the acquiring party
shall offer the non-acquiring party an undivided 50 percent of the interest so
acquired and (ii) if the interest is acquired by farming or other agreement
requiring the drilling of a well or performance of other act besides the payment
of money in order to earn or acquire the interest, the acquiring party shall offer
the non-acquiring party an undivided percentage interest in the acquisition
sufficient to vest 25 percent thereof in farmors and 75 percent thereof in
farmee. Such offer shall be made and accepted in the manner provided in
Article XV.F. of the operating agreement. All operations on any such interest in
which the non-acquiring party elects to participate shall be governed by Exhibit
“C” hereto [drilling, geological, and engineering requirements] and the
operating agreement.
In the absence of a specific AMI provision, the courts will not likely give either the farmee
or the farmor the right to share in interests or leases acquired on adjacent acreage. See Opco
v. Scott, 321 F.2d 471, 472–73 (10th Cir. 1963). But see Smith, Duties and Obligations
Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, 12-49 to -57 (1986).
373. See Zarlengo, Area of Mutual Interest Clauses Regarding Oil and Gas Properties:
Analysis, Drafting, and Procedure, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 837, 837–83 (1982)
(checklist for analysis and drafting).
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that an area of mutual interest agreement is purely contractual, that it is not
subject to the rule against perpetuities because it creates no rights in real
property. 374 An AMI clause in a farmout may also be held to be within an
exception to the rule for options to extend leases, if it is viewed as impliedly limited to the duration of the leases.375 However, it has been argued that a
perpetual AMI might well violate the rule, so that the AMI provision should
be specifically limited in time. 376
A second and more practical concern to one drafting or analyzing an
AMI clause in a farmout agreement is what land or leases are to be subject
to the AMI provision. The parties should specifically define the
geographical area to which the AMI applies. In addition, the clause should
address what kinds of interests are subject to the mutual interest provisions.
Are surface interests, mineral interests, and royalty interests to be covered
as well as leasehold interests? What about property acquired that may be
partly within and partly outside of the contract area? Finally, the provision
should address whether, if the farmor or the farmee acquires several
properties at once, the election to acquire will apply to the package as a
whole or permit the nonacquiring party to pick and choose among the
properties. 377
7. Restrictions upon Assignment
Farmout agreements often include restrictions upon assignment. From
the farmor’s view, a restriction may be a practical necessity. The farmor,
having located a farmee that it considers skilled, trustworthy, and solvent,
wants to be certain that the rights given by the farmout are not transferred to
a farmee that possesses none of those attributes. If the farmor wishes to
374. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, 678 P.2d 118, 127
(1984) (quoting Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 258 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Galveston 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 298
S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1957), modified, 158 Tex. 397, 312 S.W.2d 197
(1958)).
375. See Zarlengo, supra note 373, at 850, discussing the exception of the RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 395 (1944).
376. Id. Zarlengo, supra note 373, at 849–50. For specific language that limits the AMI
agreement to one year after completion of the last earning well, see supra note 373. If the
farmout agreement specifies a completion date for the earning well, such language almost
certainly will comply with the rule against perpetuities. If there is no specific completion
date, however, a well commenced possibly could not be completed within the perpetuities
period. An interesting subissue of AMI clauses, if the clause violates the rule against
perpetuities, is whether the clause is void or whether the whole farmout agreement is void.
377. Zarlengo, supra note 373, at 872–76.
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restrict assignment of rights under the farmout, it must do so specifically
and unambiguously. 378 Courts will strictly interpret restrictions, 379 and will
not imply them from the terms of a reassignment clause in the farmout. 380
The farmor may pay a price for restricting assignment, however. Usually
the farmor’s goal is to get a well drilled on the farmed-out acreage. To the
extent that the restriction against assignment makes it difficult for a farmee

378. Probably the most common formulation is a flat proscription. For example: “This
Agreement shall not be assigned in whole or in part by Farmee without the prior written
consent of Farmor.” Some proscriptions of assignment are more specific, probably in an attempt to avoid an implied limitation of “reasonableness”:
No provision of this agreement or of any assignment [lease] made or issued
hereunder shall be modified, altered or waived except by the express written
agreement of Farmor. This agreement is personal to Farmee, and Farmee shall
have neither the right nor the power to assign this agreement, in whole or in
part, to another party without the express prior written consent of Farmor
thereto. Likewise, Farmee shall have neither the right nor the power to assign
any interest, in whole or in part, under any assignment [lease] made or issued
pursuant hereto without the express prior written consent of Farmor thereto.
Farmor may withhold its consent to any such proposed or attempted assignment
for any reason or no reason in the sole discretion of Farmor. Any attempted
assignment made in contravention of this provision shall be, at Farmor’s sole
option (and in addition to any other remedy available to Farmor at law or in
equity), voidable and of no force and effect. The granting of consent by Farmor
to any such assignment shall be effective only as to the specific assignment
then the express subject of such consent, and all subsequent assignments which
may be proposed or attempted shall likewise be expressly subject to the
hereinabove stated and reserved rights, power and authority of Farmor.
Some parties have couched proscriptions in affirmative language, though their effect is still
to limit: “This AGREEMENT shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Parties
hereto and their successors and assigns; provided, however, Farmee shall make no
assignment of its rights hereunder without Farmor’s prior written consent.”
379. Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner, 12 S.W.2d 847, 848–49 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin
1929, writ ref’d). A reassignment clause in a farmout provides that the farmee will reassign
to the farmor any leases transferred under the agreement that it decides to surrender or not to
develop. See supra text accompanying notes 360–71.
380. See Rainbow Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538, 546–47 (Wyo. 1982). In
Rainbow Oil Co. the court held that a right of first refusal included in a farmout agreement
obligating the farmees to offer to sell the interest earned back to the farmor if the farmees
“shall elect to sell their interest” was not triggered by a company officer’s transfer of
interests to his company in satisfaction of his fiduciary obligations or by a gift to one of the
farmees’ children. Id. at 543–44. In Palmer v. Liles, 677 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court held that a restriction on assignment without
written consent did not create a right of first refusal, but merely gave rise to a claim for
actual damages suffered. Id. at 663.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/4

2017]

Farmout Agreements

373

to raise money by assigning interests, it may be counter-productive. 381 Thus,
the parties may choose to make the rights of the farmee freely assignable, 382
to permit assignment to identified parties, 383 to permit assignment when the
proposed assignee is financially strong, 384 to permit assignment when it is
likely to be conducive to getting the property drilled, 385 or to limit the
restriction in time. 386

381. Glass, supra note 3, at 15.
382. A clause that permits assignment, but specifically keeps the original farmee
obligated to the farmor is:
The rights hereunder may be assigned in whole or in part by Farmee, but, prior
to the date when an assignment or lease is earned hereunder, if Farmee assigns
an interest in the Farmout Interests pursuant to this letter agreement, Farmee
shall remain liable to Farmor and Farmor shall have the right to look solely to
Farmee in connection with any cause of action it may have with respect to this
agreement, to the same extent as if such assignment had not been made by
Farmee.
(Emphasis added.)
383. The following is an example of a clause that permits assignment to identified
parties:
This Agreement shall not be assigned in whole or in part . . . . However,
Farmor specifically agrees to allow Farmee to make an assignment to its
participants in the ____ Exploration Program, namely, ____. These participants
currently share in all costs and liabilities of the Program with Farmee. Also,
Farmor agrees to allow ____ to make an assignment to an affiliate.
When such language is used, the agreement should define “affiliate.”
384. The following language addresses financial suitability as a basis for permitting
assignment:
Farmee shall not assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of any rights hereunder
without first obtaining written consent from Farmor; provided however that
Farmor shall neither unreasonably deny or delay its assent to such request if
Farmee satisfies Farmor that its proposed assignee exercises at least the same
degree of financial responsibility as Farmee. This agreement shall be binding
upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs,
successors and assigns.
385. For example:
The following assignments, conveyances and successions of a Farmee’s rights
and interests under this Agreement may be effected without the prior written
consent of Farmor, to-wit:
(i) a conveyance by reason of the death or legal incapacity of a party
comprising Farmee;
(ii) a conveyance to a spouse or issue of a party comprising Farmee;
(iii) a conveyance to a trust for the benefit of a spouse or issue of a party
comprising Farmee;
(iv) a transfer to another party comprising Farmee;
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In addition, the farmor faces a risk that courts will regard a broadly
drafted restriction upon assignment as an unenforceable disabling restraint
against alienation. 387 Most lawyers look to landlord and tenant law as they
draft restrictions on assignments in farmout agreements, reasoning that the
farmor’s interest in restricting earning rights under the farmout and operating rights after the farmed-out acreage has been earned is as important as
the identity of the tenant to a landlord. 388 The analogy overlooks the fact
that the nature of an oil and gas lease differs from a real property lease. The
former is either a fee simple determinable estate in land or a determinable
profit à prendre or license, rather than a mere term of years. Courts are
more likely to tolerate restrictions upon alienation that will eventually

(v) a transfer to a joint venture or partnership (general or limited) of
which a party comprising Farmee is a member and has the sole
authority, irrevocably during the term of such entity, to act for such
entity with respect to the properties that are the subject matter of
this Agreement.
All other assignments, conveyances and successions of a Farmee’s rights and interests
under this Agreement shall be effected only with the prior written consent of Farmor,
which consent will not be withheld unreasonably.
386. A restriction limited in time follows:
Assignee agrees not to assign, either in whole or in part, its interest in said land,
or in the oil or gas to be produced therefrom, without the written consent of
Assignor, the restriction to be effective for fifteen (15) years from the date
hereof Any assignment shall contain a limitation requiring that the written
consent of Assignor must be obtained prior to any further assignment. No such
assignment or assignments, although made with the written consent of
Assignor, shall subject said land or any portion thereof, to any overriding
royalty, payments out of production, net profit obligation, carried interest or
any other obligation in addition to those created under the terms hereof.
(Emphasis added.)
387. A disabling restraint is one that expressly denies the grantee the power to transfer
the estate or declares any attempt to transfer automatically void. Except when used in
spendthrift trusts, disabling restraints are always held void. R. BERNHARDT, REAL PROPERTY
IN A NUTSHELL 77 (West 1982).
388. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 410 (1936) provides that:
A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on alienation of a legal possessory
estate for years is valid if, and only if
(a) the estate for years is created as the result of a business transaction,
the requirements of the rule against perpetuities are satisfied and the
restraint is
(i)
imposed at the time the estate for years is created, or
(ii) agreed to thereafter as a business transaction by the persons who
are in the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . .
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terminate than those that may be perpetual.389 Though no court appears to
have thoroughly discussed the issue, a Canadian commentator has argued
that broad restrictions on assignment in farmout agreements should not be
enforceable. 390
A step short of declaring restrictions upon assignment to be invalid
disabling restraints is to reason that they are not covenants running with the
land, but mere personal service covenants. When this characterization is
adopted, restrictions upon assignability are valid only as to executory
contracts, because after performance “the contract is no longer one for
personal services and the reason for non-assignability no longer exists.” 391
Following this reasoning, the Tenth Circuit upheld an order requiring
specific performance of a promise to convey acreage under a farmout in
Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co. 392 when the farmee’s
assignment to which the farmor objected took place after the earning well
had been drilled. 393
Something less than a complete proscription can, in most cases, meet the
farmor’s interest in restricting assignability. The parties can restrict
assignment until the farmee performs the farmout contract, but permit it
thereafter, since the interests of the farmor are most acute while drilling is
progressing. 394 When the farmor’s likely reasons for objecting to an
assignment can be identified, the farmout agreement can specifically spell
out those reasons, and limit assignment in those circumstances.395 Assign389. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 406, 407, 410 (1973). A limitation upon
the restriction similar to that supra in note 386, therefore, is doubly attractive.
390. Nowack, Restrictions Against Alienation in Agreements Relating to Oil and Gas
Interests, 23 ALBERTA L. REV. 62, 73–74 (1985); see also Scott, Restrictions on Alienation
Applied to Oil and Gas Transactions, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1 (1985) (discusses
restrictions on assignment in agreements).
391. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Hartford Accident & Ins. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366,
325 P.2d 899, 904 (1958).
392. 335 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1964).
393. Id. at 442.
394. For example:
It is agreed that the Farmee’s rights and interests under this contract shall not be
assigned prior to the time that the Farmee has earned the interest provided for
in this agreement by drilling a conforming well; provided, however, that after
the Farmee has earned an assignment of interest under this agreement, the
Farmor agrees that Farmee may assign the interest so earned in whole or in
part.
395. For example, the following:
Farmee shall not assign any interest in this Assignment until it has given
Farmor notice of the complete details of the proposed transaction and Farmee
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ment may also be barred subject to the farmor’s consent, “which consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld.” 396 “Reasonableness” limitations
should prevent classification of a restriction upon assignment as a disabling
restraint. 397 Finally, the agreement may permit the farmee to make partial
assignments so long as it remains the operator and legally responsible to the
farmor. 398
8. Calls on Production, Options to Purchase, and Prior Commitments
Some integrated oil companies with refining capacity routinely include
in their farmout agreements calls on production, options to purchase, or
prior commitments. A farmor whose purpose in farming out is to obtain
reserves or to acquire access to market may also include these devices. A
call on production gives the holder a right to require another to sell its share
of production to a purchaser designated by the farmor. 399 An option to
has received Farmor’s written consent to assign. Farmor will not unreasonably
withhold its consent to assign, but consent may be withheld when Farmor, in its
sole discretion but in good faith, believes such assignment may diminish the
value of Farmor’s rights, reservations, and exceptions under this Assignment.
Of course, the more specific the standard the better.
396. For example:
Farmee, for itself, its successors and assigns, covenants and agrees that prior to
the drilling and completion of the Earning Test Well and Farmee’s compliance
with the performance of all of the terms and provisions of this agreement, it
will not transfer or assign this agreement without the prior written consent of
Farmor, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Often, the parties will couple a “reasonableness” limitation with more specific limitations.
For example language, see supra note 385.
397. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 406 comment i (1973). This section
includes a list of factors that tend to support a conclusion that a restraint is either reasonable
or unreasonable. Id. Section 407 of the Restatement makes these factors applicable to
defeasible possessory estates in fee. Id. § 407.
398. Glass, supra note 3, at 15; see supra note 382.
399. A very broad call might read as follows:
6.1 Oil Production. Farmor shall have a continuing option to purchase
Farmee’s share of oil and liquid hydrocarbons produced and saved from the
Farmout Lands through standard lease separator facilities, to the extent such
production is attributable to the interest assigned to Farmee hereunder. The
option may be exercised by Farmor at any time and from time to time while
such production continues, by giving written notice thereof to Farmee not less
than 30 days before the date on which farmor’s purchases are to commence.
The price paid by Farmor for such production shall be equal to the prevailing
wellhead market price then being paid in the same field for production of the
same or similar grade and gravity, or if there is no such prevailing price being
paid in the same field, the prevailing price being paid in the nearest field.
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purchase is more limited. It gives the holder a right to purchase another’s
production, but only if the other elects to sell. 400 A prior commitment binds
both the farmor and the farmee to a sales contract.401

Farmor may terminate its purchases by giving written notice thereof to Farmee
not less than 30 days before the date of termination.
6.2 Gas Production. Farmor shall have the option to purchase Farmee’s
share of gas, including casinghead gas, produced and saved from the Farmout
Lands through standard lease separator facilities, to the extent such production
is attributable to the interest assigned to Farmee hereunder. When Farmee’s gas
becomes available for purchase initially and at any time thereafter, Farmee
shall so advise Farmor in writing and Farmor shall have 60 days thereafter to
give Farmee written notice of Farmor’s election to purchase the gas at the
prevailing wellhead market price paid for gas at the same or similar quantity
and quality in the same field (or if there is no such price then prevailing in the
same field, then in the nearest field in which there is such a prevailing price)
pursuant to comparable purchase contracts entered into on the same or nearest
preceding date as the date of Farmor’s election to purchase gas hereunder.
T. FAY, supra note 3, at 57.
400. An option to purchase might read as follows:
Assignor reserves and is hereby given the optional preferential right at any time
and from time to time to enter into a contract to purchase or designate a
purchaser for all of Assignee’s gas produced from said land, such right to be
exercised as follows. If Assignee elects to sell gas production and shall receive
a bona fide offer acceptable to it to purchase such gas production, it shall
promptly furnish Assignor written notice thereof and Assignor shall have
ninety (90) days after receipt of such notice to elect either to enter into a
contract to purchase such gas on the same terms and conditions of such offer,
or to designate a third party purchaser of such gas on either the same terms and
conditions or (in its sole judgment) on more favorable terms and conditions to
Assignee, and if any such third party purchaser is designated, such designation
shall be binding on Assignee. If Assignor fails to notify Assignee within said
ninety (90) day period of its election to exercise such right, then it shall have no
right to exercise said preferential right during the contract term. If Assignor
does not exercise such optional preferential right and for any reason Assignee
shall not thereafter accept said offer, or if Assignee accepts said offer and the
resulting contract expires or is terminated or renegotiated, then the foregoing
reservation of said optional preferential right shall continue in full force and
effect and said optional preferential right shall apply with respect to any new
offer or renegotiated offer to purchase gas from said land.
401. An example of a prior commitment clause for gas follows:
All interests in natural gas and casinghead gas presently owned by farmee
within the area of interest, and all interests in natural gas and casinghead gas
hereafter owned, or, controlled by farmee within the area of interest will be
subject to a gas purchase contract with farmor as buyer and farmee as seller, a
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Calls on production and options to purchase present drafting problems.
The duration of the call or the option, how and when it may be exercised,
and how to determine the price to be paid for production are issues that the
parties must address as specifically as possible to avoid the objection that
the call or option is an unenforceable agreement to agree. Prior
commitments present similar problems when the contract terms are to be
determined later.
All of these devices may present unsettled legal issues. Whether calls on
production or options to purchase create interests subject to the rule against
perpetuities is uncertain. To avoid the issue, some drafters limit calls and
options to the perpetuities period 402 and require that the contract to which
production is committed be executed with the farmout.403 Another area of
concern is that calls, options, or prior commitments may violate federal or
state antitrust laws. Whether antitrust is a real problem will depend upon
the characteristics of the companies involved, the amount of land subject to
the call, option, or prior commitment, and the competition in the area.
A third unsettled issue is whether a call, option, or prior commitment
may subject the farmor and the farmee to corporate taxation, which would
sharply limit the value of the intangible drilling cost deduction and the
percentage depletion allowance to both parties, as well as subject them to
double taxation of distributions. A farmout transaction creates an association taxable as a corporation if it possesses sufficient corporate characteristics. 404 To avoid corporate taxation, the parties to oil and gas transactions
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit ____. Said gas purchase contract is
being executed contemporaneously with the execution of this agreement.
Sometimes the commitment will be to enter into a contract at a later date on terms prevailing
in the market at that time. In such cases, a prior commitment may contain price terms much
like those of the call seen supra note 399.
402. For example:
We shall have and shall reserve the optimal right for a period of twenty-one
(21) years from the date hereof, to purchase all oil produced and saved from the
lands and leases committed hereto at the prevailing market price; said price is
meant to be that price being paid in the immediate field for oil of like kind,
quality and gravity, in like quantities and under contracts providing for similar
conditions and durations, such price to be determined from month to month.
Some courts might imply a “reasonable” limitation upon the duration of the call. Rex Oil Co.
v. Busk, 56 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 1953).
403. See supra note 401.
404. Treas. Reg. § 301,7701-2(a)(l) as amended in 1983 lists six corporate
characteristics: associates, a joint profit objective, continuity of life, centralization of
management, limited liability, and free transferability. For minerals transactions, whether
title is in the name of one of the parties may be a seventh factor.
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ordinarily structure the arrangement so that each has the right to take
production in kind or separately dispose of it. One of the essential
characteristics of an association taxable as a corporation is a joint profit
objective. 405 If the parties have the right to take in kind, they have no joint
profit objective; they have separate individual profit objectives. When
production is subject to a call, an option to purchase, or a prior
commitment, the farmout agreement does not meet the literal requirements
of an association taxable as a corporation.
Perhaps the reason that calls on production, options to purchase, and
prior commitments do not appear more frequently in farmout agreements,
however, is the chilling impact that they have upon the business deal of the
parties. In the usual situation, neither the farmor nor the farmee wants to tie
up its share of production from the farmed-out property. Each prefers to
reserve the flexibility to sell production at a later time.
9. Liability, Insurance, and Indemnity
The risks inherent in oil and gas drilling are enormous. People may be
injured, massive pollution may occur, and great cost overruns are routine.
Therefore, both the farmor and the farmee should be concerned about their
potential liability, and the insurance and indemnity provisions of the
farmout agreement.
a) Liability
The farmor and the farmee may assume that each will be liable only for
its own contracts and torts since the relationship of the parties is no closer
than that of cotenants. Nevertheless, the relationship established under a
farmout agreement may provide grounds for vicarious liability. These
include (i) joint ventures and mining partnerships, and (ii) liability as a
record title owner.
(1) Joint Ventures and Mining Partnerships
A joint venture is “a special combination of two or more persons, where,
in some specific adventure, a profit is jointly sought, without any actual
partnership or corporate designation.” 406 It is a partnership for a single
transaction. A mining partnership is an association of two or more persons
to jointly conduct a business and to share in the expenses, profits, and
405. I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126 and I.T. 3948, 1949-1 C.B. 161 reason that if the parties
have the right to take in kind, there is no joint profit objective. For a discussion of this
subject, see Houghton, Braden & Harris, supra note 59, at 6-8 to -10.
406. Griffin v. Reilly, 275 S.W. 242, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1925, no writ).
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losses of the enterprise.407 It is a cross between a tenancy in common and a
true partnership. 408
The joint venture and mining partnership concepts may be viewed as
separate 409 or as indistinguishable. 410 Either theory or both may be used to
impose liability upon the farmor or the farmee for damages or expenses
incurred in drilling under a farmout agreement.411 The classic case in the
area is Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge. 412 In Prestidge the court held Shell liable
as a joint adventurer for injuries suffered by Prestidge while Shell’s farmee
drilled at a site in Idaho. 413 The court held that the farmout agreement and
the actions of Shell’s employee satisfied the elements of a joint venture: a
contract between the parties, substantial contributions to the enterprise, and
joint control. 414
A recent unreported case from Oklahoma that imposed liability upon a
nonoperator under an operating agreement on the basis of a mining partnership illustrates how that theory may be used against the parties to a farmout.
In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Crystal Exploration & Production Co. 415 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found both the operator and Crystal, a nonoperating working interest owner, liable to pay for services and material
provided by Dresser. 416 The court held that a mining partnership requires a
407. Ellis v. Lewis, 119 Okla. 201, 202, 249 P. 295, 296 (1926).
408. Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 1927).
409. The primary distinction between a joint venture and mining partnership is that the
former has the characteristic of delectus personae; that is, the death or bankruptcy of one of
the partners terminates a joint venture, and a joint venturer has the right to exercise choice in
admitting new members to the enterprise. In contrast, a mining partnership does not
automatically terminate upon death or bankruptcy; the purpose of the relationship is mining,
and since that purpose would be thwarted and the property damaged by debate over new
partners, the mining partnership interest is freely transferable. Munsey v. Mills & Garitty,
115 Tex. 469, 480–89, 283 S.W. 754, 758–62 (1926).
410. In Smith v. Rampy, 198 S.W.2d 592, 594–98 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1946, no
writ), the court used the terms interchangeably.
411. Brimmer, Mining Partnerships, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 85, 95 (1969). See
generally Boigan & Murphy, Liabilities of Non Operating Mineral Interest Owners, 51 U.
COLO. L. REV. 153, 164–82 (1980) (discusses contract and tort liability of mining
partnerships and joint ventures); Fiske, Mining Partnership, 26 INST, ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX’N 187 (1975) (discusses generally mining partnerships and joint ventures); Jones,
Mining Partnerships in Texas, 12 TEX. L. REV. 410, 414–31 (1933) (discusses elements of
mining partnerships in Texas).
412. 249 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1957).
413. Id. at 416.
414. Id.
415. No. 84-1160 (10th Cir. July 12, 1985).
416. Id. slip. op. at 6–7.
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joint interest in the property, an express or implied agreement to share in
the profits and losses of the venture, and cooperation in the project. 417 The
court’s analysis focused on whether sufficient cooperation existed to
impose liability. 418 The court held that management or conduct of
operations by the nonoperator was not necessary. 419 It was sufficient that
Crystal:
kept in close contact with Schick [the operator], receiving almost
daily reports; Crystal asked for and received completion
procedures prior to their implementation in order to allow its
engineers time to discuss the procedures with Schick; Crystal
made recommendations regarding procedures with Schick and
Schick accepted them; employees of Crystal visited the location
and discussed procedures with Schick and engineering
consultants hired to drill and complete the well. 420
These comments could refer to a farmor’s activities under many farmout
agreements. 421
A realistic assessment of the risk of liability as a mining partner or joint
venturer in a farmout agreement is difficult because precisely what will
trigger liability is uncertain. In Blocker Exploration Co. v. Frontier
Exploration, Inc. 422 the Colorado Supreme Court held that a cotenant of an
oil and gas lease is not liable as a mining partner unless the cotenant takes
an active role in the conduct of operations or the agreement gives the
cotenant a right to participate in management or control. 423 The court stated
that “co-ownership alone does not give rise to a mining partnership.” 424
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

Id at 4.
Id. at 4–6.
Id. at 5.
Id at 5–6.
Of course, the facts will vary from situation to situation:
If the farmoutor simply waits to be advised of completion of the earning work,
and upon verification makes the necessary assignment, in the absence of any
other involvement, it probably is not a mining partnership. But if the farmoutor,
with or without specific provisions in the agreement, injects himself into the
drilling effort by offering or providing assistance, or exercising influence or
discretion, then he may be committing himself to mining partnership status
with the farmoutee.
Fiske, supra note 411, at 207–08.
422. 740 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1987).
423. Id at 987.
424. Id. at 985.
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Both Texas and Oklahoma courts have made similar comments. 425 The
Colorado court noted that:
[A] non-operating working-interest member “should not be
considered, without more, a mining partner if his only rights are
to take in kind, receive reports, inspect books, make an election
of whether to join in a particular phase of exploration/
development (commonly known as a ‘go-no-go’ decision), or
has the right of approval of specified expenditures.” 426
Quoting the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court held that “the
determining factor is related to the degree of active participation in control
or management of the venture that is exercised by a co-tenant or coowner.” 427
As a practical matter, the ease with which liability as a mining partner or
joint venturer is triggered may differ from state to state. Oklahoma and
Arkansas apparently require less than Colorado and Texas. Oklahoma
apparently requires only (1) a joint interest in the property, (2) an
agreement to share in profits and losses, and (3) cooperation in the project
to establish a mining partnership.428 Arkansas may impose liability upon
virtually any cooperative drilling arrangement on a joint venture theory. 429
Colorado and Texas, however, have not embraced the joint venture theory.
425. See, e.g., Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 144 Tex. 475, 486–87,
191 S.W.2d 716, 722 (1945); Templeton v. Wolverton, 142 Tex. 422, 428, 179 S.W.2d 252,
255 (1944); Rucks v. Burch, 138 Tex. 79, 82–83, 156 S.W.2d 975, 976 (1941); Texas Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 76–77 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1966), rev’d, 429
S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968); Nolen v. Rig-Time, Inc., 392 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also McAnally v. Cochran, 170 Okla. 368, 46
P.2d 955, 957 (1935).
426. 740 P.2d at 988 (quoting the Colorado Court of Appeals in Blocker, 709 P.2d 39,
42–43).
427. Id. at 985 (emphasis in original) (quoting 709 P.2d at 42).
428. The Dresser case, supra note 415, is an example of the liberal Oklahoma view of
what it takes to constitute a mining partnership. See also Oklahoma Co. v. O’Neil, 440 P.2d
978, 984–85 (Okla. 1968) (evidence supported finding that mining partnership or joint
venture in development and operation of oil and gas leases existed between plaintiff and
defendants).
429. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 282 Ark. 268, 668 S.W.2d
16, 17 (1984). In Hawkins the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the 1977 model form
operating agreement established a joint venture between the operator and the nonoperator.
Id. at 17. Although the issue before the Arkansas Supreme Court was whether the operator
owed a duty to the nonoperator, the court’s reasoning in finding a duty would also result in
the imposition of liability upon the nonoperator.
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In Colorado and Texas a plaintiff who seeks to establish a mining
partnership must prove the right or exercise of “control” over the
development of the property, rather than mere cooperation.430
Because what will result in liability as a joint venturer or mining partner
is uncertain, the parties should take great care in drafting the farmout agreement. The parties should, and routinely do, disclaim status as partners or
co-adventurers, 431 though such “bootstrapping” language is not
determinative. 432 In evaluating any farmout proposal, a reviewer must take
into account a substantial and ever-present risk of liability. The possibility
that insurance or indemnification can protect against such liability is
discussed below. 433
(2) Liability by Status as Record Title Owner
A court may impose liability on the basis of a party’s status as an owner
of property. In Houser v. Brown 434 an appellate court held that one who
acquired an oil and gas lease upon which there were unplugged oil wells
430. See Blocker Exploration Co. v. Frontier Exploration, Inc., 740 P.2d 983, 987 (Colo.
1987). Frontier is an example of the relatively strict view of what it takes to impose liability
as a mining partnership. See also Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 320–
21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1982, no writ) (when operator of oil and gas well had full control of
all operations, operator and nonoperator working interest owner were not a joint venture);
Dunigan Tool & Supply Co. v. Carroll, 60 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1933,
writ ref’d) (to establish mining partnership, joint ownership of mining property, joint
operation, shares of profits, community of interest, and mutual agency necessary). For an
excellent discussion of the cases from the various states, see Boigan, Liabilities and
Relationship of Co-Owners Under Agreements for Joint Development of Oil and Gas
Properties, 37 OIL & GAS INST. 8-1, 8-39 to -48 (1986).
431. For example:
The liabilities of the Farmor and the Farmee hereunder shall be several and not
joint or collective, and nothing in this Agreement or in any instrument executed
or delivered pursuant hereto shall be deemed to create a partnership,
association, joint venture or agency relationship between the parties or to create
any fiduciary obligation between them. No party hereto shall have the authority
to bind any other party hereto for any obligation or otherwise to act as agent for
another party for any purpose whatsoever, it being understood that all operations conducted by farmee as operator hereunder and under the Operating
Agreement are conducted as an independent contractor not subject to the
control or direction of Farmee as to the means or manner of performance.
Such disclaimers may also buttress the position of the farmor and the farmee that they are
not an association taxable as a corporation. See supra note 404.
432. Gragg v. James, 452 P.2d 579, 587 (Okla. 1969).
433. See infra text accompanying notes 439–45.
434. 29 Ohio App. 3d 358, 505 N.E.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1986).
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was liable to plug those wells, despite the fact that he did not know they
existed when he purchased the lease.435 While the problem is not the fault
of the lessee, he has a connection with the property that justifies application
of the state’s police power. This reasoning could result in liability being
imposed upon either party to a farmout for the default of the other. The
Texas court of appeals in Austin applied similar reasoning in Railroad
Commission v. Olin Corp. 436 when it found a nonconsenting nonoperator
under an operating agreement liable for plugging after the operator
defaulted. 437 The court held that the nonoperator’s reversionary rights was
sufficient to support the liability. 438 The inference is clear that the appeals
court would find a farmor liable for a farmee’s default in plugging.
The rationale of these cases may be extended to mechanics liens, surface
restoration, and other potential liabilities. Again, though drafters should
attempt to avoid liability by including boilerplate language in the farmout
agreement, it is unlikely to be effective. Insurance, indemnity, and the
financial stability of one’s economic partner are better protections.
b) Insurance
Even without a recognized theory of liability, both the farmor and the
farmee are likely to find themselves in court if someone is hurt in drilling or
operating. Many farmout agreements therefore specifically provide that the
farmee must carry substantial insurance for liabilities such as workers’
compensation, employers’ liability, contractual liability, public liability,
and automobile liability. 439 A surprising number of the farmout agreements
435. 505 N.E.2d at 1024.
436. 690 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
437. Id. at 631.
438. Id.; see Conine, Rights and Liabilities of Carried Interest and Nonconsent Parties in
Oil and Gas Operations, 37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 3-1 (1986).
439. For example: “Farmee shall during its operations hereunder, maintain workmen’s
compensation insurance and general liability insurance with bodily injury limits of $300,000
per occurrence and property damage insurance with a limit of $100,000.” A more
comprehensive example follows:
During the term of this agreement, farmee shall provide the following
minimum insurance coverage:
(1) Worker’s Compensation Insurance in accordance with the laws
of the State of Texas;
(2) Employer’s Liability Insurance, with limits of not less than
$500,000 per accident;
(3) Comprehensive General Liability Insurance including
contractual liability coverage insuring the indemnity agreement
in this agreement with limits of not less than $500,000 for
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reviewed, however, contained no insurance provisions. When the farmout
agreement does not impose an obligation upon the farmee to provide insurance, the operating agreement may. 440 Article VII.G. of the 1982 Model
Form Operating Agreement requires the operator to provide insurance for
the joint account of the parties.441 Two problems exist with the provision,
however. First, article VII.G. refers to an exhibit, which may not include all
the desired coverages or amounts of coverages.442 Second, the operating
agreement may not take effect at least until the farmee has earned its
interest and perhaps until payout triggers the farmor’s conversion right. 443 If
the farmor relies upon the operating agreement to provide for insurance
coverage, care must be taken that the operating agreement will be effective
bodily injury, sickness or death in any one occurrence and
$500,00 for loss of or damage to property in any one
occurrence; and
(4) Comprehensive Automobile Liability Insurance covering all
vehicles used by farmee, with minimum limits of $500,000
applicable to bodily injury, sickness or death in any one
occurrence and $500,000 for loss of or damage to property in
any occurrence.
For liabilities assumed hereunder by farmee its insurance shall be endorsed to
provide that the underwriters waive subrogation against farmor and its agents
and employees. Prior to the commencement of drilling operations, farmee shall
furnish farmor with evidence of the required coverage. Any assignee of farmee
shall comply with these requirements. Such evidence shall be furnished to
farmor at [insert address] and shall identify the Contract Acreage.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 346–51.
441. Art. VII.G. of the 1982 A.A.P.L.-610 Model Form Operating Agreement (Kraftbilt,
Tulsa) provides:
At all times while operations are conducted hereunder, Operator shall
comply with the workmen’s compensation law of the state where the operations
are being conducted; provided, however, that Operator may be a self-insurer for
liability under said compensation laws in which event the only charge that shall
be made to the joint account shall be as provided in Exhibit “C.” Operator shall
also carry or provide insurance for the benefit of the joint account of the parties
as outlined in Exhibit “D”, attached to and made a part hereof. Operator shall
require all contractors engaged in work on or for the Contract Area to comply
with the workmen’s compensation law of the state where the operations are being conducted and to maintain such other insurance as Operator may require.
In the event automobile public liability insurance is specified in said Exhibit
“D”, or subsequently receives the approval of the parties, no direct charge shall
be made by Operator for premiums paid for such insurance for Operator’s
automotive equipment.
442. Id.
443. See supra text accompanying note 349.
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during all operations under the farmout.444 The preferable approach is for
the farmout to contain its own insurance provisions.445
Unfortunately, providing for insurance coverage in the farmout is not a
cure-all either. First, the farmor must ensure that the farmee actually obtains
and maintains the required coverage. The farmor can do this in a variety of
ways, including itself holding the policy and paying the premiums. Second,
an insurance policy is no better than the coverage provided, and many
policies specifically exclude or limit coverage for risks such as
environmental pollution and blowout. Finally, the obligation to defend
imposed by an insurance policy extends only to those designated as insured
parties. 446
c) Indemnification Provisions
Because of the risk of liability inherent in drilling arrangements and the
uncertain protection of insurance, most farmout agreements contain provisions requiring the farmee to indemnify the farmor against liability. 447 Less
often, the agreement will include an agreement of the farmor to indemnify
the farmee. Of course, any indemnification is no better than the resources of
the party offering it.
444. Arguably, the insurance provisions of article VII.G. of the 1982 AAPL Model Form
Operating Agreement are inconsistent with a typical agreement to transfer farmout, because
the interests of the parties under the farmout are dissimilar from those of the operator and
nonoperators under the operating agreement.
445. See, e.g., the second example supra note 439.
446. See Texaco, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem., 453 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (E.D.
Okla. 1978). In Texaco Judge Joseph B. Morris ruled that an insurance company was not
required to defend a claim against Texaco as a result of an explosion at a gas station because
the policy in question covered the gasoline transporter and did not name Texaco. Id. at 1112.
The court rejected the contention that the transporter was the agent of Texaco on the grounds
that Texaco and the transporter had stipulated to the contrary. Id. at 1113. While the court
specifically reserved the issues of liability and indemnity under the insurance policy, the
case stands as a warning to farmors, and all nonoperators, because farmout agreements, and
operating agreements, usually disclaim an agency relationship. One can deal with the
problem, of course, by obtaining an endorsement to the policy. For a hair-raising discussion
of the limits of liability insurance, see Boigan, supra note 430.
447. For example:
Maintenance by farmee of said insurance is in no manner to be considered a
limitation of the indemnities set out herein. To the extent allowed by law,
farmee shall indemnify and hold farmor harmless from and against any and all
claims for damages for every kind to persons or property arising out of or in
connection with farmee’s operations on the lease, including claims based on
acts of farmee’s contractors, successors, and assigns, except as to any liability
arising out of operations and/or actions of the farmor . . . .
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There is good reason for cross-indemnification. The greater risk is that
the farmor will be targeted in a suit brought as a result of the farmee’s
actions, since the farmee controls the drilling operations. The farmor will
generally have representatives at the well site, however, and their
negligence may expose the farmee to liability.
A point to examine closely is whether the indemnification provision
purports to indemnify the parties from their own negligence. The farmor
may insert a provision totally shifting risk even for its own negligence.448
More likely, the parties will agree to a “knock-for-knock” provision making
each responsible for its own employees, contractors, or subcontractors
regardless of negligence. 449 Or, the farmor may convince the farmee that it
448. For language that specifically excludes the operations or actions of the farmor from
the indemnity, see supra note 447. The following provision, taken from a drilling contract, is
not so limited. In fact, it specifically provides that the contractor will indemnify the company
against claims of “the Company’s employees” . . . and damages to “property of the Company” including those “arising out of the sole or concurrent negligence of the Company”:
Contractor agrees to protect, defend, indemnify and hold the Company, its
employees, directors, officers, free and harmless from and against any and all
losses, claims, liens, demands and causes of action of every kind and character
and costs thereof including without limitation judgments, penalties, interest,
court costs and any legal fees incurred by the Company in defense of same
(including attorneys fees incurred in enforcing this indemnity), arising in favor
of any party, including, without limitation governmental agencies, Contractor’s
employees, the Company’s employees, or any third party, on account of claims,
liens, demands, debts, personal injuries, death, damage to property including
property of the Company, and all other claims of any character, which arise out
of, result from or are in any way connected with Contractor’s work or its
acts . . . including losses, claims, liens, demands and causes of action of every
kind and character arising out of the sole or concurrent negligence of the
Company to the full extent such indemnification is permitted by the applicable
law. Contractor further agrees to investigate, handle, respond to, provide
defense for and defend any claims or suits at its sole expense and agrees to bear
all costs and expenses related thereto . . . .
449. An example of a knock-for-knock indemnity provision, taken from the American
Petroleum Institute’s Model Form Drilling Contract 4C1 (1st ed. Feb. 1983) follows:
11.3 Contractor agrees to protect, defend, indemnify, and save Operator, its
joint owners’ and their respective officers, directors, and employees harmless
from and against all claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind and
character, without limit and without regard to the cause or causes thereof or the
negligence of any party or parties, arising in connection herewith in favor of
Contractor’s employees or Contractor’s subcontractors or their employees, on
account of bodily injury, death, or damage to property. If it is judicially determined that the monetary limits of insurance required hereunder or of the indemnities voluntarily and mutually assumed under Subparagraph 11.3 (which
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should accept a modified knock-for-knock provision making the farmee
responsible for the negligence of the farmor’s contractors and
subcontractors as well as its own, on the theory that the farmee is in control
of wellsite operations and therefore responsible for safety.
Those drafting or analyzing indemnification provisions should be aware
that state statutes may limit their effect. Several states, including Texas,
have enacted anti-indemnity statutes that void agreements to the extent that
they indemnify a party for its negligence or that of its employees, contractors, or agents. 450 The policy of such legislation apparently is to redress the
Contractor and Operator hereby agree will be supported either by available liability insurance, under which the insurer has no right of subrogation against the
indemnitees, or voluntarily self-insured in part or whole) exceed the maximum
limits permitted under applicable law, it is agreed that said insurance requirements or indemnities shall automatically be amended to conform to the maximum monetary limits permitted under such law.
11.4 Operator agrees to protect, defend, indemnify, and save Contractor and
its officers, directors, employees and joint owners harmless from and against all
claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind and character, without
limit and without regard to the cause or causes thereof or the negligence of any
party or parties arising in connection herewith in favor of Operator’s employees
or Operator’s contractors or their employees, other than those parties identified
in Subparagraph 11.3, on account of bodily injury, death, or damage to
property. If it is judicially determined that the monetary limits of insurance
required hereunder or of the indemnities voluntarily and mutually assumed
under Subparagraph 11.4 (which Contractor and Operator hereby agree will be
supported either by available liability insurance, under which the insurer has no
right of subrogation against the indemnitees, or voluntarily self-insured in part
or whole) exceed the maximum limits permitted under applicable law, it is
agreed that said insurance requirements or indemnities shall automatically be
amended to conform to the maximum monetary limits permitted under such
law.
450. A discussion of the Texas and Louisiana laws is found at Tade, The Texas and
Louisiana Anti-Indemnity Statutes as Applied to Oil and Gas Industry Offshore Contracts,
24 HOUS. L. REV. 665 (1987). The statutes include CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782 (West Supp.
1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
691.991 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-5-41 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2
(1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-324 (McKinney 1987); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 127.001.008 (Vernon 1986); WYO. STAT. § 30-1-131 (Supp. 1980). Section 127.003
of the Texas statute provides in part that:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement
pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water, or to a mine for a mineral is void and
unenforceable if it purports to indemnify a person against loss or liability for
damage that:
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inequality of bargaining power that may force a contractor to accept
onerous indemnification terms.
Anti-indemnification statutes generally merely void offending
provisions. Providing for prohibited indemnification carries no penalty
other than limiting the offending provision. 451 Furthermore, some antiindemnification statutes, like the Texas statute,452 have an exception that
permits indemnification for one’s own negligence to the extent that
insurance supports the indemnity. Thus, broad indemnity provisions should
continue to be a priority for each party.
10. Regulatory Provisions
Some farmouts, particularly those drafted in recent years, include lengthy
provisions addressing regulatory matters such as compliance with environmental law, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations,
conservation regulations, or securities laws. These provisions, typically
regarded as boilerplate by the parties, become important in assigning
responsibility or liability.

(1) is caused by or results from the sole or concurrent negligence of the
indemnitee, his agent or employee, or an individual contractor responsible
to the indemnitee . . . .
451. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.003 (Vernon 1986). This provision is
contrary to the general rule in Texas, as well as in most other states. Generally, indemnification against one’s own negligence is not contrary to public policy so long as the agreement
of the parties is clear. See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987). In
Ethyl Corp. the Texas Supreme Court adopted the “express negligence doctrine,” which
requires the intent of the parties to indemnify the indemnitee from the consequences of its
own negligence to be “specifically stated within the four corners of the contract” in order to
be effective. Id. at 708. But see Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 784 F.2d 1320, 1322 (effect of
Louisiana anti-indemnity statute limited to nullifying indemnity for indemnitee’s own
negligence or fault), vacated, 792 F.2d 56, certified to La. S. Ct., 794 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.
1986).
452. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.005(a) (Vernon 1986) provides that the
anti-indemnity provisions do not apply “to any agreement that provides for indemnity with
respect to claims for personal injury or death to the indemnitor’s employees or agents or the
employees or agents of the indemnitor's subcontractors” if the indemnity is supported by
insurance. The section provides, however, that “[t]he amount of insurance required may not
exceed 12 times the state’s basic limits for personal injury, as approved by the State Board
of Insurance in accordance with Article 5.15, Insurance Code.” Id. § 127.005(c). On this
basis, the maximum enforceable indemnity under § 127.005, as of the time this Article is
written, was $300,000.
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a) Environmental Regulations
One of the most common regulatory provisions in farmout agreements
provides that the farmee agrees to comply with all applicable environmental
regulations. Such a regulatory clause may be short 453 or long. 454 An
environmental compliance clause serves two major purposes. First, it
should put the farmee on notice of environmental regulations of concern. Of
course, the farmor should disclose any specific concerns. Likewise, counsel
for a farmee who encounters an environmental compliance clause should
inquire specifically whether the farmor is aware of particular potential
problems. A second function of an environmental compliance clause is to
provide clear notice of the applicability of the agreement’s indemnification
provisions.
453. A short version of an environmental compliance clause follows:
You recognize that one of the primary concerns of the oil industry is
compliance with anti-pollution provisions of the environmental regulations.
One of the principal considerations of this contract, without which it would not
have been made by Farmor, is your agreement, evidenced by your execution
hereof, to comply with all Federal, State, and local laws and regulations
concerned with prevention and/or control of pollution. You now and hereafter
shall hold Farmor harmless from any claims, actions or causes instituted and/or
damages or penalties incurred for your failure to timely comply therewith.
454. An example of a more elaborate environmental compliance clause follows:
Operator agrees to comply with the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 1857) and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251) when conducting
operations involving nonexempt contracts. In all nonexempt contracts with
subcontractors, Operator shall require:
(1) No facility to be utilized by Subcontractor in the performance of this
contract with Operator is listed on the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) List of Violating Facilities. See Executive Order No. 11738 of
September 12, 1973, and 40 C.F.R. § 15.20.
(2) Prompt written notification shall be given by Subcontractor to Operator of
any communication indicating that any such facility is under consideration
to be included on the EPA List of Violating Facilities.
(3) Subcontractor shall comply with all requirements of Section 114 of the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 1857) and Section 308 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251), relating to inspection, monitoring, entry, reports, and information, as well as all other requirements
specified in these Sections, and all regulations and guidelines issued
thereunder.
(4) The foregoing criteria and requirements shall be included in all of Subcontractor’s nonexempt subcontractors, and Subcontractor shall take such
action as the Government may direct as a means of enforcing such
provisions. See 40 C.F.R. § 15.4 & 5.
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b) Equal Employment Opportunity Clause
Equal employment opportunity compliance clauses now frequently
appear in farmout agreements, particularly those drafted by counsel for
large corporations. Federal law may well require such provisions.455 Even if
not required, however, they are helpful because they put the farmee on
notice and clarify responsibility.
c) Compliance with Conservation Laws
Some farmout agreements state specifically that the farmee must comply
with all conservation laws and rules. Conservation compliance language
probably mirrors the expectation of the parties to the farmout agreement.
After all, the farmee has the responsibility for conducting drilling and
paying drilling costs. It may also remind the farmee that it cannot count on
the farmor to do the things that are usually done before a well is drilled,
such as check and clear title. When a conservation compliance clause is
used in an agreement that makes absolute performance the standard of
performance, however, failure to comply with its terms may be cause for
termination of the farmee’s rights.
d) Securities Regulation
Some attorneys counsel that farmout agreements should include an
administrative clause addressing securities regulation to obtain the farmee’s
representation and warranty that it is a “sophisticated investor” and that it
will comply with the requirements of securities laws in its dealings with
farmed-out leases. While such bootstrapping techniques do not guarantee
compliance, they put the parties on notice of potential problems and make
clearer the responsibility for taking action to comply with applicable securities regulations.

455. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act defines an employer as a person engaged in
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
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e) Others
The number and length of miscellaneous administrative provisions
increase as federal and state legislative branches work. A review of farmout
agreements collected from major oil companies revealed that additional
regulatory compliance clauses had obviously been added from time to time
to cover a variety of regulatory concerns, including compliance with the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 456 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 457
veterans preferences, and affirmative action plans, to note only a few.458
11. Dealing with Bankruptcy
The possibility that one’s business partners will go bankrupt must enter
into the planning of anyone active in the oil and gas industry. When
bankruptcy occurs before the drilling of the earning well or before the
delivery and recording of the earned assignment, the Bankruptcy Code may
undo what the farmee and the armor have sought to accomplish in their
agreement.
The farmor whose farmee files for bankruptcy is very likely to fail to
achieve whatever purpose motivated it to make the agreement. While a
farmee’s bankruptcy trustee may drill under a farmout agreement, more
likely nothing will happen until the property subject to the farmout has been
tied up in bankruptcy proceedings for so long that it is too late for the
farmor to drill itself or to find someone else to perform.

456. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (1982).
457. Id. §§ 701–796(i).
458. As this manuscript was being prepared for the printer, the industry began using a
new kind of regulatory clause in farmouts, growing out of FERC Order No. 500, 52 Fed.
Reg. 30,334 (Aug. 14, 1987). Order No. 500 was adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to address the plight of pipelines confronted with take-or-pay
liabilities. It established an interim rule requiring that a producer of natural gas that wished
to use open-access transportation under FERC’s rules had to offer to credit gas transported
against the transporting pipeline’s take-or-pay obligations under pre-June 23, 1987, gas
contracts on a volumetric basis. Order No. 500 also required that the offers to credit come
from the owner of the lease as of June 23, 1987, even though the lease was transferred
thereafter. Thus, a farmor might be required to offer credits against its take-or-pay claims
against a pipeline so that its farmee could transport gas for the farmee’s account. If the
farmor refused, the farmee might find itself unable to get its gas to market. Overnight,
clauses clarifying the rights of the farmor and farmee began to appear in farmout
agreements. Generally, such clauses stated either (1) that the farmor would offer take-or-pay
credits, or (2) that the farmor would not offer such credits and specifically put the farmee on
notice of its risk.
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The farmee’s position is even worse. If its farmor goes bankrupt while
the farmee is conducting drilling operations under a farmout that makes
drilling an option of the farmee, the farmee may face the hard choice of
either walking away from its expensive hole in the ground or finishing its
operations and confronting the claim of the bankruptcy trustee that he can
reject the farmout agreement, and the farmee’s earned right. If the farmout
agreement makes drilling an obligation, the farmee must consider the
possibility that the bankruptcy trustee will reject the contract and the
interest earned by the farmee, even if the farmout well is drilled.
Two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are especially troublesome.
First, section 544 gives a bankruptcy trustee power to avoid any transfer or
obligation voidable by a bona fide purchaser. 459 These so-called “strongarm” powers probably empower a bankruptcy trustee to set aside any
unrecorded transaction. Thus, the trustee may avoid both farmout
agreements structured as contracts to assign after performance by the
farmee and assignments actually made but not recorded when the
bankruptcy proceedings are filed.
Section 541(d) imposes possible limits upon the strong-arm powers of
the bankruptcy trustee. Section 541(d) limits the interest acquired by the
trustee in property in which the debtor owns only a legal interest rather than
an equitable interest to the legal interest.460 The legislative history suggests,
however, that the intent of Congress may have been to protect only mortgages by section 541(d), and the case law is inconclusive. 461
459. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (Supp. Ill 1985) provides that:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard
to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by
the debtor that is voidable by . . . a bona fide purchaser of real property, other
than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has
perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether
or not such a purchaser exists.
460. Id. § 541(d) provides in part:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only
legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real
property . . . sold by the debtor but as to which the debtor retains legal title to
service or supervise the servicing of such mortgage . . . becomes property of the
estate . . . only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not
to the extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not
hold.
461. See Davis, Unassigned Oil and Gas Interest in Bankruptcy, 22 TULSA L.J. 325, 329–
34 (1987).
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The parties can avoid the problem presented by section 544 by the
relatively simple but cumbersome device of recording the farmout
agreement. 462 Farmout agreements are almost never executed with the
formalities required for recording, however. In addition, whatever their
form, farmout agreements may not qualify as recordable instruments in the
eyes of some recording officers. Finally, the recording fees for an extensive
farmout agreement are high, and many farmors and farmees will prefer to
take the risk of bankruptcy of the other rather than have the terms of their
business deal spread on the record. The parties will more likely accept the
recording of a memorandum of the farmout agreement. Memorandum
filings are not generally done, but one commentator has urged that they
become the norm and provided forms to use to do so. 463
The parties cannot so easily avoid section 365, the second provision of
the Bankruptcy Code that is likely to apply. Section 365 gives a bankruptcy
trustee authority to accept or reject “any executory contract of the
debtor.” 464 If a farmout agreement is “executory,” the trustee may reject the
agreement, leaving the farmee with a successful drilling venture, but a
financial disaster.465 The precise meaning of “executory” is unclear. The
462. See infra text accompanying notes 477–81.
463. A. DERMAN PROTECTING OIL AND GAS LIEN AND SECURITY INTERESTS (A.B.A. Sec.
Nat. Res. L. Monograph Series No. 6, 1987). While this monograph primarily analyzes
memorandum filings for operating agreements, it also addresses the use of memorandum
filings for farmout agreements. Id. It notes that the use of memorandum filings may also
perfect interests under the Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
464. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985).
465. Disaster may be too strong a term. Arguably, § 365(i)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which permits a purchaser in possession under a contract “for the sale of real property” to
obtain title notwithstanding the trustee’s rejection of the contract, will protect the farmee in
this situation. Whether a farmout agreement is a contract subject to § 365(i)(l) is not clear,
however. The argument appears particularly questionable in states like Oklahoma and
Kansas, in which oil and gas leases are not clearly “real estate.” See Hinds v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699–700 (Okla. 1979) (oil and gas leases create interest in
realty, but interest created is personal property, not real property, interest); see also In re J.H.
Land & Cattle Co., 8 Bankr. 237, 239 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (applying Kansas law that oil and
gas lease is personal property in nature of profit à prendre to conclude that bankruptcy
trustee possessed authority to reject lease as executory contract). In In re Heston Oil Co., 69
Bankr. 34, 36 (N.D. Okla. 1986), however, a U.S. district court rejected the holding of J.H.
Land & Cattle Co., ruling that an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma creates a profit à prendre
and an estate in real property in the nature of a fee interest and is not executory since it has
been fully performed by the lessor. Even if § 365(i)(l) does not apply, the farmee would be
able to assert a nonadministrative claim for damages under §§ 501 and 502. 11 U.S.C. §§
501, 502 (1982 & Supp. HI 1985). Still, the farmee that becomes entangled in the
bankruptcy proceedings of its farmor is likely to lose the benefit of the risk it took.
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seminal law journal article on the subject has suggested it should mean
contracts “so far unperformed that the failure of either to perform would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”466 The
Tenth Circuit has defined “executory,” however, as meaning that “neither
party [has] completely performed and the obligations of each [remain]
complex.” 467 By either definition, however, the typical agreement to
transfer farmout structure should be subject to the powers of the trustee
under section 365, until the farmee has drilled the earning well, and perhaps
until the assignment is actually made. 468
To avoid the application of section 365 the parties must structure the
farmout agreement to conditionally assign the farmee’s interest when the
agreement is signed or before drilling is commenced, rather than after the
well is drilled. Even this may not be enough, however. The conditions of
the assignment (e.g., reversion upon failure to drill or reversion of deep
rights after drilling) may be enough to keep the contract executory, since
the parties will have to file title-clearing releases. 469 In addition, the trustee
may consider a conditional assignment of the farmee’s interest a
“fraudulent” transfer that the trustee may set aside under section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 548(a)(2) gives the trustee authority to avoid
transfers made within a year before the filing of bankruptcy for less than the
reasonable equivalent sale of the property transferred when the debtor was
either insolvent when the transfer took place or became insolvent as a
result. 470 If the farmout agreement is of the typical “option to drill” variety,
466. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
(1973).
467. Workman v. Harrison, 282 F.2d 693, 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068
(1973).
468. Cf. Davis, supra note 461, at 336–40 (discusses defining executory contract). See
also Pearce, Keeping Oil and Gas Leases Alive: A Review of Both the Mineral Lessee’s
Obligations and Possible Ways to Keep the Lease in Effect, 1986 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
SPECIAL INSTITUTE ON HARD TIMES IN THE MINERALS INDUSTRY 8-54.
469. Some bankruptcy cases suggest that a contract is executory even though the only act
remaining to be accomplished under the purchase agreement is the delivery of the deed. See
Davis, supra note 461, at 339. But see the reasoning of the court in In re Heston Oil Co., 69
Bankr. 34, 36 (N.D. Okla. 1986). Is making an assignment any more onerous that defending
title?
470. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985) provides in part:
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . that was made or incurred on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily—. . . .
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

396

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

there is a strong argument that consideration for the transfer was
inadequate, since the farmee promised to do nothing. 471 The inadequate
consideration argument is also available when the assignment is
conditional; the farmee has no binding obligation. The only sure way of
avoiding treatment of the farmout agreement as an executory contract under
section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is to couple the advance assignment of
the farmee’s interest with a binding obligation to drill by the farmee, a
structure that will often not fit the business needs of the parties.472
The farmor and the farmee may well choose to take the risk of
bankruptcy of one of the parties and the intervention of the bankruptcy
courts in structuring farmout agreements. Pre- and post-contract
administration can lessen the risks to some degree, however. The financial
stability of one’s business partners is a primary consideration in whether to
make a deal. Once the contract is executed, the farmee, which has the
obligation to pay drilling costs and thus more to lose, should continue to
monitor the fortunes of the farmor and avoid spending money or entering
into binding contracts when the farmor’s finances look shaky.
12. Terms of the Assignment
Few farmout agreements are recorded. Once an agreement has been fully
performed, however, the farmee generally receives a recordable assignment
of interest. When this structure is followed, it is important that the terms of
the farmout agreement and the terms of the assignment not conflict, or a
dispute may arise as to which prevails. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stack 473
illustrates this problem. In Stack the assignment followed the farmout
agreement by a day, before the drilling of either of the two required wells.
Subsequently, Stack, the farmee, refused to assign Phillips the overriding
royalties on lease extensions and renewal leases that were required by the
farmout, but not mentioned in the assignment. Stack contended that the
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction or was about to engage
in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining
with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts
that would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts
matured.
471. Hardwick, supra note 226, at 6-22.
472. Id. at 6-21.
473. 231 So. 2d 475 (Miss. 1969).
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agreement had merged into the assignment, or that the assignment had
superseded the agreement. The Mississippi Supreme Court focused upon
Stack’s admission that he had been obligated to drill the two wells provided
for by the farmout even though the assignment did not mention that requirement. 474 The court concluded that the intent of the parties was that the two
instruments together constituted the contract between the parties.475
The Stack result is not a foregone conclusion in similar fact situations,
because it turned upon the Mississippi court’s finding of the intent of the
parties. Another court confronted with similar facts might well mechanically apply the rules of merger to conclude that the terms of the assignment
prevail in the event of conflict. Both the farmor and the farmee, therefore,
should pay close attention to the terms of the assignment to be certain that
they are correct and complete. In the alternative, incorporating the terms of
the assignment in an attached appendix can minimize the possibilities of
conflict. Thus, the farmout agreement will provide merely that the
assignment will be made “on the terms and conditions set forth” in the
appendix. 476
13. Recording
As discussed above, the parties do not usually record farmout
agreements. They probably should. Other than the administrative expense
that may be involved for the farmor to clear the record if the farmee fails to
perform, which the farmor can deal with by having the farmee execute
releases or reconveyances when the farmout is executed, and which at worst
is no more burdensome than the routine land work of clearing title of old
leases, there really is no good reason not to record the farmout or a
memorandum of it. 477
Recording the farmout agreement does not prejudice the farmor.
Whether or not the parties record the farmout agreement, the farmor’s
leasehold interest is likely to be subject to mechanics’ and materialmen’s

474. Id. at 481.
475. Id. at 482.
476. See supra note 126.
477. See the discussion of memorandum filing at A. DERMAN, supra note 463;
Morgenthaler, Planning Ahead fora Co-Participant’s Bankruptcy: A Stitch in Time, 32
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-1, 13-6 to -20 (1986). A simple statement that “upon request
of any party, the parties hereto shall execute and acknowledge a memorandum of this
Agreement in recordable form” can provide authority to file a memorandum. The parties
could also execute a memorandum at the signing of the farmout.
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liens if the farmee fails to pay its bills. 478 A recorded agreement, however,
may save the farmor’s retained nonparticipating interest. 479
Recording is particularly important to the farmee. One can argue that the
farmee’s interest ought not to require recording for protection because the
practice of not recording farmouts is so well established that third parties
should be placed on inquiry notice of the possibility of their existence. One
may assert that the farmee’s possession of the property under a farmout
agreement should put others on notice of its claims. These arguments are
tenuous and dependent upon particular facts, however.480 The surest way
for the farmee to protect its rights is by recording. In many states, recording
puts third parties on notice of the provisions of unrecorded agreements
referred to in the recorded instrument, as well as of the terms on the
record. 481
V. Conclusion
The review of more than one hundred example farmout agreements, and
discussions with dozens of lawyers incident to the preparation of this
Article, have largely confirmed the author’s personal preconceptions about
farmout agreements. First, the structure of farmout agreements is very much
a function of tax rules. Farmout agreements are business agreements
478. See Superior Oil Co. v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718, 720–23 (1951);
Zone Oil & Gas Co. v. Dudley & Heath Drilling Co., 474 P.2d 395, 397–99 (Okla. 1970).
Cf. Texon Energy Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 733 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, no writ), holding a farmor liable for drilling costs where the farmor had
approved an authorization for expenditure and executed an operating agreement. But see
Dews v. Halliburton Indus., Inc., 708 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Ark. 1986), holding that a farmor is not
liable either for legal or equitable liens upon the leasehold as a result of a farmee’s default.
479. See Zone Oil & Gas Co. v. Dudley & Heath Drilling Co., 474 P.2d 395, 399 (Okla.
1970). In Zone the court refused even to consider the argument that Zone’s production
payment was not subject to the lien because the parties had not recorded the conveyance in
which the payment was reserved. Id.
480. See O’Kane v. Walker, 561 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1977). In O’Kane the court
held that a conveyance for a low, but not unreasonably low, price was not sufficient to put
the purchaser on inquiry notice. Id. The case also contains an excellent discussion of when
inquiry notice is given. Id. at 208–09; see also Hill, Title Repositories, Recording, and
Constructive Notice, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 469, 477 (1983).
481. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. 1982).
In Gulf Oil Corp. the court held that an assignment gave notice not only of the operating
agreement referred to in the assignment, but also to farmout agreements referred to in the
operating agreement. Id.; see also Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d
828, 830 (10th Cir. 1986) (farmee bound by terms of operating agreement referred to in its
farmout agreement).
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entered into by people who seek to make a profit, and compliance with the
tax rules often makes the difference between profit and loss in our society.
All farmout agreements reviewed were obviously drafted with an eye to
giving the farmee the full benefit of the intangible drilling cost deduction.
Concern with other tax issues was also apparent.
Second, although the tax structure of farmout agreements is very much
the same, their substantive provisions vary widely. In part, the difference in
substantive provisions is reflexive; once a company has been burned by a
particular problem, it drafts to avoid it in the future. In part, also, the wide
variety of substantive provisions in farmout agreements reflects the vitality
of American businessmen and their lawyers. “Dealmaking” is often every
bit as important in whether or not a venture is profitable for both of the
parties as the underlying value of the properties farmed out. The agreements
reviewed reflected the high creativity index of the oil and gas industry.
Finally, however, farmout agreements are susceptible to orderly analysis,
and not enough attention is given to that analysis. Understanding the
purposes that may lead the farmor or the farmee to enter into a farmout
agreement, the essential provisions that the agreement must contain to
achieve those goals, and the alternatives available to the draftsman are the
keys to successfully preparing or analyzing a farmout agreement. The goals
of each of the parties will determine how the agreement will be put together
and what provisions will be emphasized. The essential provisions of an
agreement are those without which any farmout agreement will be
incomplete. Drafting alternatives help keep the agreement flexible and
responsive to the parties’ needs.
The aim of this Article has been to develop an analysis of the purposes
and essential considerations of a farmout, and to collect alternative
provisions that may be of use to the draftsman. In a sense, this Article is
unfinished. It will never be finished, because only the creativity of
businessmen and their lawyers limits the variety of provisions that may be
included in a farmout agreement.
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